A STUDY OF EARLY BUDDHIST ETHICS

IN COMPARISON WITH CLASSICAL CONFUCIANIST ETHICS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore early Buddhist ethics in comparison with classical Confucianist ethics and to show similarities. The study suggests that the popular belief that the two ethical systems are radically different from each other needs to be reconsidered. When a focus is given to the development, transformation, and realization of the self, a similar framework (except the metaphysical groundworks of morals) is revealed in the two ethical systems. Furthermore, this study intends to reject the popular thesis: early Buddhism is only self-liberation-concerned soteriology and classical Confucianism is only society-concerned thought requiring self-effacement.

My understanding of the core virtue of self-transformation is as compassion (*karuṇā*) in early Buddhism and benevolence (*jen*) in classical Confucianism. So this study is focused on the analysis of compassion and benevolence by examining their metaphysical grounds, their functional mechanisms, their applications, and their meta-ethical nature.

The metaphysical groundworks of morals (and so of the virtues of compassion and benevolence) are explained in terms of the rebirth and kamma theory, and the theory of Mandate of Heaven. For a person to develop and achieve these core virtues, this study shows the significant role of self-restraint or self-overcoming, the principle of extension from near to far, self-oriented motivation for the core virtue, both-regarding position (self-regarding and other-regarding), and the important role of both sympathetic feeling and reason. In the domain of social interaction, compassion and benevolence appear in the area

of education and politics as tools for achieving happiness for both oneself and others. In politics, the paradigmatic model is adopted: a ruler as an embodiment of the virtue rules a country by being a moral example to the people.

The analysis of the core virtues in terms of moral objective shows the inseparability of factual knowledge from moral practice, the universal acceptability of the virtue, and the possibility of maintaining objectivity by taking both-regarding action.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A	*Aṅguttara Nikāya*
D	*Digha Nikāya*
Dhp	*Dhammapada*
GS	*The Book of Gradual Sayings* (tr. of *Aāguttara Nikāya*)
KS	*The Book of Kindred sayings* (tr. of *Saṁyutta Nikāya*)
M	*Mijjhima Nikāya*
MLS	*The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings* (tr. of *Majjhima Nikāya*)
S	*Saṁyutta Nikāya*
Sn	*Sutta-nipāta*
Thag	*Theragāthā*
Thig	*Therigātha*

INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to interpret and compare early Buddhist ethics with classical Confucianist ethics from the perspective of self-transformation.[1] The early Buddhist philosophical and moral tradition is strikingly different from that of classical Confucianism. Since early Buddhism and classical Confucianism developed their own unique traditions in different cultural settings, philosophical and moral differences are inevitable. However, we also find significant similarities in these different paradigms of thought. These similarities are revealed when one focuses on the conceptions of self-transformation.

The beginning of the similarities seems to originate in a shared position. The major concern of both systems is cultivation and development of a desirable character through a

[1] I interpret both ethical systems from the perspective self-transformation. It is one perspective from which one can look at both ethical systems.

The term transformation has been associated with the idea of moral development in psychology. The cognitive theories of Piaget and Kohlberg contain the notion of transformative development. Especially, Kohlberg's theory of moral development emphasizes a transformative idea at every stage. For him, each succeeding stage transforms the previous one into a higher reorganization. He uses the notion of transformation in the concrete process. In his theory, the transformation process is clearly specified as one that is taking place in stages.

The usage of the term "transformation" in the description of the concrete process of moral development seems to limit some of its applications. When one sees the term transformation used in the context of morals, one expects to see a specific developmental process. I do not use this term in this sense. My purpose is not to show the stages of moral development or the specified contents of self-transformation itself in both systems. In fact, it is not possible to show moral development in terms of perceived stages. In Buddhism and Confucianism, moral transformation of the self is not specified in terms of stages. The paradigm taken from the treatment of physical ill-health may not function in the context of moral disease. The transformation does not depend primarily on the previous stage in a causal chain. It involves many factors, past and present, social and cultural, so that the self is developed in interactions with these factors in the direction of producing a morally healthy person. This is the concept of transformation that will be adopted in the analysis of ethics of early Buddhism in comparison with classical Confucianism.

process of transforming oneself. Perhaps, one may call this "character building ethics." This does not imply a lack of concern about social ethics, since building a good character necessarily involves interaction with others, concern about others, and social engagement. Furthermore, the similarities are based on commonalities that are shared, and on particularities, in both systems of ethics. The co-existence of commonalities and particularities leads me to believe that in thought and morals, and in reasoning and sentiment we have a commonly shared universality that bridges the gaps between different cultures and times. Commonality and particularity, or universality and plurality, seem to be the ground of comparison in thought and ethics as well.

In the two ethical systems, self-transformation is perceived as a constant and challenging task. It is constant because it is achieved not at one moment, but through gradually accumulated effort. It is challenging because changes of situation of the transforming person, and interactions with others are involved. The core task of self-transformation, embodying compassion/benevolence, is to follow the path toward realization of the highest moral goal, freedom or happiness (***nibbāna/tao)*** of the self and others. This virtue cannot be perfectly accomplished by pursuing it for oneself. This means that an emphasis on transformation only of oneself, will involve misinterpretation of both systems of ethics. In this way, the following common interpretations will be found lacking: (1) Early Buddhist ethics is concerned about liberating the self alone and is less concerned about others. (2) Classical Confucianist ethics is concerned about happiness of collective members and is less concerned about individual happiness.

In comparison, we might discuss all and sundry similarities and differences indiscriminately. Focusing on self-transformation will allow us to limit the scope of comparison. From this perspective, similarities between the two systems will emerge regarding self-transformative ideas, methods, and modes of realization. However, a consideration of the reasons for self-transformation, and of the metaphysical backgrounds of the two moral systems, will reveal differences of between the two traditions. In this context, the main goals of this study can be addressed: From the perspective of self-transformation, early Buddhist ethics shows overall similarities in comparison with classical Confucianism in spite of major differences between the groundworks of their respective metaphysics of morals. On the other hand, this study aims to show that "compassion ***(karuṇa)***" is a core virtue of early Buddhist ethics that compares with the core virtue of classical Confucianism, benevolence (*jen*).[2] I maintain that true realization of compassion/benevolence is indispensable for the highest moral achievement of the self and others.

To sum up: Chapter one will be a preliminary study. In order to understand fully the two ethical traditions, their social milieu and views on human nature need to be sketched. In chapter two, the metaphysics of morals of the two traditions will be discussed in order to see the theoretical foundations of self-transformative morals. In this chapter, I shall

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[2] *Jen* has been translated into English in various ways: Humanity, human-heartness, benevolence, and so forth. While the first three terms convey only the dispositional quality or status of the virtue *jen*, the fourth, benevolence, conveys more. Benevolence means "disposition to do good and an act of kindness" as well. Benevolence fits better to my interpretaion of *jen*. I understand the classical Confucianist *jen* as a virtue that has two components (dispositional quality and concrete benevolent actions). As Wing-tsit Chan observes, *jen* has the aspect of a state of mind and of an activity, and each aspect is emphasized in The Analects and Mencius respectively. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretaion of *Jen* (Humanity)," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2 (1975): 119.

explain the two different frameworks of the moral ground. In chapter three, I shall discuss the main moral virtue necessary for transformation of the self. Following my claim that a realization of the main moral virtue, that is, compassion/benevolence, is a way of self-transformation, I shall analyze its functional mechanism through a consideration of modern theoretical perspectives. In chapter four, I shall discuss how the main virtue is applied to educational and political institutions. In the last chapter, I shall examine the virtue in the light of the problem of moral objectivity. In this chapter, we will come to understanding of the nature of this virtue, and of the characteristics of the two ethical systems as well. In conclusion, I shall briefly summarize the results of this study. In addition, I shall interpret the moral goal, ***nibbāna/tao,*** in the framework of the two ethical systems and consider the life pattern of the self-transformed person.

As long as we consider the clarification of human thought, and especially ethical thought as one of the tasks of philosophy, the method of comparison suggests itself as an effective tool. The method of comparison taken in this study will help us to clarify the ethical ideas of early Buddhism, and also of classical Confucianism. Furthermore, the comparative method will help us to identify some hidden assumptions, and enable us to understand certain concepts. I shall adopt the method of reviewing early Buddhist texts in a direct comparison with classical Confucianist texts.[3] For the purpose of these comparisons, it will be useful to identify and to analyze equivalent concepts in both systems. Finally, in interpreting the ethics of both systems, I shall apply modern ethical perspectives and modern legal thoughts.

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[3] The scope of the texts will be limited. The ***Pāli Nikāya*** for the early Buddhist texts and The Analects and Mencius for the classical Confucianist texts will be used.

B. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION
OF THE NOTION OF SELF-TRANSFORMATION

As I mentioned, the concept of self-transformation will enable us to sketch and compare the two ethical systems in an appropriate way. In order to show that the notion of self-transformation that provides the framework of this study is acceptable in both ethical systems, it will be necessary first to explore the concept of self-transformation in a more broadly philosophical context.

Since the concept of transformation implies both continuity and change in sameness, the notion of self-transformation raises a philosophical problem. This is the problem of identity and unity, and continuity of the self through transformation. Furthermore, the problem of the sameness and change of the self arises. In other words, two questions need to be asked: (1) Is the self identical diachronically? (2) Can the self carry sameness and change at the same time?

Hume provides a classical theory of self-identity, in which he rejects the idea that the self is continuous and claims that self-identity is just memory or false belief. For him, there is no substantial self. In other words, the identity of person does not involve the identity of substance and is based only on psychological connectedness through perceived mental events. Hume's thesis of the non-substantiality of the self or non-persistency of self-identity (although he acknowledges that he cannot solve the problem of self-identity)[4] does not raise any problems of inconsistency in the early Buddhist and classical

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[4] For Hume does not know how he has to reconcile the two inconsistent principles laid out in perceiving self-identity: (1) Distinct perceptions, as distinct existences, form a whole only by being connected together. (2) The mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. In other words, he cannot solve the question of how the identity of a person is perceived without a faculty that connects all distinct perceptions. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Oxford UP, 1960) 636.

Confucianist position. However, an inconsistent problem arises if we ignore bodily criteria for self-identity since the two traditions value human body in their moral systems.

The objection that Hume ignores bodily criteria was made by Sydney Shoemaker. He points out two sorts of "psychological criteria"of personal identity: (1) similarity of personality, character, and interests and (2) memory. Both can occur together but not all the time. To discuss them, he begins with the former. He argues that it is necessary to use bodily criterion before using similarity of personality. When we observe "one and the same person" over a period of time, we are not depending on merely psychological facts such as similarity of personality, character, and interest. In order to use similarity of personality, we need to use the image of the same body. Observing the same person necessarily involves observing the same body. Therefore, Shoemaker rejects the notion that personal identity is independent of bodily identity. Notice here that Shoemaker is not denying psychological criteria, but on the contrary argues that in order to utilize it at all requires bodily criteria. In other words, bodily criteria have a priority over psychological criteria.[5]

As I have just seen that Shoemaker argues that bodily criteria are more fundamental, and that psychological criteria are secondary, because the latter depends on the former. However, as Terence Penelhum sees it, psychological or memory criteria do not always depend on bodily criteria. As he argues, the dependence goes the other way, because unless people had memories, they could not know past facts and so they could not have knowledge about the past of the body.[6] Indeed, we need to have our own memory or, at least, equivalent information regarding the past of the body in order to identify a person.

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[5] Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (New York: Cornell UP, 1963) 195-97.
[6] Terence Penelhum, "Personal Identity," Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967 ed.) 102-03.

What Penelhum suggests, which Shoemaker misses, is that the psychological and bodily criteria are bound by each other. Each needs the other in its functional mechanism. Therefore, we can say that psychological criteria or memory alone, as Hume argues, cannot be a sufficient criterion of personal identity. It is necessary to use both criteria for personal identity.

This position would not be absurd since "our actual concept of a person is of a psychophysical being."[7] As already implied, this position is not in conflict with a doctrine of the non-substantiality of the self. A person, as a moral being, can be fully transformed in the dimension of a psychophysical actual being without assuming substantiality of the self. A person continues as a psychophysial and moral being. We accept continuity of the self without accepting substantiality of the self. This position presents that of early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. Both systems perceive a person as a psychophysical being that has continued in the past and present time.

However, the notion of the self of early Buddhism and classical Confucianism demands of us a further consideration. If we consider the early Buddhist notion of interdependence of people that is based upon the principle of dependent arising and the classical Cofucianist notion of the inseparable relatedness of the self with others, then any explanation of self-identity in terms only of the individual psychophysical self will not fully reflect the notions of the self of these two systems. The problem of self-identity should involve a consideration of the self as a being that is related to others.

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[7] Penelhum 101.

MacIntyre, who sees the self in the context of history and narrative, rightly stresses the importance of the correlation of the self with others in his conception of selfhood.[8] From such an observation of the correlativity of the self, he develops an account of three important concepts: accountability, narrative and intelligibility.[9] In the perception of selfhood, each of these three concepts are inseparably bound and presuppose the applicability of the two others. For MacIntyre, narrative is organized in a meaningful way over time with the help of accountability and intelligibility. In this way we are able to maintain a unity of narrative. MacIntyre believes that this unity of narrative is necessary for unity of character, and that the latter presupposes personal identity.[10] He does not think that narrative is more fundamental than personal identity.[11] On the contrary, he postulates a sequential order among the unity of narrative, the unity of character, and self-identity. Although for him none of these is more important than the others, we must notice that correlativity of self and others is either assumed or is necessary for personal identity. In fact, he defines the relationship between narrative and personal identity as a mutual presupposition. So, for MacIntyre, the concept of personal identity can never be separated either from the concept of narrative, or from unity of character.

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[8] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1981) 218.

[9] Correlativity provides a basis for accountability for the self and others. I ask others my accountability and others ask me their accountability: "I am part of their story, as they are part of mine" (MacIntyre 218). Asking for and giving accounts constitute narratives. Due to accountability, we are able to connect events into narratives in continuity. Accountability plays a role in constituting narratives with actions in continuation of time. In constituting narratives with actions, we need to make the actions intelligible. So intelligibility is "the conceptual connecting link between the notion of action and that of narrative" (MacIntyre 214).

[10] He writes, "Thus personal identity is just that identity presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of a narrative requires" (MacIntyre 219).

[11] MacIntyre 218.

MacIntyre's argument, which highlights the other-related aspect of self-identity, is significant insofar as it takes into account a crucial element of self-identity that had been ignored in previous theories. Previous theories focused solely on the single individual as a subject, and did not consider the correlation of the self with others. The notions of narrative and of the unity of personhood through narrative, should be taken into account in matters of self-identity. In this way we are better able to explain the notions of self-identity of both the early Buddhist and the classical Confucianist traditions. In both systems, self-identity is perceived in terms of psychophysical being, and also in terms of one's social relations.

Since self-transformation in a moral context does not entail a radical or total change at a single moment, and since, on the contrary, it assumes the coexistence of both sameness and change, a further problem arises. Namely, that of how sameness and change are able to coexist in transforming the self. Both Aristotle and Descartes argue for their compatibility on the basis of the metaphysics of substance. Both of them draw a clear distinction between substance and its attributes. For them, a thing is numerically identical when its substance is unaltered, and qualitatively similar when its qualities remain unchanged.[12] Sameness and change are compatible because a substance remains the same while its qualities change. It is in this way that they argue for the compatibility of sameness and change. Since their argument is based on a sharp distinction between an absolute numerical identity and a relative qualitative similarity, and so is established through the

[12] V. C. Chappell, "Sameness and Change," The Philosophical Review Jul. 1960: 354.

assumption of substance, opponents are easily able to produce a refutation of by attacking this metaphysics of substance.

Now, without depending upon the metaphysics of Descartes and Aristotle, Chappell is able to demonstrate the compatibility of sameness and change. He observes that the word "same" has different senses in ordinary language. According to him, we have two kinds of linguistic expression in use in everyday language: and there are those of reference and description,[13] and they are used for identification and comparison respectively.[14] In most cases, the two usages are separable case by case. But in the care of the term "same," it contains within itself two senses: "same" identification applies absolutely (or not at all), while as matter of comparison, it is applied merely as a means of qualification.

Chappell's observation does parallel the metaphysical argument given by Descartes and Aristotle. He reveals the meaning of the term "sameness" through an examination of the nature of language on an empirical level. His argument is significant in so far as he is able to demonstrate the compatibility of sameness and change. His observation shows how the self can always be identified with the very same self itself by using the term "same" in the sense of identification. While at the same time it shows how the self can always be spoken of by using the term "same" merely in the sense of comparison. In this way, sameness and change seem to be comparative or able to coexist. In other words, sameness may be preserved through change.

As has been discussed, Chappell reveals the compatibility of sameness and change by drawing an attention to the ambiguity of the term "same." The compatibility or

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[13] Chappell 355.
[14] Chappell 357.

coexistence of sameness and change receives a more dynamic explanation in the writings of Parfit. Even though his position on self-identity is different from the position that we are taking,[15] his notion of "connectedness" by which he explains the survival of the self seems to be a good springboard from which gain another understanding of the coexistence of sameness and change within a single person. This concept of connectedness is able to explain the manner in which sameness and change interrelate between one self and a successive self.

Parfit argues for a transition from psychophysical identity to psychophysical survival. According to him, it is neither practical nor logically possible to have a one-one and all-or-nothing form for identity.[16] He uses the concept of "connectedness" to explain survival as a relational matter of degree. For example, if I want to change some of my physical and mental features in order to be a better person, I can change them by adding new desirable features and subtracting old undesirable ones. The value of my relation to the resulting person, the better person, depends both on my degree of connectedness to this person, and on the value that she places upon her own physical and psychological features.[17] My bad features may be appropriately targeted for removal when they are less connected to, and less valued by, my future and better self. Notice here that less connectedness allows for

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[15] It should be pointed out that Parfit's position is different from our position with regard to the problem of self-identity in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. First of all, he attacks the idea of personal identity and suggests a sense of survival that does not imply or presuppose identity and argues discontinuity of the self. For him, "continuity," psychological continuity, is transitive because it only requires overlapping chains of direct psychological relatives (which means intransitive psychological connectedness). So, in survival, psychological connectedness is more important than psychological continuity. Notice that Parfit replaces identity with survival and suggests successive selves; what matters is survival and survival is a matter of degree because degree of psychological connectedness is important. Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," ed. John Perry, Personal Identity (California: California UP, 1975.

[16] See the thirteenth chapter of Personal Identity and the Article, "Personal Identity."

[17] Derek Parfit, Reasons and Person (New York: Oxford UP, 1984) 299.

change, and more connectedness promotes stability. Greater degree of connectedness is preferable when one wishes to maintain similarity of feature. Sameness is maintained through connectedness to the resulting person, insofar as those features which are directly connected to his/her remain. However, such a conception of connectedness is able to explain sameness and change only between two directly successive selves, since connectedness requires direct connections,[18] and since any individual self is not so directly connected with still earlier historical selves. In other words, Parfit's account of the discontinuity of the self does not allow of sameness between the various non-successive historical selves.

Alternatively, the notion of continuity of self may be applied to early Buddhism and classical Confucianism in order to allow us to argue that sameness and change can constantly be thought of throughout many non-successive historical selves. Sameness and change coexist in the process of the self-transformation in the following way. When one tries to cultivate a better character, one needs to change a certain part of one's character while holding onto other desirable parts. One maintains a desirable character in connection with "a desirable self" and so sameness continues. On the other hand, one may introduce a new desirable character that replaces an undesirable character; and in this way change occurs through continuity. Sameness and change may then coexist in the process of self-transformation in this way. Both early Buddhism and classical Confucianism take this position with regard to self-transformation. No radical total change is implied. In my interpretation of the two ethical systems, to cultivate a better character by transforming

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[18] Parfit 300.

the self is to embody the main virtue, compassion/benevolence, gradually in greater degree. So the self-transformative person's main task is to achieve a realization of this main virtue.

As already implied, by the term "transform" I mean "to change one's character toward a better character or an ideal personality." The ideal personality of early Buddhism and classical Confucianism is shown through the image of the noble one (***arahat***), and the virtuous one (*chün tzu*) . The final image of the ideal person is captured in the notions the enlightened one (***buddha***) and of the sage (*sheng jen*). On transformation of the self, one pursues the image of the noble one and the virtuous one, in order to reach eventually, the stages of the enlightened one and the sage.

In my interpretation, it is compassion in early Buddhism that is the main virtue of the noble one (and also of a ***buddha***), and benevolence in classical Confucianism that is the virtue of the virtuous one (and also of a sage). Thus, in the process of making an effort toward the process of becoming a noble one/virtuous one ought to embody compassion/benevolence. On the path from being an ordinary person toward being a noble/virtuous one, the virtue of compassion/benevolence will be required, in different degrees according to the level of one's achievement.

Thus both early Buddhist and classical Confucianist traditions seem to have common assumptions with regard to the embodiment of the self-transformative virtue, to realizing the final moral goal, and to achieving the perfection of personality. Human beings are not perfect, yet they are perfectible, since they have the potential to be perfect. To awaken and cultivate this potential is the most important thing for achievement of this perfection of

personality. This process is gradual and continuous, and involves making efforts for long periods throughout one's life. In this way, the achievement of the perfect personality is based not on any external power, but rather on one's internal capacity to exert effort towards it.

CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS: SOCIAL SETTINGS AND VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE

A. THE SOCIAL SETTINGS AND THE CRITICAL EXAMINERS

In any attempt to understand a particular moral system in the larger context of moral philosophy, I believe that one needs to look both at the social settings of the system, and its view of human nature. Different historical and social structures, including political and economic structures, and religious conventions, contribute to different types of morals and values. MacIntyre places a great emphasis on historicity and social context in understanding the moral values of different traditions. The historical and social structures of a tradition, which come to be established during a span of time, constrain the individuals' ethical perspective and moral life. The social structure as a comprehensive mechanism influences an individual's life in every respect. An individual's ideals and morals especially are formulated within that structure. Each historical tradition has its own unique characteristics.

While social structure is important for producing a system of morals, the particular social structure will not be the conception of the only factor in formulating morals. Another significant factor is the conception of human nature. Morals will be different depending upon how we conceive of human nature. This is why moral philosophers have tried to explain morals by examining the psychological aspect of a human. Psychological terms such as passion, potentiality, sentiments, emotion, reason, sympathy, and compassion play a great role in their explanations of a person's morality. Human nature is

complex and capable of tremendous diversity. As a result, it has been conceived in various ways. I am using this term in a moral context, without ignoring its complexity, and I shall highlight both its good and bad characteristics, and its malleability or transformability.

Human nature always interacts with social structure. Coherence, contradiction, and compromise are brought out when that interaction occurs. Morals maneuver between human nature and social structure. This is the reason why we need to take a look at the socio-historical milieu of early Buddhism and classical Confucianism and their concepts of human nature. "Unless our moral reflections are historically informed, they will be mere speculation."[19] Unless our moral inquiry reflects human nature, it will not be useful for human self-transformation. Examining the socio-historical milieus, and the conceptions of human nature of the two systems, we will find them to be significantly different.

Most commonly, the Buddha is characterized as "a moral reformer," Confucius as "a transmitter" of the tradition, and Mencius as "a successor" of Confucius. We can put Mencius together with Confucius, because "a successor" here also implies "a transmitter." Through a clarification of the significance of the terms "moral reformer" and "transmitter" in each tradition, we will begin to understand the perspectives of the two traditions.

Scholars have continued to see the Buddha as an anti-traditional reformative thinker and Confucius as a pro-traditional conservative thinker. This is not entirely incorrect. For the former takes a critical look at his tradition without having radically different attitude, and the other is faithful to the tradition. More specifically, the former rejects a core of Brahman doctrines by claiming non-substantiality of the self, and the latter tries to bring

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19 Annette Baier, "Doing without Moral Theory," eds. Standley Clarke & Evan Simpson, Anti-theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989) 44.

the traditional *Chou* culture into his contemporary social context. However, if we look closely at their starting points and methodologies, we will see that this characterization does not fully reflect their positions.

It is commonly accepted that the Buddha came from the ascetic (***samaṇa***), non-Brahmanic tradition that was very critical of the Brahmanical religious and social systems. However, the fact that he came from the ascetic tradition does not necessarily mean that he followed the contemporary ascetic tradition. In fact, he was skeptical about his contemporary ascetics, and wanted to bring back the ancient tradition. In order to argue this, I shall make two points. Firstly, the Buddha admitted the value of the previous individually enlightened person (***paccekabuddha***) and the seer (***isi***), and regarded them as moral achievers. Praising them, he counted five hundred individually enlightened persons and identified them as seers. He said that they were equal to seers in the sense that they were free from further becoming and had achieved the moral goal (***nibbāna***).[20] In particular, he illustrated the lives of the achievers by describing the lives of the seers.[21] In other words, we find by locating them in an important place in the early discourses the Buddha praising, the achievers of the moral goal, and thus happily his pupils to lead a moral life. Later, in this line of thought, the Buddha himself is identified with "the banner of the seers (***isinam dhaja***)"[22] and furthermore he is recognized as "the seventh of the

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[20] MLS 3.110-13.

[21] In the ***Sakka Sutta***, the moral life of the seers is representatively charaterized by the words ***silāvanta*** (virtuous) and ***kalyāṇadhamma*** (of good conduct) (KS 1.291-93). More specific explanations on their life in terms of morals are shown in the ***Sutta-nipāta*** and the ***Dhammapada***: verses 284, 689-691 and 1006-09 in the former, and 281 and 422 in the latter.

[22] KS 2.190.

seers (*isinam isisattama*)"[23] by early Buddhists. Secondly, the doctrine (***dhamma***) is occasionly identified as an "ancient doctrine (***dhamma sanantana***)," implying that it is not newly created.[24] In other words, the doctrine of the Buddha can be traced back to the ancient doctrine. For these two reasons, we can say that the Buddha accepted and tried to revitalize the ancient ascetic tradition represented by both the achievers of the moral goal and the ancient doctrine.

As already implied, the Buddha's act of restoring the ancient ascetic tradition was based on human morals. He was able to draw from it a fruitful method of moral cultivation. So, he unlike his contemporary ascetics, emphasized neither extrasensory powers of the individually enlightened persons and seers, nor accepted the extreme ascetic life. This is because neither extrasensory powers nor extreme asceticism are helpful in moral cultivation.

We are aware of the fact that the Buddha was critical of the Brahmanical tradition. He criticized Brahmanical sacrificial ritual, and the privileged Brahman class. But we also know that he did not reject the whole Brahmanical social system itself. His concern was to improve people's moral-social conditions by way of accommodation and reformation. It is appropriate to say that he went to back to the ancient tradition without rejecting the whole Brahmanical system. As a result he formulated his own unique moral system which was grounded on a critical examination of both contemporary ascetic and Brahmanical traditions.

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23 S 1.8, 192.
24 Dh 5; S 1.8, 189.

In formulating his moral system, he seems to have used a pragmatic criterion, from the perspective of a good human life. For example, he rejected the two extremes for the middle way in moral pactices, and put aside the metaphysical questions. This position will be explicitly explained in chapters III and IV.

In a similar way, Confucius was a critical examiner of his contemporary social systems and views. His intention to revitalize the *Chou* culture implies that he was not satisfied with his contemporary social system and philosophical theories. Even though he wanted to revitalize the *Chou* culture, he did not want to do so without critical examination and reformulation. One of his achievement was to reformulate the idea of the Mandate of Heaven which was used by the *Chou* rulers as a political ideology. In the *Chou* dynasty, Heaven or Mandate of Heaven was identified with the rulers or their sons. Confucius does not follow this idea and internalizes Heaven or Mandate of Heaven as a person's morality. In other words, he demythologizes and ethicizes it. Having done this, he adopts the *Chou* social and moral culture as an ideal for transmission.

In my understanding, a reformer Buddha is a critical transmitter, and in the same way a transmitter Confucius is a critical reformer. Their main point of reformation and transmission was to establish human morality from the perspective of practicality. Even though they had similar methods and aims, they were significantly different in the degree which they adopted and modified their own traditions.

The Buddha and Confucius had different social settings. It is said that there existed many different theories at the time of the Buddha: Brahmanism as the main stream, materialism and relativism as reactions to Brahmanism, skepticism, and so forth. In spite

of the varieties of ideas, the political and social circumstances were generally stable. Though there may have been some danger of invasion during his life time, the country of the ***Śākya*** was peaceful. Moreover, the ***Śākya*** had their own assembly hall, the home of their own democratic social system. The existence of the assembly hall implies that they had a fundamental social institution that enabled them to reflect on and discuss their issues freely. Politically and socially stable participatory environments must render people more open to encounter and examine newly formulated ideas.

These environments seem to generate a condition of urbanization. In general, urbanization provides more chances to communicate and to encounter varieties of thoughts. Consequently, people will be more critical and rational. Similarly, it seems that the mood of urbanization of the time of the Buddha, helped to disseminate the Buddha's critical ideas. He must have a group of people who opened their hearts and listened. In fact, his doctrine appealed "to men of an urban background."[25]

According to Trevor Ling's research, the Buddha's life from the first to the last was predominantly urban: "It was life spent in great centers where people came together to trade and to deliberate, to study and to practice their special crafts and industries, to discuss and to be entertained, to seek justice, to make money, or to find the truth."[26]

In contrast with the Buddha, Confucius and Mencius were confronted not only with the unending wars of The Spring and Autumn Warring Period, but also with the numerous competing theories intended to stablize the situation. Confucius and Mencius traveled

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[25] Trevor Ling, The Buddha: Buddhist Civilization in India and Ceylon (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 106.
[26] Ling 106.

state by state to suggest methods of right governing to many feudal rulers and so to have a chance to realize their political ideas. When traveling with their pupils, they often encountered hardship because of the unending wars. For example, Confucius and his followers starved seven days in a war. Mencius seems to have had a still more severe environment on his travels. This is probably why Mencius had constantly to speak about right governing. He saw feudal rulers who were continuously involved in invading and conquering for their own interest. They followed injustice and became increasingly corrupt, abandoning the welfare of the people. He seems to have identified the main cause of social problems with such improper governing of the leaders.

As the Buddha had urban people as his audience, so did Confucius and Mencius have a special group who listened to what they said. Fung observes that a group arose with Confucius: *Shih*, as a class of scholars, were neither farmers, artisans nor merchants, and therefore were not engaged in any kind of productive activity. They depended on others for their support. They were capable either of holding a governmental office or teaching.[27] They were critical scholars who together with the feudal rulers made up Confucius' and Mencius' audience. Furthermore, anyone could join them. In other words, the door to listening and learning was open for everybody. In this way, Confucius and Mencius attempted to popularize their ideas.

It was to such groups of people that the Buddha, Confucius, and Mencius brought their critical reformative ideas. As we have seen, they apparently did not admit any class distinctions in their group. Even though their audiences were similar in the sense that they

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[27] Yu-lan Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1952) 52.

were open to a critical examination of their contemporarie's theories, including their own, one apparent difference seems to arise due to their different social and political settings.

The two systems agreed that the purpose of self-transformation is to obtain the moral goal, and so the inner moral practice of each individual is extremely important. However, a difference that is based on their distinctive social settings arises, when the idea of self-transformation is connected to society in the realization of the main virtue of compassion/ benevolence. Classical Confucianism seems more concerned about politics as a palpable tool for the realization of this virtue. A greater role is placed on participation in the activities of government, and on the idea of governing people.

B. THE VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

The Buddha analyzes a person into five elements (***khandha***): material form (***rūpa***), sensation (***vedanā***), perception (***sañña***), dispositions (***saṅkhāra***), and consciousness (***viññāṇa***). He understands a person as a psycho-physical personality. In his analysis, a person is neither beyond nor below a psycho-physical personality. In other words, a person is not a metaphysical self but experiential self: and so the Buddha neither establishes any permanent unchangeable self, substance (***atta***), nor denies the empirical self.

Two significant points emerge from the Buddha's analysis of a person from the perspective of self-transformation. First, consciousness for him is not something independent of the body, nor is it substantial. It, as a mental activity, is perceived on the

same level with the other four elements. The Buddha does not give any superiority to consciousness as do many metaphysicians.[28]

Second, dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) form the main focus in the process of self-transformation. Dispositions are thought to be formulated through uncountable past lives. They are traced back through time beyond a person's present life. The long history carried by dispositions results in a diversity of accumulated aspects. There also continue to next life as accumulated psychological tendencies. As long as a person is in the wandering world, he/she formulates dispositions constantly through bodily, verbal, and mental activities. As a result of accumulated and current activities in a process of formulation, they always take place at bodily, verbal, and mental loci. This nature of dispositions implies that they can always be reformulated. In reformulating dispositions, one can demolish bad dispositions and develop good dispositions.

As already implied, the reformability or malleability of dispositions for the better needs to be emphasized from the moral perspective. At the same time, the degradation of dispositions toward evil needs to be observed. The view that dispositions can be improved or degraded raises a question regarding inherited dispositions at birth: Are humans born good or bad?

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[28] We wonder why he does not do that. The answer can be provided in two ways: on the grounds of morals and of epistemology. On the one hand, his emphasis on the moral life leads him to avoid speculating on a less urgent issue. To reify consciousness by giving superiority to it would lead him to be a metaphysician, which he wants to avoid. It seems that he is concerned that one can easily fall into one extreme in searching for consciousness as an entity. In this sense, he holds a pragmatic position in dealing with consciousness; for moral life it is not necessary to reify consciousness. On the other hand, even though consciousness, in organizing sense data and representing human experiences, differs from the other faculties in its active and subjective role, it is perceived as one of the constitutients of human personality. In other words, it "is conditioned by the sense and sense object." David Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987) 32. Furthermore, it is not something pure or uncontaminated and conditioned by dispositions.

According to the Buddha, humans are not born in a status of *tabula rasa.* At the moment of conception, a person's nature is already formulated. In other words, one's nature is decided at the same moment that one's body starts developing. In fact, it is already decided in the form of the previous existence before the body starts developing. This means that we, as ordinary beings, are not able to know the initially formulated human nature as either good or bad, because we are never be able to identify the type of the previous existence or its nature. Since we do not know what point would be the first point of human nature formulated, the question whether the initially formulated nature is good or bad would be meaningless in Buddhism. But still we can consider what human nature is without specifying the point of time. The Buddha expresses his position on the nature of a human being without specifying the point of time.

The Buddha observes that there is both good (***kusala***) and evil (***akusala***) in each person. In the ***Aṅguttara Nikāya***, he presents six types of persons by observing their mental status in term of good and bad. Furthermore, he connects the six types of persons with their environmental conditions.[29] The Buddha divides persons into six types in combination of these two factors: (1) the personal factor based on accordance with the predominance of good or bad. (2) the environmental factor based on good or bad. Also, he connects the six types with future consequences. The six types are:

(1) predominance of evil and a good environment.
Consequence is "to be bound not to fall."
(2) predominance of evil and a bad environment.
Consequence is "to be bound not to fall."
(3) utterly black in evil (and no mention about
environment). Consequence is hell.

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[29] GS 3.287-91.

(4) predominance of evil and a bad environment.
Consequence is "to be bound to fall."
(5) predominance of good and a good environment.
Consequence is "to be bound not to fall."
(6) predominance of good (and no mention a simile of
environment). Consequence is "to be the *Tathāgata*."

What is to be first kept in mind in analyzing the Buddha's typology is that everyone has both good and bad in themselves. He observes: "The good has disappeared, the evil is uppermost; but the root of goodness is not cut off and from that good will proceed."[30]

Looking at (1), (2), (4), and (5), we see that one can always make a change to develop good in oneself when evil is predominant. As a result of developing good that is predominant in the person, he/she deserves good consequences. This is the case only if a good environment is provided. As seen in (2) and (4), the predominant evil does not bring a good consequence if it is accompanied by a bad environment. The only case where one is likely to fall is (4) the evil-predominated person connecting with bad environment. From this observation, we see how the Buddha considers environments of a moral agency as being important.[31] We also notice that the Buddha seems to focus on improvement from the predominant evil to good rather than degradation from the predominant good to the evil.

[30] GS 3.288.
[31] To see the same point more clearly in the present context, let's consider the ***Cakkavatti-sihanānda Sutta***. We see in the ***Sutta*** that environmental scarcity causes evil actions. Due to the destitution that resulted from king's improper responsibility, no wealth was cultivated. As a result, this poverty became widespread: "When poverty was thus became rife, a certain man took that which others had not given him, what people call by theft" (DB 3.66). From the poverty, stealing and other worse immoral behaviors arose. Since evil originates from poverty, basic materials are necessary in order not to cause evil. The point here is that evil is not attributed to people or people's nature.

(3) and (6) seem to require a special attention. One who is utterly black in his evil (***ekantakāḷakehi akusalehi***) is to be in hell in the future. For him, it does not matter whether he has a good environment.[32] The Buddha seems to assume that there are people who do not have any possibility to be good within a certain period of time. "An utterly black" person in oneself, is totally predominated by evil; neither white nor good is left. So, whatever good chances or environments there may be, one is not able to utilize them to cultivate the good. One is to go to hell. In the same ***Sutta***, ***Devadatta*** is taken as an example of this. The Buddha did not see "a bright spot (***sukkaṁ dhammaṁ***)" for good in ***Devadatta***. He declared: "***Devadatta*** is wayward gone, hell-bound for a *kalpa*, and unpardonable (***āpāyiko Devadatto nerayiko kappaṭṭho atekiccho***)."[33]

One question remains with type (3): We need to consider the period of time of "the utterly black." How long does the duration of time of "a being-utterly-black" period continue? Is it permanent? The Buddha would not accept such a position. The duration would expire some day after he spends a certain period of time in hell. The kamma of the person will be used up. Here kamma theory functions.[34] "The length of time" needs to be considered in interpreting the moral improvement and degradation of a person. It would not be appropriate for the Buddha to apply a permanent time period. The utterly black

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32 The Buddha brings a simile for this case: The seed that is spliced, rotten, and spoilt by wind and heat does not yield growth even though it is thrown on well-tilled ground in a goodly field (GS 3.289). There is an uncertainty: What does "utterly black in his evil" exactly mean? It must mean a person who is utterly evil. But the question still arises: How could the "utterly black" be in the complex of dispositions including black and white? Or, does this type of person abandon the possibility of his moral improvement?

33 GS 3.287.

34 Kamma theory of the Buddha will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

person is to be perceived in a limited time. In the case of ***Devadatta***, he has not uncountable *kalpas* but "a" *kalpa*.

Type (6) person is able to realize the best good (***nibbāna***) and is known to the ***Tathāgata***. He has bad with good in him and he activates the good here and now. Good completely overrides bad in him and brings ***nibbāna***.[35] A complete predominance of good is emphasized. Once one makes good predominant, one easily develops a pure and cool mind. Furthermore, one "will become completely cool (***parinibbāyissati***)"[36] and obtain a culmination of the good.

In type (3) and (6), the exceedingly bad and good in a person are considered. Here the Buddha pays more attention to internal dynamic energy which can be either negative or positive, than to environmental elements. Here he does not take environmental elements into serious consideration. When one is exceedingly bad, one will go to hell. When one is exceedingly pure by cultivating good, one obtains the highest good. In both cases, environmental elements do not seem to be influential.

What is required at this juncture is to accommodate the two different observations. Consideration of the environment is significant in (1), (2), (4) and (5). Emphasis on internal dynamic energy is significant in (3) and (6). An appropriate interpretation that synthesizes these two observations would be that the Buddha considers both significant. Perceiving environmental elements and the dynamic energy of a moral agent, the Buddha sees both good and bad in every person.

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35 He says: "Or suppose I know of some person: 'There is good and evil in him.' Then presently I know: 'There is not in him evil amounting to a hair's prick-end, and being exceedingly pure in faultlessness, he will, here now, become completely cool'" (GS 3.290).
36 GS 3.209.

Interestingly, this view has recently been presented by Kekes. He writes: "...human nature contains a mixture of good and evil dispositions. We have them innately, and neither has essential priority over the other."[37] According to the Buddha, depending upon predominance of one of them and on the environment, one performs actions as either good or bad (and deserves their consequences). For the Buddha, environment is also an important factor with the status of a person in action. He thinks that human actions are combinatory results of their nature and external influences. Corrupt or evil actions are not caused by only one of the two variables. Similarly, Kekes argues that external influences can corrupt people but corruption or evil behavior is not caused only by such influences. He holds that "corrupting external influences are neither necessary nor sufficient for very many evil actions."[38] This position resonates with the Buddha's. However, the Buddha considers some exceptional cases; in our observation, type (3) and (6) show that this is not the case all the time. Sometimes, environmental variables are negligible and do not have an effect.

Confucius does not provide a crystal clear explanation of human nature (*hsing*) in terms of good and bad. However, we can infer his positive and optimistic position about it. In fact, his whole moral philosophy is based on a positive view of human nature. One example of his positive view is the golden rule: Do what you want others to do for you and do not do what you do not want others to do for you. The rule presupposes the good

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37 John Kekes, Moral Tradition and Individuality (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 124.

38 Kekes 124. It is worth citing more in order to see the reason for this argument. He continues: "For, since people sometimes do evil in the absence of specific external influences, and they sometimes do not do evil in their presence, it is reasonable to look for an internal propensity that makes us receptive or resistant to specific external influences" (Kekes 123).

nature of humans because "I" become the main criterion for deciding how to treat others; Whenever one wants to do morally good, one is required to reflect on oneself as a guide. Also, Confucius believes that all people are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice.[39] Natural equality in the positive sense is a fundamental presupposition in the cultivation of Confucian virtues.

The Confucian positive assumptions about human nature are more explicitly established by Mencius. Before we discuss Mencius' position, the term for human nature first needs to be considered. An issue on the term was recently raised by Ames. The issue also suggests differences between *hsing* and, *hsin*, heart or mind.

Ames claims that to understand "*jen hsing*" as human nature is not adequate because it "requires explanation culturologically as something defined and enacted in community."[40] He highlights the historical, social, and cultural aspects of *hsing*. According to him, it is a concept of something developed and achieved rather than of something given. He uses the analogy of *Ox* mountain[41] to prove his interpretation. He points out that *hsing* "designates the mountain forests rather than the mountain itself" and it "refers to that which goes beyond the basic condition." Here what he tries to show is that the western concept of human nature which means "the genetically given" does not fit Mencius' *hsing*.[42]

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39 17-2. When only numbers appear, it indicates Lunyu. When numbers appear with a letter, it indicates Mengzi: for example, 2A-1. The texts, the Analects and Mencius, translated by D. C. Lau are used.
40 Roger Ames, "The Mencian Concept of Ren Xing: Does it Mean 'Human Nature,'" Chinese Text and Philosophical Contexts (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1991) 142.
41 The analogy of *Ox* mountain is as follows. The mountain where the trees were luxuriant becomes bald as a result of grazing by the cattle or sheep, or of hewing by axes. As the mountain abandons its original nature *hsing*, so can humans: "A man's letting go of his true heart (*fang hsin*) is like the case of the trees and the axes." Just as we cannot say that the baldness of the mountain is its nature, so also we cannot say that humans do not have native endowment (*ts'ai*) by just looking at their animal-like-behaviors (7A-8).
42 Ames 145-46. Pointing out the conflation of *hsin* and *hsing*, he makes a distinction and explains the relationship between them: "the *hsing* as a creative act is rooted in the *hsin* "heart and mind," and human

Ames' interpretation is stimulating in the sense that he pinpoints and articulates the subtle differences of the two concepts of Mencius. As he interprets certain passages[43] to show *hsing* not as a given but as "an accomplished project,"[44] *hsing* seems to allow a stretched interpretation. There is also an implication that shows *hsin* is more fundamental than *hsing* and the development of the latter is a continuation of the former's nurture or its result: "For a man to give full realization to his heart (*hsin*) is for him to understand his own nature (*hsing*).... By retaining his heart (*hsin*) and nurturing his nature (*hsing*) he is serving Heaven."[45] However, the interpretation that *hsing* as an achieved concept is creative in the historical, social, and cultural context seems to be exaggerated beyond Mencius' intentions.[46]

Regardless of the problem, to the extent that I agree with Ames' interpretation, I take his argument seriously. For his argument implies that both *hsing* and *hsin* can be human nature in Mencius. In this context, I would like to point out that Mencius uses the term

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beings in general do have certain determinative propensities as a function of the *hsing*. But it is precisely against these determinate propensities that we are able to observe the change, growth and refinement that constitute *xing* (*hsing*)."

43 7A-21, 30, 33.

44 Ames 160.

45 7A-1.

46 In addition, Ames' interpretation that *hsing* "refers to that which goes beyond the basic condition" in the *Ox* mountain analogy is based upon his own assumption; he assumes that the exuberance of the trees on the mountain is not a basic condition. Here the question I want to make against his interpretation is: (1) what does he exactly mean by "the basic condition" and (2) how does he know what Mencius considers as "the basic conditions?" In other words, how can we be sure that for Mencius the exuberance of the trees is not the basic condition? It seems that the exuberance of the trees for Mencius is given in the mountain, which means it is understood as "an inherent character or basic constitution of the mountain." I suspect that for Ames to see the exuberance of the trees as "a cultivated beauty" is to apply our conventional understanding to it; in our conventional understanding, the exuberant trees perhaps mean "already nurtured or cultivated" trees. However, we are not sure that Mencius has the same conventional understanding, and so means already nurtured or cultivated trees. One can argue that Mencius does not seem to do so. "There almost never is direct evidence that decides matters of textual interpretation." David Wong, "Response to Craig Ihara's Discussion," Philosophy East & West ns 41.11 (1991): 57.

hsin, not *hsing*, to indicate inherited mind; we notice that Mencius uses *hsin* in the case of "*pu jen chih hsin* (a mind unable to bear the sufferings of others)" and the four *tuan*. Since then we can use *hsin* to indicate human nature, as there is a conflation of the two terms in Mencius' thoughts, I prefer to use *hsing* for human nature.

Mencius claims human nature is good. All human beings also have "*pu jen chih hsin.*" A famous example is: When one sees a baby drowning in a well, natural instinct is to rush to its rescue, without expecting any reward, praise or blame. This action comes naturally and instantly. It is a behavior based upon an instinctive emotional nature. Furthermore, everyone has the four beginnings (four *tuan*): the heart of compassion (*ts'e yin*), the heart of shame and dislike (*hsiu wu*), the heart of yielding (*tz'u jang*), and the heart of right and wrong (*shih fei*).[47] People have these four beginnings just as they have four limbs. These four need to be fully developed. Everyone needs to cultivate these four because they do not grow without caring. Unless one cultivates them, they may be lost. To recognize, to extend, and to activate fully them is the important task. From these four beginnings, the four main virtues[48] are developed.

The important point observed in Mencius' thoughts is as follows. The four beginnings need to be nurtured or cultivated. If one does not nurture them, one will let go of them. For good nature, right nourishment (*yang*) is a prerequisite. As long as one maintains the right nourishment, one's good nature grows continuously. The nourishing aspect of the good nature is fundamental for moral life and therefore it is emphasized in moral life. For

47 2A-6.

48 The four main virtues are: benevolence (*jen*), righteousness (*yi*), rites (*li*), and knowledge (*chih*).

Mencius, "the moral life is the life lived nurturing the moral sprouts that are the most important aspect of our nature: the parts of us that makes us unique among creatures."[49]

Confucius' egalitarian principle with regard to the moral perfectibility of humans continues in Mencian ideas. Mencius emphasizes equality of humans in terms of moral capability. Everybody can be the sage-kings, Yao and Shun, by nurturing the inherent good nature. Together with human potentiality, Mencius also emphasizes constant efforts to be a morally perfected person. Depending upon one's own efforts, moral outcomes will be different.

People by nature are good and everyone can nurture good nature by themselves. This seems to give no account of evil. How does evil arise? From our observations of Mencius thoughts, evil must have something to do with "not nurturing goodness in a person." Every individual needs to nurture the good nature on one's own. Therefore, one must look within oneself, when one fails to nurture it and thereby displays evil or bad tendencies: "Look into yourself whenever you fail to achieve your purpose."[50] Mencius stresses one's responsibility to nurture one's own good nature. When one does not make good nature function, evil such as laziness or violence arise. Evils are indeed not based on nature. They are caused by ensnaring one's heart: "Mencius said, 'In good years the young men are mostly lazy, while in bad years they are mostly violent. Heaven has not sent down men whose endowment differs so greatly. The difference is due to what ensnares their hearts.'"[51]

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[49] Philip Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990) 12.
[50] 4A-4.
[51] 4A-7.

Even though Mencius holds an individual responsible for one's moral failure, he does not think it to be entirely the individual's fault. He considers the basic requirements for nurturing good to be the following two things:[52] (1) materials such as clothes, food, and dwelling. (2) education in the fundamental Confucian virtues. When common people lack the necessities to sustain themselves and the basic knowledge regarding human virtues, they may be in danger of losing their good nature. As good is given to them, so the materials for basic physical needs, and the basic level of knowledge of moral guidelines should be provided in order to nurture good nature properly.

The two necessary conditions, basic necessities and education, for nurturing good nature are required not for all people but for most common people. Mencius seems to leave room for an exceptional case. He seems to believe that one can nurture good and be a moral person in a severe situation. A virtuous one seems to be the person for this case because he is able to overcome materially insufficient situations, and he already knows and achieves the fundamental level of morality. In other words, if one achieves a certain level of morality, one will not be influenced by lack of materials and will know what specific morals are required.

Early Buddhism and classical Confucianism have both similarities and differences in how they regard human nature from the perspective of morals. In early Buddhism, we

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[52] We read this in Mencius: "Hou Chi taught the people how to cultivate land and the five kinds of grain. When these ripened, the people multiplied. This is the way of the common people: once they have a full belly and warm clothes on their back they degenerate to the level of animals if they are allowed to lead idle lives, without education and discipline. This gave the sage King further cause for concern, and so he appointed Hsieh as the Minister of Education whose duty was to teach the people human relationships: love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends" (3A-4).

have dispositions which represent the inner complexity of a human being and continue throughout time. Dispositions are given at the moment of time when consciousness enters into the womb. Logically, humans have a certain nature even before they are born. An embryo has dispositions containing dynamic and complex characteristics in it. In spite of the importance of the dispositions in transforming the self, the Buddha does not say a lot about them. Especially, he does not remark on them in terms of good and bad. What is implied in the Buddha's view is that dispositions contain not only good and bad characteristics but also neutral characteristics. While the Buddha understands dispositions as dynamic and complex, Confucius and Mencius understands them in a simpler way. For Confucius and Mencius, humans are born with good natures. Also, it is clear that the Buddha's observation about dispositions reflects the long history of the dispositions throughout the past lives of a person. Differently enough, Confucius and Mencius thoughts on human nature does not make reference to any past life of a person.

Dispositions are not fixed. They are always changeable. In order to be a morally good person, one needs to refine and reformulate dispositions in a good direction. The Buddha believes that everyone has the capability to reformulate and improve their dispositions by making constant efforts. Regarding improvability of the self, the classical Confucianists take a similar position. Humans' good nature needs to be nurtured by each person. The idea of nurturing is strongly emphasized in classical Confucianism. While early Buddhism stresses changeability or improvability of the self, classical Confucianism stresses the idea of nurture or cultivation.

Even though both systems give each individual a responsibility to realize morals, they also point out the importance of the environment of a moral agent. A good environment and basic necessities should be provided for moral transformation. Severe circumstances for most people can make a moral agent fail. However, neither system questions how and to what degree the environment is influencial for moral achievement.

On the other hand, both systems have their own analytical modes for assessing the influence of the environment. For the Buddha, there are the six different types of persons combining different environment. Being based upon the six types, he provides the different combinations interacting with good or bad environment. Environmental influences are varied case by case. Differently enough, the analysis of the classical Confucianist tradition is based on a constant mode applied to a changing environment: everyone is born with a good nature.

CHAPTER II. THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK OF VIRTUE

In this chapter, I shall interpret the ethics of both early Buddhism and classical Confucianism in order to clarify the foundation of self-transformative morals. By examining their moral foundation, we shall see that the moral foundations of the two systems are distinctively different. One is based on kamma and rebirth theory, and the other is based on the notion of *t'ien.*

A. EARLY BUDDHISM

The theory of kamma and rebirth is deeply implicated in early Buddhists ethics. According to this theory, lay people and renunciants alike are subject to kammic influences. Their moral struggle is under kammic law as long as they are not morally perfected persons. Only by eliminating kammic influences are they able to achieve moral perfection.

The early Buddhist concept of kammic law is bound up with the principle of dependent arising (***paṭiccasamuppāda***). Kammic law and the principle of dependent arising are dynamic principles in early Buddhist ethics. The scope of operation is not limited to this present world alone; rather, they function throughout time.

From the perspective of ethics, rebirth theory is necessarily connected with kamma theory since the status of one's rebirth will be in accordance with the quality of one's kamma. The concepts of kamma and rebirth form two of the most fundamental validational concepts, alongside other such basic notions as "non-self" and "dependent

arising." As Horner puts it, "Buddhism is unintelligible apart from the allied doctrines of kamma and rebirth."[53]

Kamma literally means action or deed. In a Buddhist ethical context, it carries strong psychological connotations. It is identified with motive or intention and is allied with the term volition (*cetanā*). The Buddha's remark, "O monks, I call *cetanā* kamma,"[54] shown the importance of psychological state of an actor. Since the Buddha did not provide a further definition of kamma, this remark has become the basis of the scholarly interpretation of kamma. Excluding from the notion of kamma its effect or result (*vipāka*), Rahula limits the meaning of kamma only to "'volitional action,' not all action,"[55] and Francis Story claims" by kamma is meant volitional activity only."[56] From the perspective of the elimination of kammic power through mental purification, such emphasis on the centrality of volition is entirely appropriate. It is also appropriate from the perspective of moral responsibility. However, to take kamma as only volitional action does not convey the broader meaning of the term. The notion of kamma necessarily includes all actions, even the unintentional actions of a moral agent. So, even though from the perspective of morals, it is the volitional aspect of actions that is emphasized because of the need to speak of responsibility, I hold that the scope of kamma should be extended beyond "volitional action."

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53 Isaline Honer, The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1987) 97.

54 "*Cetanāhaṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vādāmi*" (A3.415).

55 Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974) 32.

56 Francis Story, "Kamma and Causality," Wheel 221 (1975): 16.

Furthermore, the notion of kamma also includes the sense of "causal effect." Whenever a moral agent acts, a consequence (***vipāka***, or ***phala***) follows. This causal relationship between act and consequence forms an essential part of the theory of kamma. The consequence of an action can occur at different times. It can follow immediately after an action, a long time after an action, or even in a subsequent life time. In so far as it allows a consequence to occur in another life, kamma theory necessarily presupposes rebirth theory.

What are the conditions of kamma and rebirth? The origin of kamma is ignorance (***avijjā***). "Constant traveling from birth to birth, from this form to that form, again again--this is what results from ignorance."[57] Ignorance is the origin of dispositions (***saṅkhāra***): "Ignorance is the provenance...the source...the birth...ignorance is the origin of the ***saṅkhāra***. So it is, monks, that conditioned by ignorance are the ***saṅkhāra***."[58] When it is conditioned by the dispositions, consciousness (***viññāṇa***) arises. Consciousness then triggers the other nine factors of dependent arising in the continuously wandering (***saṁsāra***) world.

How, then, does consciousness enter into a physical body? Consciousness enters into a mother's womb under both physical and psychological conditions. The physical conditions are the coitus of the parents and the mother's proper season.[59] The psychological condition is "the enjoyment of all that makes for enfettering": "in him, who contemplates the enjoyment of all that makes for enfettering, there comes descent of consciousness."[60]

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[57] Sn 12-6.
[58] MLS 1.317.
[59] David Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995) 104.
[60] KS 2.64.

Besides these three conditions, the five elements, earth, water, air, fire, and space, are necessary for consciousness to arise in a physical form. The moral agent then takes a different body depending upon ignorance, dispositions, and consciousness.

Kalupahana understands consciousness as transmigrating consciousness (***gandhabba***). "***Gandhabba*** is a metaphorical description of consciousness at the moment of death craving for survival."[61] Consciousness seems to have a certain color depending upon the dispositions of each moral agent. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Buddha did not accept the idea of the mind as a *tabula rasa*. The notion of *tabula rasa* is even rejected for the moment of the first flickerings of consciousness before actual birth.[62] Consciousness is assumed to carry the kamma that has been accumulated in previous lives. If the moral agent is an enlightened one, however, consciousness can have no future ground. With the absence of dispositions, consciousness will not survive. As Mittal notices,[63] we have an example of two liberated monks, ***Godhika*** and ***Vakkali***, who committed suicide by stabbing themselves with a dagger, but their consciousness did not leave.[64] Dispositions provide the fuel for rebirth or successive lives for a moral agent in the continuously wandering and dependently arising world. Consciousness never disappears as long as the moral agent is under kammic influences. It continues to take different bodies. It may also take a form from one of the four other states of existences: the beings in hell, in the world of departed spirits, in heaven, and in the realm of animals.

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61 Kalupahana 104.
62 Kalupahana 105.
63 Kewal Mittal, Prospectives on Kamma and Rebirth (Delhi: Sham Printing Agency, 1990) 161.
64 KS 1.151-52, KS 3.105-06.

Having seen the mechanism of kamma, we need to point out two ethical implications. The first one is with regard to the goal of the moral agent. Having achieved the goal of freedom from the continuously wandering world, consciousness disappears because dispositions or kammic influences are cut off at death. For the enlightened one, this life is the last one. To be born in a heavenly place or in a better situation within this world is not the final goal for him/her. We read this in ***Therīgāthā***: "They, the majority, not knowing the truths taught by the excellent Buddha, rejoice in existence [, mother]; they long for rebirth among the devas. Even rebirth among the devas[65] is non-eternal; (it is) in the impermanent existence; but fools are not afraid of being reborn again and again."[66] To put an end to rebirth in either heavenly or the wandering world is the goal of the moral agent. To achieve this by being moral is the final moral goal of such freedom (***nibbāna***). The second implication is that the notion of kamma and rebirth are bound up with the theory of dependent arising since ignorance is the triggering cause of the twelve links. In other words, the theory of dependent arising is coupled with the concept of transmission of past actions to the present life and of present actions to a future life. The whole process of taking a new life through consciousness itself reflects the principle of dependent arising. A new existence proceeds from one's previous existence in the sense that it proceeds from one's previous kamma. The characteristics of a new existence are determined according to the condition of kamma. Consequently, as Damien observes, "kamma is not an occult

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65 *Devas* are gods.
66 Thag 454-55.

power but an aspect of Dependent-Origination; instead simply it is the principle that moral actions have consequences (***kamma-niyama***)."[67]

As we have seen, since the final moral goal is the elimination of kamma and rebirth, any attempt to bifurcate kamma and ***nibbāna*** would not be appropriate. Some scholars analyze early Buddhist ethics by differentiating kammic and ***nibbānic*** action. King contrasts the two and emphasizes a tension between them. A lay person's morality works in terms of "an infinite number of successive rebirths," but a monk's works in terms of "an internalized process of self-perfection."[68] In other words, lay people work for a happy or better rebirth and monks work for putting an end to rebirth. A similar structure is used by Reynolds. Though he does not contrast the same two notions, he still bases his distinction between monks and laity in the distinctive concepts of ***dhamma*** (***nibbāna***, monk) and kamma (***saṁsāra***, lay). Besides this doctrinal distinction, there is also a radical difference between the noble order (***ariya saṅgha***) and that of ordinary monks, this is grounded in the distinction between the supra world (***lokuttara***) and this-world (***lokiya***). The former practice the path to the moral goal while the latter practice morality (***sīla***) and concentration (***samādhi***) to improve their own kammic destiny. The scheme of analysis used by both King and Reynolds seems to be based on the practice of early Buddhism rather than on textual analysis. Aronson, for example, refutes Kings's bifurcation, arguing that such an analysis is doctrinally ungrounded.[69] The same criticism also seems to be applicable to Reynolds.

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67 Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 127.
68 Winston King, In the Hope of *Nibbāna* (La Salle: Open Court, 1887) 69.
69 Harvey Aronson, Love and Sympathy in *Theravāda* Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986) 79.

There is no precise specification in the texts of a distinction between the moral goal and the heavenly world that corresponds with the distinction between the monkhood and the laity. The analysis that monks are searchers for the moral goal and lay people aim for a reward or better life in this world needs to be reconsidered.[70] The same point applies to the distinction between the noble order and ordinary monks. A heavenly reward can accrue to monks: "Thus, monks, is ***dhamma***[71] well taught by me,... all those who have enough faith in me, enough affection, are bound for heaven."[72] The moral goal, similarly, is attained by lay people. Even a lay woman follower can attain the moral goal.[73] Lay followers or householders who attain the moral goal are not liable to return from that world.[74] Lay people, contemporaries of the Buddha, became noble ones.[75] Monks and lay people then, can equally accomplish the noble way of life (***brahmacariya***). Indeed, the goal can be sought and obtained by everybody: "Whoever will dwell vigilant in this doctrine and discipline, eliminating journeying-on from rebirth to rebirth will put an end to pain."[76]

As we have seen, being free from rebirth is a central task for everybody. In early Buddhism, the idea of being free from rebirth is based on kamma and rebirth theory. Our next question seems to follow: How is such a notion to be allowed? Its validity is based on the Buddha's own empirical observations, and on inductive reasoning based upon them. It

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70 This analysis does seem to reflect a half truth from the perspective of a present realistic form of Buddhism. Lay and renunciative people seem to have different goals in the mode of their practical religious life.
71 ***Dhamma*** in this context means the doctrine of the Buddha.
72 MLS 1.182.
73 MLS 2.140.
74 MLS 2.169.
75 Honer 109.
76 Thag 257.

is said that the Buddha obtained extra-ordinary powers after enlightenment. Among them, the clairvoyance of the divine eye (***dibbacakkhu***) made it possible for him to see his past numerous lives and habitations in the first watch of the night:

> I remembered a variety of former habitations, thus: one birth, three...four...five...ten...twenty...thirty...forty...fifty...a hundred...a thousand...a hundred thousand births, and many an eon of integration and many an eon of disintegration; such a one was I by name, having such and such a clan, such and such a color, so I was nourished, such and such pleasant and painful experiences were mine, so did the span of life end. Passing from this, I came to another state where such a one was I by name, ... Passing from this, I arose here. Thus I remember diverse former habitations in all their modes and detail....[77]

In the early Buddhist texts rebirth theory is said to have been verified by the Buddha and his disciples.[78] Their direct experience can be generalized to all human beings by inductive reasoning: "In Buddhism, the propositions about the phenomenon of rebirth are inductive inferences based on the data of direct experience."[79] Such perception of past rebirth status, implies the memory of kammic conditions as well. In the same ***Sutta***, the Buddha links kamma and rebirth:

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77 MLS 1.28.

78 We observe many examples of the disciples who recollected their previous lives. See the ***Therigātā*** 100, 171, and 179, and the ***Theragātā*** 166.

79 David Kalupahana, Causality: The Centural Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1975) 106.

> With the purified deva vision surpassing that of men I see beings as they pass hence or come to be; I comprehend that beings are mean, excellent, comely, ugly, well-going, ill-going, according to the consequences of their deeds, and I think: Indeed these worthy beings who were possessed of wrong conduct in body, who were possessed of wrong conduct of speech, who were possessed of wrong conduct of thought, scoffers at the ariyans, holding a wrong view, incurring deeds consequent on a wrong view--these, at the breaking up of the body after dying, have arisen in a sorrowful state, a bad bourn, the abyss, Niraya Hell (also a parallel remark for a good conduct and a good heavenly bourn).[80]

With regard to kamma and rebirth, this ***Sutta*** shows only that good conduct leads to a good rebirth and bad conduct to a bad rebirth. At this point, Buddhist kamma and rebirth theory do not differ from that of Hinduism. The Buddha, however, goes further. In the ***Mahākamma-vibhanga Sutta***, we encounter a more complicated theory of kamma and rebirth. The Buddha divides persons into four types: (1) One of the morally bad behaviors in this world arises in a bad bourn; (2) One of morally bad behavior in this world arises in a good bourn; (3) One of morally good behavior in this world arises in a good bourn, (4) One of morally good behavior in this world arises in a bad bourn.[81] The second and the fourth types of person, in particular, reflect the Buddha's philosophical position as a middle way based on the truth of dependent arising. Having abandoned the two extreme views, absolutism and nihilism, he takes a pragmatic middle position. Applying this

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80 MLS 1.28-29.
81 MLS 3.257.

position to the above ethical analysis, we can see that he overcomes absolute determinism and indeterminism, or moral absolutism and nihilism. If he insisted on only the first and the third types, he would fall into absolute determinism or moral absolutism. If he insisted on only the second and the fourth types, he would fall into indeterminism or moral nihilism. As he was aware of all contemporary dogmatic philosophical views and kept himself away from them by taking a middle position, so he was aware of the two moral dogmas and made room for moral responsibility in a middle path. In this context, I conclude that the Buddha's position on morality is "neither deterministic nor indeterministic."

The principle of dependent arising is applied to the division of human types. Observation of the second and the fourth types of person reflects this principle. Other conditions can always intervene between conduct and consequence. For example, when a good person is to be born in a good state, a factor that interrupts the scheduled plan may intervene. As a result, the good person could be born in a bad state. Or, the good person can perform a bad action at the time of death, and this factor may bring him or her to a bad status. In other words, one agent's characteristics are never the same as another's. One person's behaviors are never the same as another's. Besides the person's characteristics and behaviors, we have many possible conditions. With many different conditions, a good person or a bad person can be born in a bad or a good status. However, all conditions are not perfectly visible. We are not able to see all the conditions. Furthermore, since "the principle of dependent arising is an extension of experience into the obvious past and the future,"[82] the person's good or bad conduct can be countervailed by one's bad or good

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[82] David Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy (Hnolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992) 54.

conduct of a previous life. Consequently, good or bad conduct does not carry an agent into a good or a bad status simply according to a one to one correspondence between act and consequence.

Indeed, the principle of dependent arising functions throughout the present, past, and future. Depending upon the quality of an agent, a variety of consequences can result. A morally bad agent can be reborn in hell by committing a minor deed of wickedness. A morally good agent can expiate the same slight deed of wickedness in the present life. In other words, the same wicked deed brings different consequences depending upon the character of the agent. Here the link between an action and consequence is not absolutely settled. The general quality of the agent will produce a consequence where quality is equivalent to that of the agent.

This is more clearly explained by using the simile of salt. A small amount of salt can make water either undrinkable or drinkable depending upon the amount of water. If one puts a lump of salt into a cup of water, the water becomes undrinkable. But if one were to it into the river Ganges, the water of the Ganges would still be drinkable. In exactly the same way, the same slight deed of wickedness may either produce a bad consequence such as hell, or it may be expiated.

We have seen why a strict determinism or one-to-one relationship between action and consequence is not proposed by the Buddha. This is because he sees all actions under the principle of dependent arising. Notice that in the above case the application of the idea of dependent arising to the causal relationship of action and consequence is limited to the present. As stated earlier, however, from the perspective of the theory of rebirth, the

causal mechanism of kamma includes the present, past, and future. The principle of dependent arising will thus be extended to the past and future. In fact, in the Buddha's own words, "the principle of dependent arising is an extension of the experience of dependence into the obvious past and the future."[83]

The scope of the dependent arising that connects action and consequence pervades the three times. This will become clear if we consider the scope of kamma and rebirth theory, and kamma's effectiveness in terms of the three times. When we say that the scope of kamma and rebirth includes the three times, we do not assume a certain beginning point of the past or ending point in the future. The past time is without known beginning and the future time may be endless. Therefore, the causal connection connections of action and consequence are laid out through an endless period. Notice that in Buddhism ignorance and dispositions, which are the first links in the kammic chain, have been formulated in an indeterminate past. Also, it is worth noticing that we have, among four kinds of kammas, a kamma which brings forth a result in some after-life (***aparāpariya vedaniya***). In comparison with the other three kammas,[84] this kamma represents better the indefinite interval between the connection of action and consequence. Just the link intervenes a beginningless and endless time period, so does the principle of dependent arising.

Since there is an indefinite time between an action and its result, a moral agent will not be able to trace a complete causal and effect cycle. Furthermore, as we saw, the links may be multiple. A present consequence or kammic action can have its cause at any previous

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83 Kalupahana 127.

84 The other three kammas are: kamma having immediate effect in this life, kamma having effect in the next succeeding life, and kamma losing its effect and potential effect. Hammalawa Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (London: Wisdom Publications, 1986) 30.

time. In other words, the present consequence or kammic action can be a counterpart of either a past life or the present life. The same is true in the case of future consequences and kammic actions. They are covered by both the present and past lives. Therefore, such an understanding as "present kamma is a counterpart of the past kamma" or "future kamma is a counterpart of a present kamma"[85] does not seem to be correct. The three times are not separated from one another. The kammic causal connections of the present extend throughout the past and into the future.

The connectedness of the three times in the early Buddhist conception of kamma may be compared with that of Heidegger. In Heidegger's thought, the three times are intertwined, and the present carries the unclosed past as history, and the future as unfulfilled possibility. In other words, an individual *Dasein* is a bearer of temporality that includes the present, past and future. Neither the notion of kamma nor Heidegger's notion of time involves a linear sequence of the three times. These times are involved in an individual's every action. For example, when I am writing something, I am calling on previous experiences and also thinking about what I am going to write next.

The notion of an unlimited time adds two ideas to the principle of dependent arising. First of all, regarding the link between action and consequence, it functions as a theoretical ground for the free will problem. To refer to Dharmasiri's interpretation: we have free choice, or free will, and causal connections are indeterministic. The result of an action which is decided by free will will not necessarily be confined to the present time. Therefore, from this perspective free will is also extended in terms of time. Likewise, since

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[85] Story 11.

time extends in two directions, we can say that if the result of a free action cannot be found in the present, it may be found in the future. Furthermore, we can say the action itself is a result of free action in the past. A current scholarly argument seems to provide a justification for this: "kamma itself in the ultimate sense is the product of choice and free will."[86] The doctrine of kamma together with the concept of limitless time seems to support a free will argument. However, a further question needs to be asked from the perspective of dependent arising since everything is explained in terms of the principle of dependent arising. Human will is not free from it. It is conditioned by, or at least interacts with, dependently arisen situations. It is not possible to have a pure free will.

Secondly, the concept of unlimited time can be useful in motivating people to be compassionate toward others.[87] With regard to the past unlimited time, we can infer that we have been related to others in many previous lives. Aronson argues that "there is no person in the world today who has not been in a close relationship to us."[88] Aronson's claim seems a little strong, but it is still acceptable. Furthermore, the concept of unlimited time along with the principle of dependent arising strongly implies such interconnection. If we trace past lives continuously, all people, including animals, will be seen as interrelated. With regard to future time, unless we are free from the continuously wandering world, we can assume that we may have a close relationship with others in the future. It would be a

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86 Story 4.

87 A similar idea is written by Dharmasiri in the context of the problem of rebirth. He writes: Another important phenomenological significance of the belief in rebirth is the powerful moral perspective it lends to altruistic activities, as discussed above, by suggesting that other beings could have been closely related to oneself in previous births. Gunapala Dharmasiri, Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics (Antioch: Golden Leaves Publishing Company, 1989) 40.

88 Harvey Aronson, "The Relationship of the Karmic to the *Nirvānic* in *Theravāda* Buddhism," Journal of Religious Ethics ns 7.1 (1979): 43.

reasonable to conclude both that we have seen in close relationships with others in past lives, and that we may be so in future lives. One who accepts this conclusion should be more compassionate and caring toward others. For such a person it would be easy to live with the essential virtues of early Buddhist ethics, virtues such as loving-kindness (***mettā***), compassion (***karuṇā***), sympathetic joy (***muditā***), and equanimity (***upekkhā***).

At this juncture, we need to return to our earlier discussion in order to close this section. Earlier we discussed that origin of kamma and rebirth is ignorance and the moral goal is to attain freedom from ignorance. Since ignorance is a direct cause of kamma and rebirth and "ignorance is the basis of all suffering,"[89] it should be exterminated. To exterminate ignorance is equivalent to the destruction of the three defilements of greed (***lobha***), hatred (***dosa***), and confusion (***moha***). When action is freed from the three conditions, kamma is barren instead of fruitful; no more rebirth exists. For this purpose, one needs to practice virtues in actions and transform oneself by doing so.

B. CLASSICAL CONFUCIANISM

The metaphysical ground of morals in classical Confucianism is found in the notion of *t'ien* or Heaven. Confucius retrieves the origin of morals from the notion of *t'ien.* The locus of *t'ien,* as a moral source, becomes identified in the human mind. However, Confucius does not claim *t'ien* merely as a moral source. Rather, *t'ien* for him has more complex implications. The complexity of the notion of *t'ien* gradually disappears in

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[89] Sn 729.

Mencius' moral theory. It is Mencius who refines the notion of *t'ien* as a moral source in the human mind. Furthermore, he concretizes and internalizes it as morality.

The complexity of the notion of *t'ien* is a reflection of complexity of ancient Chinese thought about *t'ien*. In other words, Confucius' and Mencius' thoughts on *t'ien*, regardless of the degree of the influence of previous thoughts on *t'ien*, still reflect the ancient idea. In the ancient idea, *t'ien* is not a moral concept and it carries the image of personal God that protects people and controls things. In spite of influence and adoption, Confucius' and Mencius' notion of *t'ien* is revolutionary in the sense that it is depersonalized and internalized as inner morality.

We see three implications of *t'ien* that are not simply associated with morality in the Analects. First, it refers to a kind of watchman or judge of human behavior. When Confucius is asked by one of his pupils, Wang-sun Chia, about offering, he answers that "when you offended against Heaven, there is nowhere you can turn to in your prayers."[90] It seems that *t'ien*, here, is an absolute which has awesome power over humanity. Taking a similar passage: "...if I have done anything improper, may Heaven's curse be on me"[91] and also, "alas, Heaven has bereft me! Heaven has bereft me."[92] This *t'ien* seems to exist outside of humans rather than inside of humans, as watching over human behaviors and controlling them.

Second, *t'ien* as a cosmological principle manages the change of seasons and time. When Confucius said, "I am thinking of giving up speech," Tzu kung spoke, "If you did

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90 3-13.
91 6-28.
92 11-8.

not speak what would there be for us, your disciples to transmit?" To Tzu kung's response, Confucius said, "What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?"[93] This verse shows the more general *t'ien* concept which is a common trait of many other primitive religions. It appears as a universal God which moves and controls the real world from behind the world. In other words, "Heaven is that there is an objective order which is the manifestation of the work of Heaven: Perhaps it would be more correct to conceive of Heaven in impersonal rather than personal terms."[94]

Third, *t'ien* is a controller of human wealth and honor as well as of death as it exists beyond the control of humans. "Tzu-hsia said, I have heard it said; (Life and death are a matter of Destiny.) Wealth and honor depend on Heaven."[95] As the life and death of humans is beyond power, so wealth and honor of humans depend on *t'ien*. Also, for Confucius, death is a matter of destiny.[96]

The three characteristics of *t'ien* show Confucius' reflection on it as external power not associated with human morality. These are more like personal and anthropomorphic aspects of God which are remnants of ancient Chinese thought. So, these are not ethical concepts. As matter of fact, the Analects shows much more this external aspect of *t'ien* than its internal ethical aspect.

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[93] 17-19.

[94] Shu-hsien Liu, "The Religious Import of Confucian Philosophy; Its Traditional Outlook and Contemporary Significance," Philosophy East & West ns 21.2 (1971): 158.

[95] 12-5.

[96] Confucius' thought on death is represented in his lamentation on his pupil dying of illness. Visiting him, he said; "...it must be Destiny." For him, death is a problem which is beyond human power.

Reflection on *t'ien* as a moral ground begins with the idea of *t'ien ming*, Heaven's Mandate or Destiny. It shows the ethical aspect of *t'ien*. Confucius develops his creative humanistic thinking through the idea of *t'ien ming*. He indicates *t'ien* as the internal morality by claiming that it is given in him.

First, *t'ien ming* needs to be recognized as morality in the human mind. It is to be understood through learning. It is not given by personal God as in the Christian tradition. For Confucius, understanding it is tremendously important, and is to be achieved as a culmination of learning from the perspective of the Confucian moral goal. "A man has no way of becoming a virtuous one (*chun tzu*) unless he understands Destiny."[97] Confucian learning (*hsueh*) as a personal cultivation implies the practice of virtues and leads one to the recognition of *t'ien ming*. When Confucius understands it, he seems to be ready to claim this: "Heaven is author of the virtue that is in me."[98] *T'ien* is substantiated and internalized as a supreme virtue in one's own mind. However, it is hard to describe specifically the nature of *t'ien* in the form of an internalized supreme virtue. In comparison with Mencius' notion, Confucius' notion of *t'ien* is much looser.

While the Confucian notion of *t'ien* reveals morality on a more abstract level, another of his related notion--the notion of gods and spirits (*qui shen*)--presents his moral idea more specifically. We will so on see how the latter notion reveals specific human ethics.

In the Analects, gods and spirits are objects of sacrifice (*ji*). Confucius' position regarding the gods and spirits is recorded. He says: "...Keep one's distance from the gods and spirits." These words presuppose the existence of the gods and spirits because we

97 20-3.
98 11-8.

cannot keep distance from something without admitting its existence. I think this remark insinuates two things indirectly. One is that one should have "reverence (*ching*) for the gods and spirits," the other is that one should "not be too close to them." These two positions are reconfirmed in another passage. Confucius tells what attitude one should take when reverencing the gods and spirits: "'Sacrifice as if present' is taken to mean 'sacrifice to the gods as if the gods were present'"; The Master, however, said, "Unless I take part in a sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice." Even when a meal consisted only of coarse rice and vegetable broth, he invariably made an offering from them and invariably did so solemnly."[99] In other words, in making sacrifices he recommends doing so sincerely with one's own heart.

When we consider the above attitude in making sacrifice we cannot but think that Confucius believed in the existence of the gods and spirits. However, if we consider his remark, "Keep distance from the gods and spirits," he does not seem to mean that we should serve the gods and spirits wholeheartedly. It should be understood that this remark was made from the standpoint of a human being. The world where we are is not the world of the gods and spirits but the world of humans. For Confucius, the most important thing was to serve humans. When Chi-lu asked how the spirits of the dead and the gods should be served, Confucius answered like this; "serve man (*shih jen*)" and "understand life (*chih sheng*)": "Chi-lu asked how the spirits of the dead and the gods should be served. The Master said, 'You are not able to even serve man. How can you serve the spirits?' 'May I ask about death?' 'You do not understand even life how can you understand death?'"[100]

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[99] 3-12.
[100] 11-12.

This passage can be literally interpreted into two ways focusing on the question, "How can you serve the spirits?" First, after you serve humans you serve the spirits. Secondly, you serve only humans and need not serve the spirits. If we understand the deep meaning of his remark, "You are not able to serve man. How can you serve the spirits?," we seem to be required to take the second position. Confucius teaches that one should serve humans even after they die. When he was asked about being filial (*hsiao*), he answered: "when your parents are alive, comply with the rites (*li*) in serving them; When they die, comply with the rites in burying them; comply with the rites in sacrificing to them."[101] As we see in this verse, being filial also means to serve parents, and to serve them as spirits, and through the spirits after they die. Sacrificing to parents that appear as spirits after they die, means not serving spirits themselves but serving parents in the context of extended life. The point of sacrifice is not on serving themselves but the serving of parents through sacrifice. For Confucius, sacrifice to parents is an expression of respect.

Reviewing the meaning of sacrifice in the Analects, we can draw several conclusions about sacrifice. First, Confucius does not seem to negate absolutely the existence of the gods and spirits. Second, he teaches that one should serve humans before serving the gods and spirits. In other words, he teaches that one had better serve humans rather than serve the gods and spirits. Third, he recommends sacrificing to the gods and spirits, but his real intention of sacrificing to them is in serving humans sincerely even after they die.

So far, we found the two aspects of *t'ien* by examining the notion of *t'ien* of Confucius. One is an external personal aspect and the other is an internal depersonal aspect. Human

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[101] 2-5.

virtues are grounded on the latter aspect. They are in the human mind and recognized by learning. However, the latter aspect is still abstract in so far as it does not yet prescribe specific ethical norms. The specific ethical norms are better derived from his thoughts on the gods and spirits. As we have seen, sacrifice to them is no more than one of the expressions of respect to humans.

Moving on to reflect on Mencius's concept of *t'ien* as a moral ground, we shall start by discussing the subtle differences between the two thinkers.

In general, their ideas on *t'ien* as a moral ground are not very different. However, there is a difference in the degree to which they emphasize a certain point. We see many passages on the external aspect of *t'ien* in the Analects while we see many passages on the internal aspect of *t'ien* in Mencius. In other words, Mencius far more firmly establishes *t'ien* as a moral ground.

Mencius it is true, also perceives *t'ien* as an external power: "...Heaven alone can grant success."[102] Another feature of this external *t'ien* is given in order to test humans. *T'ien* does not send down a leader during bad years to test people by ensnaring their hearts.[103] It seems that *t'ien* is a controller of human affairs and of bad and good times. Even though the tremendous power of *t'ien* becomes more moderate, it still remains a controller in the human world. Human success and failure still depend on Decree.

However, Mencius emphasizes a person's own influence on his/her success and failure. He thinks all good pleasure and indolence is brought by humans: "there is neither good nor

[102] 1B-14. Another similar verse is 5A-8. This verse implies that there is the Decree, *ming*, in the process and the result of work. In other words, there is Decree in the matters of success and failure.
[103] 6A-7.

bad fortune which one does not bring upon oneself...."[104] This position makes an ethically significant point in the sense that he values an agency in reaping the results of one's own action. Furthermore, he gradually overcomes the external aspect of *t'ien* and lays out *t'ien* as an internal moral concept.

Considering the gods and spirits, we see that they still play a role. Although there is no mention about the gods and spirits in Mencius, their existence is implied. The altars of earth and grain take the second position in the order of the degree of importance. Mencius says how to properly sacrifice to them and that altars should be replaced even if natural disaster continues in spite of sacrifice. Here one thing to be pointed out is that the gods and spirits do not seem to be only ancestor gods, which is different from Confucius' position. For Confucius, the gods and spirits appear to be only ancestor gods.[105]

It is important to note that altars can be replaced if they are considered unhelpful to humans and they are less important. So, Mencius' position regarding the gods and spirits is similar to Confucius.' For both thinkers, humans are prior to the god and spirits. However, Mencius' position is obviously more human-centered.

It is clear that we hardly see the emphasis on the unreasonably powerful *t'ien* in Mencius. There is remarkably little concern with the external power of *t'ien* in Mencius. It is a reasonable moral law which is within humans, rather than an external powerful God. It is pursued in the human mind as a specific moral virtue: "...Benevolence is the high honor bestowed by Heaven and the peaceful abode of man....[106] Mencius said;There are honors

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104 2A-4.
105 7B-4.
106 2A-7.

bestowed by Heaven, and there are honors bestowed by man. Benevolence, dutifulness, consciousness, truthfulness to one's word, unflagging delight in what is good, -- these are honors bestowed by Heaven...."[107] Here Heaven is clearly substantialized as four main virtues and benevolence is placed first. Compared to the internalized virtue of Confucius, the specific virtues here are applied for all people. For Confucius, apparently, the internalized virtue is applicable to fewer people. One can argue that for Confucius *t'ien* as supreme morality is pursued by only a specific group of people such as a virtuous one or sage. Mencius, on the other hand, claims that all people have the Heaven-given virtues, so the virtues are applicable to everybody.

For Confucius, how one may recognize *t'ien ming* as a moral virtue is not clear, even though he implies that it is possible to recognize it through incessant learning. For Mencius, how to recognize the virtue is obvious and more specific.

Humans are born with a seed to recognize the virtues. The seed is a potentiality to know supreme inner virtues or Heaven. Using this potentiality and recognizing Heaven is being aware of one's own nature. Mencius says:

> For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By retaining his heart and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven. Whether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper destiny.[108]

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107 6A-15.
108 7A-1.

The essential meaning of *t'ien* is internal morality for both Confucius and Mencius. From the perspective of morality, *t'ien* is a ground of morality. When *t'ien is* located in the human mind, it becomes a moral principle. As pointed out, *t'ien* for Mencius is more specifically moral. For him, *t'ien* is the source of moral life.[109] Furthermore, Mencius understands *t'ien* as human nature. It is given to everybody equally. The person who recognizes *t'ien*, which is not different from one's own nature, can nurture one's nature and serve *t'ien* at the same time. In other words, nurturing one's nature and serving *t'ien* are not different. So, this *t'ien* is not to be found anywhere except the human mind. This is epitomized in the following passage from the last book of Mencius:

> For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By retaining his heart and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven.[110] All the ten thousand things are there in me. there is no greater joy for me than to find on self-examination, that I am true to myself.[111]

C. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the early Buddhist system, everyone is bound up with kamma and the rebirth cycle. As long as one is under kammic influences, one holds consciousness (***viññāṇa***) continuously. In other words, consciousness takes people into various forms of life. Since consciousness is the primary recognizable subject that travels the continuously wandering

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109 Kwong-loi Shun, "Moral Reason in Confucian Ethics," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16 (1989): 327.
110 7A-1.
111 7A-4.

world, one needs to put an end to it in order not to be reborn.

The origin of consciousness is based upon ignorance, which is the origin of kamma and dispositions (***saṅkhāra***). Eliminating ignorance and, as a result of it, not holding consciousness is the way to put an end to rebirth. If one wants to obtain the moral goal (***nibbāna***), one needs to work for it. To be moral in actions, speech, and thought is fundamental. As we will see in the next chapter, this requires one to practice self-restraint. Furthermore, to realize the main virtue of compassion it is necessary to obtain the moral goal.

In the classical Confucianist system, we have seen that the ground of morals is laid out in the notion of *t'ien.* Confucius and Mencius recognize and establish morals through the notion of *t'ien. T'ien* for Confucius is both external God and the internal moral principle in one's mind. The external aspect of *t'ien* is a reflection of the ancient traditional concept of *t'ien.* This introduction of the internal moral aspect of *t'ien* is very significant in the sense that it is a turning point for moral speculation. Mencius, as a successor of Confucius, highlights the internal aspect of *t'ien.* He more systematically claims that *t'ien* as morality exists in everyone's mind. The realization of *t'ien* is perceived as the cultivation of human nature, by which he means to cultivate morality. In classical Confucianism moral cultivation requires practising self-overcoming and developing benevolence. This concept of moral cultivation will be discussed in the next chapter.

As we have discussed, morals originate from the inner necessity of humans in both early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. Neither system argues that a personal God endows humans with morals. The beginning point of morality is not external. In early

Buddhism, morality is based on a logical explanation of kammic influences together with the principle of dependent arising. In classical Confucianism, morality is based on the realization of *t'ien* in the mind. Both systems believe that humankind is endowed with the capability to achieve freedom. Both systems require moral practice in order to achieve this freedom. Overcoming kammic influences by being moral and establishing morals by realizing *t'ien* in the mind are possibilities and duties for everybody. In order to fulfill these duties, one must make constant and active efforts. The metaphysical systems of morals in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism require diligent efforts to achieve moral perfection, since no other possible way is not provided.

Both systems deal with the spirits in a similar way. Early Buddhism considers heavenly existences from the human perspective. To be a heavenly being in early Buddhism is not the final goal of a moral agent, since the heavenly being is in the wandering world where kammic influences function. In other words, the heavenly world is desirable not for a morally perfected person but for the one who is still in the continuously wandering world. In order to achieve moral perfection (freedom), heavenly beings should come back to the human world. The human world is the only place where one is able to achieve moral perfection. The Buddha as a morally perfected one in the human world is highly respected by the heavenly gods.[112] Similarly, for Confucius and Mencius, the gods and spirits are mentioned from the human-centered perspective. Recall that sacrifice to the gods and spirits is primarily an extended way of serving humans. In both systems, the spirits are explained in the context of human morals. In short, the notion of gods is used for the

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[112] The gods in heavenly world are frequently taught by the Buddha and pay a respect to him.

purpose of motivating humans to be moral. This way of looking at gods is based on their pragmatic position regarding morals.

In spite of their similar perspectives regarding gods, we notice that each system has a unique way of thinking about and explaining moral grounds. Kamma theory itself carries a heavy metaphysical assumption: I will probably be reborn depending upon what I did or what I shall do unless I become an enlightened one. Although one can validate the idea of rebirth by inductive logic since it was observed by someone, one cannot prove the idea of kamma. In other words, the Buddha does not seem to provide a clear-cut relationship between good and bad human behavior, and the five types of rebirth. When he mentions that he saw such and such behavior of a person, and that he/she was born in such and such a place as a result of his/her behaviors, he gives a general explanation of kamma and rebirth. However, kamma theory is complicated because of its association with the principle of dependent arising. Also, the relationships between behavior and consequence are irretrievably scattered throughout time. Who is able to perceive the relationships that are made under the principle of dependent arising throughout limitless time? Since most people do not perceive the relationships between behavior and consequence, or the connection between kamma and rebirth, kamma theory seems to involve strong metaphysical assumptions. It is nontheless the basis of the early Buddhist metaphysics of morals.

To contrast with the early Buddhist metaphysics of morals, what mode of thinking can one observe in classical Confucianism? Its metaphysics seems to be more simple. Confucius' and Mencius' reflection begins with "*t'ien.*" Their reflection on *t'ien* tends

toward a single point, namely, its internalization and ethicization in the human mind. They try to overcome the images of a personal God by replacing them with the virtues endowed.

One may ask this question: are Confucius and Mencius successful in claiming "Heaven-given-virtue" or "endowed-morality?" Do they prove their claim sucessfully? They do not seem to provide evidential explanations.

The metaphysical grounds of morals of a self-transformative person are distinctively different in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. There is no speculation on the Confucian and Mencian type of Heaven in the former system. Correspondingly, there is no speculation on kamma and rebirth in the latter system. However, their critical methodologies following after their traditions are strikingly similiar. Their way of looking at their own traditional concepts, kamma and rebirth, and *t'ien*, is revolutionary in the sense that they put humans at the center and establish a firm moral foundation on the ground of the two concepts. Utilizing the traditional concepts in the light of morals, they set out the frameworks of moral metaphysics by modifying and reformulating them from the human-centered-pespective.

CHAPTER III. THE MAIN VIRTUE: A SELF-TRANSFORMATIVE METHOD

In this chapter, I shall try to answer the question of how self-transformation is possible. The question requires us to examine how and what virtues are supposed to be embodied in a self-transformed person. The question can be formulated in various dimensions of which I shall focus on two. (1) What does the self do regarding itself in the context of the self? (2) What does the self do in the face of others or, in what way does one interact with others? On the other hand, I shall explain the ethical significances of self-restraint/self-overcoming and interpret compassion/benevolence in the light of modern scholarship.

Both early Buddhists and classical Confucianists by and large bear a close similarity regarding these two dimensions. In the dimension of the self alone, both systems assert the necessity of self-restraint (***saṁyama***)/self-overcoming (*ke chi*) for self-transformation.[113] Self-restraint/self-overcoming is fundamental to work in the first dimension, namely, the self alone. In the second dimension, namely, the dimension of social interaction, one needs to practice and embody "compassion (***karuṇā***, or ***anukampā***)"/"benevolence (*jen*)."

In my interpretation, self-restraint/self-overcoming is a prerequisite for embodying compassion/benevolence in oneself. Without practicing the former, one cannot be

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113 I prefer to single out the term self-restraint (***saṁyama***) and self-overcome (*ke chi*). There are so many terms in early Buddhism that render the sense of restraint. For example, ***saṁvara*** (restrained), ***danta*** (restrained), ***vijita*** (conquered), ***saṁvuta*** (restrained) ***samāhita*** (tranquillized), and so forth. The terms seem to be used denoting three different fields of restraint. I mean a general sense of all possible control or overcoming by restraint (***saṁyama***). Its Confucian equivalent is relatively not diverse. Self-overcoming (*ke chi*) seems to be the most appropriate term to render the idea of self-restraint. In English, I do not significantly differentiate the terms to restrain and to overcome. Other terms such as to control or to subdue can be used.

successful in the latter dimension. The converse is also true: the former is not meaningful unless it is conjoined with the latter. The latter as a cardinal virtue for self-transformation presupposes the former.

A. SELF-RESTRAINT AND COMPASSION IN EARLY BUDDHISM

(1) Self-restraint

Early Buddhists place great emphasis on self-restraint (***saṁyama***) and believe it is a means of self-transformation. It is fundamental in the sense that it is a beginning point for moral development. It is a culminating element in the sense that it is considered as one of the essential characteristics of a worthy one (***arahat***). To practice self-restraint is not something that is beyond human capability. Furthermore, to accomplish self-restraint is always achievable regardless of gender or class. However, it is perceived as something difficult to achieve.

The image of a self-restrained person is represented as a conqueror. The conqueror image is shown in the simile of the charioteer. The idea of a charioteer who controls a chariot in a correct direction is used as an analogy for a person training him/herself in self-restraint. Just a charioteer controls a chariot, so a worthy one controls all his/her sense faculties (***indriya***).[114]

The most fundamental restraint is restraint of the sense faculties (***indriyasaṁvara***). Restraining the sense faculties facilitates the noble state of life (***brahmavihāra***);[115] non-

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[114] The Buddha is described as a great charioteer, as an incomparable (***anuttara***) charioteer of men to be tamed (***purisadammasarathi***) (BGS 1.151). There is no doubt that the singular and essential characteristic of conqueror or a charioteer is self-restraint.

[115] BGS 5.93.

restraint of the faculties is an obstacle to the achievement of the noble state of life.[116] The major aim of the restraint of the sense faculties is to control the six sensory faculties, namely, the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental facculties. Controlling the entire body and mind through restraining the six sensory faculties is repeatedly emphasized in the early Buddhist texts.

Restraint of the six sensory faculties is explained in terms of restraint of the three fields: bodily, verbal, and mental. The restraints of the three fields are closely bound to each other, appear together, and represent the total restraint of the self. One who restrains oneself in body (*sarīra*), speech (*vācā*), and thought (*citta*) abandons evil conduct in the three fields.[117] Here a self-transformed person's moral practice is understood as a matter of restraining the actions of the three fields.

Why does early Buddhist ethical theory emphasize self-restraint? What are the benefits of self-restraint for self-transformation? Self-restraint apparently brings purity (*suddhi*, or *visuddhi*) and non-attachment (*viveka* or *nekkhamma*) which are clearly positive psychological results.

The *Sutta-nipāta* clearly states that "purity comes through restraint (*suddhiṁ vataṁ samādāya upaṭṭhitāse*)."[118] Purity means the annihilation of nfluxe (*āsava)*; as a result of

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116 BGS 5.93.

117 Dh 231-33. When one achieves restraint in conduct of the three fields, one is said to be perfected in terms of restraint (Dh 234).

118 Sn 898.

self-restraint or of detachment (***nekkhamma***) from sense pleasure (***kāma***) one obtains the annihilation of the influxes (***āsavakkhaya***).[119]

Another result of self-restraint is non-attachment. In order to understand the process by which self-restraint leads to non-attachment, one must be clear about what attachment means in the Buddhist context. One of the attachments which is most frequently warned against is attachment to sense pleasures. The Buddha thought that attachment to sense pleasures is a major hinderance to the moral goal and is something to be overcome. Overcoming attachment to sense pleasures rightly begins with understanding the nature of sense pleasures. When one correctly sees their nature, one becomes disgusted with them. To understand that sense pleasures are unwholesome and impermanent, and therefore they are connected with suffering, is essential for avoiding indulgence in sensual pleasures and detaching oneself from them.[120] Furthermore, restraint of mind and speech are also cultivated in overcoming with right understanding. So, wisdom (***paññā***), or understanding the nature of things correctly, is always required for self-restraint.

In terms of detachment, while bodily restraint brings about detachment from sense pleasures, restraint of the mind seems to bring other types of detachment. In the ***Cūḷasihanāda Sutta***, the Buddha mentions four kinds of grasping: grasping at sense pleasures (***kāmupādāna***), grasping at views (***diṭṭhupādāna***), grasping at rules and ritual

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119 Thag 458. If one controls the sense faculties well, one is free from the influxes (Thag 205-06). One who tames oneself abandons sense desire and cleanses oneself of impurities of thought (***cittakilesa***) (Dh 88).

120 Their nature is described vividly in the ***Therigāthā***. Sense-pleasures are likened to a frightful attack, a snake's head, a butcher's knife, a chopping block, and a fire-brand (Thig 353, 488). Furthermore, they are perceived as the root of evil (***aghamūlā***) (Thig 489). They can be pleasurable; but this is an unstable (***addhuva***), limited pleasure which eventually brings sufferings (Thig 510).

(*sīlabbatupādāna*), and grasping at the theory of self (*attavādupādāna*).[121] Restraining the mind, one frees oneself from the four kinds of grasping. With regard to restraint of speech, the Buddha emphasizes detachment from secret speech (*rahovāda*) that is harmful and disconnected talk (*khīṇavāda*) that is harmful.[122] Being Detached from harmful secret and disconnected speech, one should consider both the truthfulness and usefulness of one's speech in the light of the moral goal. Even though one's speech be truthful, it should be abandoned if it is not connected with the goal. By this the Buddha seems to mean that one should avoid becoming involved in metaphysical discussions that are not related to the moral life and are not verifiable on the basis of experience. In my understanding, since early Buddhism is a goal or freedom-oriented moral system, a pragmatic position seems to be taken regarding actions of speech, in line with the moral goal. The Buddha's pragmatic positon in the light of moral practice will be discussed further in Chapter V.

Together with a correct understanding of things, concentration (*samādhi*) also serves as a means of self-restraint. Self-restraint becomes habitual as a result of, oft-repeated concentration. Through repeated practice of concentration or reflection self-restraint is obtained.[123] However, most commonly, concentration is a helpful technique in the process

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121 MLS 1.88.

122 M 3.230, 236. First, he says that one should not use secret speech (*rahovāda*) and disconnected speech (*khīṇavāda*) (M 3.230). Explaining secret and disconnected speech, he means that one should abandon only harmful (*saraṇa*) secret speech and harmful disconnected speech. In other words, he allows for harmless (*araṇa*) secret speech and harmless disconnected speech (M 3.236-37). Two kinds of the secret and disconnected speech should be abandoned: Those that are not true, not connected with goal (*anatthasaṁhita*), and cause suffering, and those which are true but not connected with goal, and cause suffering. These two, being wrong paths, are harmful. The third type of secret and disconnected speech is a right path and not harmful: that which is true and connected with welfare, and which does not cause suffering.

123 The Buddha talks about repeated concentration: "All those recluses and brahmans, Rahula, who in the long past purified a deed of body, purified a deed of speech, purified a deed of mind, did so (only) after repeated reflection (*paccavekkhitvā*)" (MLS 2.90).

of self-restraint and it is done before achieving self-restraint. The Buddha confirms that the role of concentration is the continuous process of self-restraint. It is like a mirror reflecting all behaviors of the three fields in the process of developing self-discipline. Before, during, and after achieving self-restraint, one should apply concentration. Before self-restraint, one needs to penetrate into the nature and function of the three fields through meditative technique. During the process of obtaining self-restraint, one needs to check one's activities in a meditative way. After achieving self-restraint, one needs to continuously maintain the achieved restraint in concentration. Therefore, concentration is never to be separated from self-restraint even for a single moment. Finally, a self-transformed person makes concentration a part of his/her familiarization. Every action of the self-transformed person should be performed with concentration.

It has been observed that right understanding (*paññā*) and concentration (*samādhi)* play an important role in self-restraint. Virtues (*sīla*) also play an important role as loci of self-restraint. Five or eight moral virtues (*pañcasīla* or *atthangasīla*) or the code of rules (*pātimokkha*) are closely connected with self-restraint. They especially seem to foster restraint of body and speech. The moral virtues are maintained through self-restraint, and there is some area of overlap between them in experiencing self-restraint. One experiences self-restraint by maintaining moral virtues (*pātimokkha saṁvara saṁavuto*).[124] In this way, moral virtues cooperate with right understanding and concentration in the process of self-restraint.

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124 BGS 3.89, 1.58.

The major practice of self-restraint is to control the six sensory faculties. Since voluntary human actions can generally be apprehended in physical, verbal, and mental form, the Buddha emphasized restraint in the three fields. One may wonder, however, why the Buddha categorized the scope of self-restraint into these three fields, and emphasized their restraint rather than the restraint of each sensory faculty. One possible reason is that the four sensory faculties can be categorized under the rubric of body. The forms of bodily actions include actions of eyes, ears, nose, and tongue. The mind is in a separate category because of its distinctive activity, it functioning whenever the other five sensory faculties are in action. The next question is why he assigned a separate category for actions of speech? If speech functioned like the other four sensory faculties only as a receiver or a taster of food, he would not have needed to point a distinct category. However, the mouth functions as a direct message-sender in interactions with others. It is a door for conscious activities conveying moral thoughts and explains moral actions. Thus, he seems to have considered speech as having a distinctive function in moral communications and assigned it separate category. Thereupon, it seems reasonable that he focused on actions of the three fields.

Self-restraint should be understood in terms of the middle way. As is well-known, the Buddha tells avoidance of both self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*) and self-indulgence (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) with regard to bodily actions. Both extremely ascetic practice and extremely hedonistic satisfaction are to be shunned. From the perspective of bodily restraint, "to be moderate in eating" is repeatedly emphasized as a crucial course of action for self-restrained persons. Without being moderate in taking

food, one is apparently unable to progress in moral cultivation. So, a meal should be taken not for its own sake, but for sustaining the body in order to facilitate the practice of moral virtues; it should be taken thoughtfully and prudently for the maintenance of the body in order to reach the noble way of life.[125]

The attitude one takes with regard to food is neither one of attachment nor of disgust. Adopting a pragmatic attitude for the purpose of maintaining the body in a healthy manner, one can enjoy food. However, to hold a moderate position in taking food is not always easy in real-life situations, due to each person's feelings and judgments. Furthermore, since each person's body is constituted differently, the ideal amount of food intake will differ. In other words, the middle way position does not provide all people with the same standard. The middle way can vary, depending upon the differences among individuals and particular situations. Therefore, skill in decision making is required. Here, there is room for individual autonomy. In the light of the middle way prescription, I understand autonomy as the ability to recognize the middle position and manifest it voluntarily and creatively in one's actions; the middle point reflects one's particularity without overriding a commonly shared morality. Thus, it reveals the most proper moral action within the specific context. This middle way is applied to all actions in the same way including verbal and mental actions.

With regard to oneself, a self-transformative person is restrained in actions of body, mind, and speech, an ability achieved through moderation--taming and tuning human

[125] The Buddha addresses the monks: "How is a monk moderate in eating? Herein a monk takes his food thoughtfully and prudently, not for sport, not for indulgence, not for personal charm or adornment, but just for the support, for the continuance of body, for its resting unharmed, to help the living of the noble way of life..." (GS 2.46).

nature in a desirable and effective way. Thereupon the person is able to move out into the external world, where the tamed self interacts with other humans as well as other kinds of beings.

At this juncture, our discussion turns to how the self transformative person interacts with the world. Encountering the world, what virtues should one endeavor to cultivate? In the matter of interacting with others, one attempts to embody the virtue of compassion.

Before discussing this issue further, let us emphasize the important relationship between self-restraint and compassion. There is no sharp demarcation between the two virtues. No hierarchical order is postulated between them; neither early Buddhism nor classical Confucianism assumes that only after accomplishing the virtues of self-restraint and of self-mastering does one proceed to cultivate the virtue of compassion. Theoretically, it seems to be reasonable to accomplish the virtue of self-restraint before cultivating the virtue of compassion, since self-restraint appears to be a preliminary step for developing compassion. However, practically speaking, both are qualities to be practiced simultaneously. They are not easily separated and the levels of their achievement are diverse.

(2) Development of Compassion

The self, when interacting with others, needs to be understood in terms of dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). The self is never separable from others nor from interactions with them. According to early Buddhism, the self and others have equal value. One cannot think of oneself without others and others cannot be thought of without oneself. In the

case of compassion, self and others are also equally important. With this understanding, compassion is perceived as a virtue for both self and others. This will be made clear as we examine the developmental process entailed in developing compassion in early Buddhism.

Developing compassion seems to have several stages. Compassion begins with the self. In the end and ultimately involves compassion for all sentient beings. The destination would be the realization of happiness for all living beings. Thus, the term compassion should be taken as a virtue for all living beings in Buddhism. It necessarily includes oneself and animals, in addition to other human beings.

The beginning point for developing compassion is oneself. In saying this I want to point out two things. First, it is assumed that one needs to develop a significant level achievement in the process of self-restraint. As a result of restraining oneself to a significant level, a person's mind becomes pure and non-attached. Second, a person takes care of oneself, before taking care of others. The Buddha says that one should not neglect one's own welfare (***aṭṭha***), but should be devoted to the welfare of others by understanding, by analogy, one's own welfare.[126] At this beginning stage of development of compassion, one should understand what one's own welfare consists in. Giving precedence to one's own welfare seems understandable, since the Buddha's first motivation to abandon princeship and become a world renouncer was to liberate himself from perceived sufferings.

126 "One should not neglect one's own welfare through excessive altruism. Having understood one's own welfare, one should be devoted to true welfare" (Dh 161).

Gradually, the concept of others is introduced, but consideration of others is expressed in a negative sentence: one should not hurt others.[127] Being concerned one's own welfare by not ignoring one's own gain, one should be careful to also respect others' gain. "One should not despise one's own gain (*salābham*), nor should one go about coveting others' gain (*aññesaṁ pihayam*) ."[128] One's own welfare is maintained, yet others' welfare is also respected. Notice here that compassion for others is not activated with a strong motivation. Rather, it is latent pending a more active stage of development.

Before we move on to discuss further stages in the development of compassion, the notion of dependent arising needs to be considered in the context of the consideration of others introduced at the earlier stage of deveopment. The notion of dependent arising necessarily brings others into consideration. As mentioned, the Buddha's first motivation to become a renunciant was based on the concept of liberating himself, a goal that was achieved when he became enlightened. After he became enlightened, a further motivation seemed to arise due to the core content of the enlightenment experience, which was dependent arising. The notion of dependent arising implies that one's life is connected with others. By theoretical implication, consideration of others is a natural consequence of the enlightened realization of dependent arising.[129]

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127 Dh 184.
128 Dh 365.
129 In this line of thought, one may argue that the enlightened Buddha should be concerned about others since his life is also connected with others interdependently. One may want to understand the Buddha's resolution to teach morals or his doctrine (*dhamma*) in the context of his connectedness with other beings. However, we see that the Buddha's resolution to preach his doctrine was based on his compassion for people (MLS 1.213) rather than the recognition of his connectedness with all other unenlightened people. His resolution to preach his doctrine after hesitating, because of his concern that people would not understand the deep, subtle, and difficult doctrine, and his active and careful search for the first listener of his doctrine (*Ariya-pariyesanā Sutta*), seem to support the fact that consideration for others in terms of preaching the doctrine is based on the mind of compassion. This position will be taken in chapter IV.

Now welfare for others becomes a consideration in an active way. The others under consideration are people who are directly associated with oneself. The groups of concerns are family, friends, and co-workers. Strangers or unrelated persons do not seem to be considered yet: "Monks, when a good man is born into a family it is for the good (***aṭṭha***), welfare (***hita***) and happiness (***sukha***) of many folk; it is for the good, welfare and happiness of his parents; of his wife and children; of his slaves, work-folk and men; of his friends and companions; it is for the good, welfare and happiness of recluses and brahmans."[130]

At the next step, one seems to start extending one's concern toward all humankind. All humankind (***manussa***) and gods (***deva***) as well become objects of compassion. One intends to work for the welfare (***aṭṭha, hita***) and happiness (***sukha***) of many people out of compassion (***anukampā***) for the world, and also to work for the welfare and happiness of gods and humans.[131] A consideration of gods together with humankind may seem odd. However, if we consider the early Buddhist conception of gods, it would not be odd since the gods are not completely different from humans and other beings. "The gods are as much a part of the world as are the human beings or any other type of living beings."[132]

At the final step of the development of compassion, one includes all sentient beings. "Compassion (***anukampā***) for the welfare of all creatures and beings (***sabbapāṇabhūta***)"[133] is expended to all beings everywhere. It becomes a universal idea without boundary or limitation. Compassion is pervasive under all circumstances

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130 BGS 3.38.
131 DB 2.358
132 M. M. J. Marasinghe, Gods in Early Buddhism (Colombo: 1974) 83.
133 MLS 2.12.

(*sabbatthā*) throughout the entire world.[134] At this stage, compassion becomes a more abstract concept, since it can go beyond concrete connections and specific experiential contexts. At this level compassion is perceived as a universal ethical idea.

As we have seen, the development of compassion as a method of self-transformation in early Buddhist ethics begins with a concern for self and is enlarged to include all other sentient beings. It moves from a concrete form of relationships toward the abstract universal idea. The first half of its development is firmly based on concrete experience through perception of the self and others individually. However, the later half of its development is less concrete, since human beings and other sentient beings are perceived collectively. Compassion is first aroused in perception of particularity and then in perception of universality. The degree of concreteness of relationship is a critical criterion to show a gradual development of compassion from one to many.

From the viewpoint of human beings, it is unclear whether the Buddha differentiates quality of compassion in terms of the degree of concreteness of relationship and level of the evolution of creatures. It is clear that he gives priority to humans over other sentient beings. With regard to human beings only, however, it is not clear that a certain party should receive priority over others. More specifically, it is not clear to argue that one should show more concern about one's own family than others. He seems to argue that one should give the same quality of compassion to all other beings. The attitude of taking care of family becomes expended and equally applied to all others, including animals: "Just

[134] BGS 5.221.

as a mother would protect her only child at the risk of her own life, even so, let him cultivate a boundless heart (***mānasam aparimāṇaṁ***) toward all beings (***sabbabhūta***)."[135]

It may seem appropriate to say that one should be equally compassionate toward oneself, one's family, or friends, and "unrelated" others. This interpretation fits the Buddha's sermon to his pupils on another occasion. In the ***Aṅguttara Nikāya***, he says that one should be bent on the profit (***aṭṭhahita***) both of oneself and another.[136] There is no doubt that what is recommended is actions involving equal recognition of self and others. However, this principle does not give a sufficient answer since there are many cases where one is not able to give equal recognition.

The Buddha's answer seems to make one's own priority. In the same sermon, he discusses his position saying that the person who is bent on his own profit, but not on others is better than the person who is bent on other's profit, but not on his own. The most desirable attitude is to consider, the profits on both sides. However, when one is not able to do that, one must consider one's own profit prior over others.

As we have discussed, the scope of compassion is limitless. Compassion is applied for every sentient being (***sabbabhūta***), including oneself. The fact that the development of compassion begins with the self illuminates the inner mechanism of compassion, namely, the questions of why and how compassion arises. The issues of why and how are related to the self and reflection on the self. Regarding the questions of why and how, one can find answers from the perspective of human psychology.

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135 Sn 149.
136 BGS 2.104.

The question of why can be phrased, "Why should one be compassionate?" and can be answered, by looking at the psychological mechanism of compassion. On this issue, the early Buddhist position is simple: No one wants to experience hurt. Everyone wants to be taken care of with compassion. Just as I want others to be compassionate toward me, others want me to be compassionate toward them. Here we see that the motivation of compassion originates from reflection on the self and from an expectation of others based on the reflection: "One who knows what is suitable (*sāruppa*) for oneself would not hurt (*hiṁseyya*) anyone in the world."[137]

The question of how can be phrased, "How can one generate compassion?" and the answer lies in applying the same self-reflective rule as with the psychology of compassion described above. Reflection on the self is fundamental for generating compassion. Through self-reflection, one sees one's own feelings and preferences. Applying these standards to others, one infers, or assumes, what others would feel and like: "All tremble at punishment; all fear death. Taking oneself as an example for comparison, one should neither strike nor kill." [138]

The psychological mechanism of compassion here is to observe, perceive, and apply one's own preferences. Now one is ready to extend, or extrapolate from those preferences, identified by the self-reflective method, to others. The whole self-reflective process is a procedure for putting oneself in the other's situation. The person identifies oneself with others in a hypothetical situation and decides what action to take. The determining principle is to avoid what one would not want to experience in the other's hypothetically

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137 Sn 368.
138 Dh 129-30.

perceived situation. In other words, the role taking principle provides one with a specific prescription for action.

Notice that sympathy plays a great role in the whole process of extending compassion. One must have sympathetic feelings in identifying oneself with the other's situation. In fact, to have sympathetic feeling is one of the crucial factors for developing compassion in early Buddhist ethics. Sympathy, together with wisdom, is the source of compassion. Compassion could not be activated without sympathetic feelings. The Buddha states: "With his heart thus serene, he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge which penetrates (***abhiniharati***) the heart. Penetrating (***abhininnāmati***) with his own heart the hearts of other beings, of other men, he knows them."[139]

B. SELF-OVERCOMING AND BENEVOLENCE IN CLASSICAL CONFUCIANISM

(1) Self-overcoming

Self-overcoming (*ke chi*) in Confucianism is focused on control of bodily desires. Bodily requirements through sense organs seem to be satisfied in a restrained manner. To be overwhelmed by bodily desires and to indulge in them are seen obstacles to proper perception and cultivation of classical Confucianist virtues. Mencius emphasized that one should overcome bodily desires and should follow more important values.[140] However, a

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139 DB 1.89.

140 One should take care not only of food and drink, but of other values also. "A man who cares only about food and drink is despised by others because he takes care of the parts of smaller importance to the detriment of the parts of greater importance" (6A-14).

minimum level of satisfaction of bodily desires and maintenance of the body are legitimate concerns.[141]

The classical Cofucianist position regarding the body from the perspective of self-overcoming is fairly positive. Bodily desires are acceptable as long as one can control and utilize them for the sake of cultivation of the mind and virtue. Reflection on the positive side of the body and recognition of its utility is highlighted in a pragmatic light.

Self-overcoming goes further. It extends beyond the scope of the body to include control over all things related to a person's everyday activities. Self-overcoming in every situation, even very small matters, becomes purposeful. Losing self-control in small matters, for Confucius, parallels not nurturing the mind or virtue: "The lack of self-restraint in small matters will bring ruin to great plans."[142] Self-overcoming in small matters means refining oneself in every aspect and preparing oneself for higher virtues. Notice that Confucius does not mean ignoring or abandoning small matters that happen around a person. Ignoring or abandoning small matters can make one lose touch with the practical reality of life. To do so contradicts Mencius' and Confucius' thoughts on morals and life, which never lose touch with the firm ground of practicality and the experienced world. In their thought, morals and life are meant to be good and beneficial for humans, so small matters deserve proper attention in the process of self-overcoming for a moral life.

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141 Concern for food and drink should be accompanied by one's concern about cultivation of the mind and higher virtues. When the desires of the body are controlled at a reasonable level with concern about the mind, the organs of the body become more significant: "If a man who cares about food and drink can do so without neglecting any other part of his person, then his mouth and belly are much more important than just a foot of an inch of his skin" (6A-14). Furthermore, Mencius makes a distinction between a non-virtuous man (*hsiao jen*) and a great man (*ta jen*), being based upon what one nurtures: "He who nurtures the parts of smaller importance is a smaller man; One who nurtures the parts of greater importance is a great man" (6A-14).

142 15-27.

The classical Confucianist conception of self-overcoming always holds to its fundamental assumption: neither ignoring nor rejecting ordinary life while pursuing virtue. In other words, ideal virtues should be placed and realized in everyday experienced life situations.

Self-overcoming is not based on extreme restraint. Even though in classical Confucianism poverty is acceptable, asceticism, as an excessive method of discipline or self-overcoming, is not acceptable.[143] Heiner Roetz argues differently stating that "Confucian 'gentleman' must show readiness for poverty and *asceticism*."[144] He does not make clear what he means by asceticism here. If he uses the term in the sense of physical austerity in a special and inevitable situation, it would not be inappropriate, for there seem to be exceptional cases. The condition for practicing asceticism is an unavoidable situation. If ascetic measures are the only way to maintain one's virtue, the ascetic way would be taken.[145]

As implied, being poor is not seen as desirable. However, a virtuous person does not feel uncomfortable with being poor. When placed in a poor situation, such a person can still lead a virtuous life without an agitated or unhappy mind. The difference between a

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143 Great care seems to be required in applying the term asceticism for classical Confucianism. Webster's Dictionary gives two meanings for the term: (1) Practicing strict self-denial as a measure of personal and especially spiritual discipline. (2) Austere in appearance, manner, or attitude. Asceticism in the first sense of "practicing self-denial" does not fit classical Confucianism. However, asceticism is allowable in the sense of "austere in manner" in an exceptional situation where one does not find a less severe way of maintaining one's virtue. Thus, we can say that in general classical Confucianism does not accept the ascetic way. Especially, it does not recommend an ascetic way of discipline for self-overcoming. In fact, it should be abandoned.

144 Heiner Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) 162.

145 For example, when Po-i and Shu-ch'i were not able to find any other way to keep their virtue, they accept an austere situation and died of hunger.

virtuous person and a non-virtuous person (*hsiao jen*) is their attitude in dealing with poverty. The virtuous person can still lead a joyful life while the non-virtuous person cannot, since the latter becomes overwhelmed in a situation of poverty. In other words, the difference between the two is grounded on the major values they maintain in their life or whether they have any other overriding value over wealth. The virtuous person has overriding values, while the non-virtuous person does not.[146] Leading a joyful life in a situation of poverty is certainly an additional positive quality of the virtuous person. One delights in being poor.[147] The capability to live in this way is a result of habituating oneself to self-overcoming. Confucius praises Hui who was leading such a life and found perfect joy in a situation intolerable to most people.[148]

Classical Confucianism rarely praises an ascetic way of life. Rather, it praises a simple and joyful life even in difficult situations. Without specific examples which can be taken as a measure to determine what a difficult situation is, I rely on intuitive understanding of the texts. Classical Cofucianist ethics appear to take for granted a minimum sufficiency of material goods for self-overcoming. In other words, the life of self-overcoming is practicable on the condition that minimum material conditions are sufficient.[149]

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146 The virtuous one (*chün tzu*) devotes his mind to attaining the Way and not to securing food. Go and till the land and you will end up with by being hungry, as a matter of course; study, and you will end up with salary of an official, as a matter of course. The gentleman worries about the Way, not about poverty (15-32).

147 1-14.

148 "How admirable Hui is! Living in a mean dwelling on a bowlful of rice and a ladleful of water is a hardship most men would find intolerable, but Hui does not allow this to affect his joy. How admirable Hui is!" (6-11).

149 The joyful life of Hui, is said to consist of at least a bowlful of rice and a ladleful of water. This kind of joyful life in overcoming bodily desires is repeatedly addressed by Confucius: a *chün tzu* seeks neither a full belly nor a comfortable dwelling (1-14).

Restraint of speech is also a major part of self-overcoming. Regarding restraint of speech, the position of classical Confucianism is surprisingly simple. The reason one should be careful in speech is that one should speak within the boundary of one's practice of virtue. Whatever should be consistent with one's actions. This requires one to follow what one says and not to exaggerate one's moral status. One should be always truthful with one's own words as well as actions. Confucius presents the virtuous person's mode of speech: "He puts his words into action before allowing his words to follow his action."[150] He "desires to be halting in speech but quick in action."[151]

Restraining one's actions of speech is necessarily related to the quality of one's moral actions. From the perspective of the present, one's speech presumably explains the actions one engages in. From the perspective of the past, speech presumably explains with truthfulness what one has done. From the perspective of the future, speech presumably holds one responsible for what one is going to do. The quality of actions, truthfulness, and responsibility are highly valued in Confucius' reflection on restraint in speech. In fact, it may be noted that Confucius considers restraint in speech solely in relation to the practice of moral actions.

Another point worth mentioning is that Confucius' ideas regarding restraint in speech presupposes a deep level of self-reflection. What is spoken should be based upon a person's examination of past, present, and future actions. In fact, speech activity itself is examining one's own performance of moral actions. When one's speech is truthful, without exaggeration or deceit regarding one's present activities, it becomes a moral

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150 2-13.
151 4-24.

activity by menifesting sincerity. For a moral one, speech will reveal one's actions themselves, for speech and action represent a harmonious non-dual whole.

Self-restraint of the mind in classical Confucianism is expressed as "nurturing mind (*yang hsin*)." By nurturing the mind Mencius means "to reduce the number of one's desires," which is perceived by him as the best way of mental nurturing.[152] His logic regarding nurturing the mind by reducing desires is as follows: If one has a great many desires, one will not be content unless all the desires are fulfilled. Contrarily, if one has few desires, one will be satisfied easily.[153] The more desires one has, the more one's mind will be overwhelmed by these desires. Trying to satisfy desires, one puts one's mind in danger of losing control. Such a person never reaches a stage of satisfaction or contentment. Therefore, if one wants to nurture the mind, one should reduce the number of desires through self-restraint.

Another way of restraining the mind is by not "losing the mind" nor "letting the mind stray (*fang hsin*)."[154] Significantly, for Mencius, the single purpose of learning is understood as to look for the lost mind.[155] Not losing the mind is likened to retaining continuously the mind of new-born baby.[156] Since, for Mencius, everyone is born with a good mind, the task of restraining the mind is nothing but retaining and nurturing the original good mind.

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152 7B-35.
153 7B-35.
154 When one's chickens and dogs stray, one has a tendency to go after them. But, when ones mind strays, one does not (6A-11).
155 6A-11.
156 4B-12.

According to Mencius, the idea of not losing the mind, or retaining the mind, implies to "watch over one's character (*hsiu shen*)." Watching over one's character is the most fundamental among the many things that one should watch over.[157] In fact, "watching over one's character" is the ultimate foundation of all classical Confucianist moral virtues, because on the basis of that, one develops other virtues. It is also a basis of affirmative self-perception, self-autonomy, and self-respect.

(2) <u>Development of Benevolence</u>

On the level of interaction with others in the Confucianist view, a self-transformed person behaves in society in a manner of benevolence. All interactions with others should be accompanied by benevolence.

Self-overcoming and benevolence are inseparably interwined with each other. Confucius' famous definition of benevolence shows clearly the relationship between them: "To return to the observance of rites through overcoming the self (*ke chi fu li*) constitutes benevolence (*jen*)."[158] Self-overcoming is fundamental for learning to embody the virtue of benevolence. As discussed, it is presumed to be preliminary to the development of benevolence. Still, it is not on an equal par with benevolence in terms of priorities, because there is a intermediate concept--the concept of rites (*li*)--between them. Even though there is no clear-cut boundary between self-overcoming and rites, because they overlap in their mutual relationship, they must be placed on different levels. This is because self-overcoming is, on the whole, oriented toward the self, while rites are oriented toward

157 4A-19.
158 12-1.

interrelationships with others. In this sense, returning to rites appear to entail benevolence, since benevolence in its more significant and active meaning presupposes interrelationships with others.

With regard to the relationship between the self and others, there are some controversies. Modern Confucian scholars present different interpretations of benevolence in terms of self and others. Fingarette interprets benevolence from the perspective of rites and greatly emphasizes the external aspect of benevolence. In his interpretation, the self disappears in the performance of rites. He thinks that "*jen* just is the perfect giving of oneself to the *human* way."[159] His interpretation is based on a belief that Confucian virtues are all "dynamic" and social, and that the Analects does not have a concept of "static" or "inner" among its virtues.[160] By contrast, Wei-ming Tu highlights the inward aspect of the self by understanding benevolence as "a matter of inner strength and self-knowledge."[161] For him, the self as a center of relationship has the task of cultivating and developing itself in relationship with others.[162] While Fingarette emphasizes other-related aspects of benevolence, Tu highlights the self-related aspects. In my understanding, the two positions do not fully reflect the classical Confucianist position on the relationship between self and others. The two positions need to be combined: benevolence should contain both inner and outer aspects, or both self- and other-related aspects. As we

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159 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: the Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) 56.

160 Fingarette 55.

161 Wei-ming Tu, "The Creative Tension Between *Jen* and *Li*," Philosophy East & West ns 18.1 (1968): 7.

162 Wei-ming Tu, Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979) 123.

discuss the developmental process of benevolence, we shall more clearly see why the combined position is more appropriate.

The first step in the developmental phases of benevolence seems to be the construction of a stable self. Building a stable sense of self is a fundamental step on the way to self-overcoming. The self should be prepared to be benevolent through the practice of self-overcoming. When one internalizes and embodies the virtue of self-overcoming, one becomes free from selfish desires. Reducing selfish desires and concerns gradually helps one cultivate a more highly developed self. Reducing desires is a process of self-denial in a way, denying the self which is undesirable and negative. The continuous process of destroying the undesirable self should be accompanied a process of constructing the desirable self. This process of simultaneous destruction and construction is mutually entailing and occurs within the same self. As a result of this process, a desirable self will eventually emerge.

The newly constructed self is an agent that takes the lead in the development of benevolence. This self as a leading agent of benevolence, has the characteristics of self-respect, self-confidence, and self-autonomy. In general, the firmly established self is a fundamental ground for the classical Confucianist virtues. As Heiner understands it, self-respect is a precondition for all moral actions and it is the decisive foundation of Confucius' ethics.[163] Without an established sense of self, one is not able to advance to the next step in the process of becoming benevolent. Indeed, a stable self and its perceptual self-image based on self-overcoming are essential. A positive self-perception

163 Roetz 161.

provides one with the mental capacity to view others. It enlarges one's own perspective and enable one to see and consider others.

Benevolence also involves a consideration of the family. Being a good son or daughter (*hsiao*) and being a good brother or sister (*t'i*), is the foundation of benevolence.[164] Benevolence in general manifests itself in relationships between parents and children, and between siblings. Benevolence in family is expressed in the form of love, kindness, affection, and intimacy. Interestingly, these qualities are not taught since they are looked upon as a natural part of a human being. It is said that instructing each other should be avoided in order to maintain intimacy; instructing each other can damage intimacy and affectionate relationships.

Classical Confucianism states at great length that the nature of the relationship between parents and children is one of the forms of embodied benevolence, but it does not say much about the relationships of siblings. It mentions much more about children's attitudes toward parents and their obligation to serve them, but not the reverse. This is ground in the belief that "the content of benevolence is the serving of one's parents (*hsiao*)."[165]

Let us consider the mode of benevolence in family by looking at the way of serving parents. To serve parents means both physical care and obedience or, explicitly, not going against one's parents' wishes within the bounds of one's capacity. The boundary of one's capacity in the standard, because an absolute level is not given and because one is required to do one's best in any given situation. To fulfill one's parents' wishes is even more valued. In fact, being filial means to attend to one's parents' wishes rather than to take care of their

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164 1-2.
165 4A-27.

mouth or belly.[166] While the parents are alive, a son and daughter should please them by not making them unhappy and worried. When they die, their will is followed continuously in observing their "ways." In this way, one's parents' will, which perhaps represents the family precepts and customs, continues to be maintained.

The fact that one should not go against one's parents' will raises the question: What to do when their will is not right? There is an example in The Analects; In order to protect his father, a son hides his father's bad behavior by not telling the truth to a government official.[167] Confucius seems to say that the parents' will should be followed no matter what, and that to do so is to be filial and thereby benevolent; Mencius provides a different answer with the example of king Shun. Going against his parents' wishes, Shun gets married without informing them. By this apparent unfilial behavior he chooses what he thinks is right, abandoning benevolence toward parents. Interestingly, Mencius defends Shun by considering that if he does not get married, he cannot be filial because he will not be able to continue the family lineage, thereby committing one of the most serious unfilial actions.[168] Mencius' defense of Shun is based on his assumption that Shun would commit a more serious unfilial action if he did not go against his parents' present wish. In other words, unfilial behavior is justified in this case by not committing more serious unfilial behavior.

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166 4A-19.

167 13-18. Since this example is given in order to explain Confucius' notion of righteousness, it will be discussed at some length in the context of righteousness in chapter IV.

168 Mencius' defense does not seem to be justified, however, because *Shun* could seek other possible solutions without going against his parents. For example, he could try to change his parents' will or could wait until they allow him to get married. Above all, to my mind, to commit the present unfilial action does not justify a future filial action that has not occurred.

From the above discussion and the two examples, we can draw several conclusions regarding filial and benevolent behavior. First, in general one should follow parents' will. But, second, not following parents' wish can be justified in order to prevent one from committing more serious unfilial behavior. In this case, ignoring a minor wish, one follows a major will. This implies that one generally, but not always, follows one's parents' wish. Third, in being filial and benevolent, Confucius and Mencius do not want to abandon righteousness. Confucius argues that not telling the truth is right in the situation. Mencius dilutes the concept of righteousness into benevolence; he interprets Shun's action in the context of benevolence, such that Shun is considered right. Fourth, there is an apparent conflict between benevolence and righteousness in the two examples. But the apparent conflict does not assume a substantial importance in classical Confucianist ethics, in the sense that it cannot be maintained in cooperative and flexible nature of the virtues. This will be examined more closedly in Chapter IV and V.

If one understands benevolence toward parents only in terms of psychological love (*ai*), there would be no conflict between benevolence and righteousness, for serving, caring, affection, and love continue under any circumstances. Even when parents are not right, children still love them regardless of their mistakes. In the case of the sage king Shun, his loving mind did not change when he went against his parents in that situation. A more extreme example of a loving mind is the case of the sage king Yao. Confronting his father's malignant murder plot toward him, he neither reduces nor abandones his loving attitude. In this story, we see a dramatic contrast between the wicked murder conspiracy and pure filial sincerity. Of course, the point of the story is to highlight the latter quality of

filial sincerity by illustration. Yao's loving mind is not shaken at all even by his father's wicked, murderous intention. Such filial piety is beyond concepts of right and wrong.[169] Moral judgment does not affect filial love.

Parents' love toward sons and daughters is less specifically addressed. However, parents' love is importantly implied in the idea of mutual love. One concrete principle adopted in maintaining mutual love is not teaching one's own children. The reason given for not teaching one's own children reveals the essence of Confucian moral thinking, which emphasizes a paradigmatic mode of moral education. Just as one's actions should model one's words, so should a teacher's actions model his teachings. When a father's action does not follow from what he teaches, the child is hurt and the father is also hurt.[170] Consequently, their relationship will be damaged.[171]

So far, we have discussed how benevolence is developed in the family, but benevolence also goes beyond the bounds of family. One extends the mind of caring to acquaintances such as friends. The way of implementing benevolence at this stage is different from the ways discussed previously. In the case of friends, one is concerned about what is right, and correct advice with sincerity is always recommended.[172] In this instance benevolence

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169 No judgment and demand should come between parents and children, because it can creat distance; "Father and son should not demand goodness from each other" (4A-18). Confucius makes a milder remark: One can give advice to parents in the gentlest way when they are doing wrong; even though the advice is not accepted, one should not change one's attitude of respect (4-18).

170 4A-18.

171 The implication here is that parents should teach children by their own behavior. The paradigmatic way of teaching is the most desirable. Mencius seems to exemplify this way of teaching metaphorically when he remarks: "My disdain to instruct a man is itself one way of instructing him" (6B-16). Confucianist paradigmatic way of teaching children shows a cautious concern for benevolence between parents and children.

172 Confucius says, "advise them to the best of your ability and guide them properly, but stop when there is no hope of success" (12-23).

presupposes awareness and judgment of right and wrong in contrast to the way of being benevolent in the family. Furthermore, the criterion of right and wrong is a standard for benevolence.

At the last stage of the development of benevolence, one attempts to expand benevolence to all people regardless of the degree of acquaintance or closeness. All humans are regarded as brothers (*jie xiong*) in regard to reverence (*ching*) and respect (*gong*), therefore, one should not worry about not having brothers.[173] One should extend a loving mind to the whole world. This mind seems to urge one to awaken oneself and to save all people.[174] The motivation to benefit others becomes a moral imperative. Although one might question whether benevolence on this level agrees with the classical principle of differentiated love which tells one to love others on the basis upon closeness of relationship, "to extend loving mind to everyone" does not need to be in a conflict with the differentiating principle. In being benevolent toward all, one can be more concerned about one's own parents or siblings.

At the last stage of development, benevolence becomes a Confucianist political motivation and ideal. To benefit all humankind by realizing the idea of benevolence becomes both the beginning and the end point of Confucianist politics. If one is fully benevolent toward all people, this would be a fulfillment of benevolence and Confucianist politics. Confucius puts this in the category of a sagely virtue.[175]

173 12-5.
174 5A-7.
175 6-30.

As we have seen, benevolence is developed beginning with the self and gradually extending to others. The principle of expansion is clearly addressed by Confucius: "A benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others in so far as he himself wishes to get there. The ability to take as analogy what is near at hand can be called the method of benevolence."[176] Reflecting on oneself and examining one's sincerity is crucial in extending benevolence. One also takes responsibility for failure of benevolence. If benevolence fails, one should look for the cause within oneself.[177] As one continues to extend benevolence, one considers the closeness of relationships according to the differencial principle. Depending upon the degree of closeness, one differentiates the quality of benevolence. Family, being in the closest relationship, deserves the most benevolence. Especially, parents take the highest priority for benevolence. Family, especially the parental relationship, is a focal point in extending a loving mind toward others. The manner of concern for one's own family is then applied to the treatment of another's family and then others.[178] Reflecting on one's own moral experience of extending benevolence to people around oneself, one applies that same moral attitude to people in more distant relationships. Notice here that benevolence as a virtue originates from concrete relationships. It has a specific locus that is identified in the experiential world. The virtue of benevolence does not originate from an abstract universal law. In fact, one may argue that experiential concreteness and non-abstractness

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[176] 6-30.

[177] 2A- 7. Mencius provides the analogy of archery for this: if an archer fails to hit the mark, one should look for the cause within oneself observing the correctnesss of one's stance (2A-7).

[178] 1A-7.

is a characteristic not only of benevolence, but of all other classical Confucianist virtues as well.

The concrete nature of Confucianist virtues is more clearly revealed in the Confucianist Golden Rule, which explains the inner mechanism of benevolence. An analysis of the Goldren Rule reveals the reflective method of extending benevolence: "Do not do what you do not want others to do for you."[179] Intuitively we assume that everybody wants to be loved rather than not be loved; thus, the Rule says that one should be benevolent since one does not want to be disliked or disfavored by others. The positive formulation of this rule is "reciprocity (*shu*)," which helps one ascertain positively what kind of action is required in a specific situation. Applying the rule of reciprocity, one puts oneself in another's position and treats others as one would want to be treated. What happens in the application of this rule is a kind of communication with another, who is in fact a reflection of oneself. Of course, the communicative situation is hypothetical, since one is never able to encounter exactly the same situation as another person. Nevertheless, reciprocity is a method of role-playing providing a guideline for benevolence; Mencius clearly states that reciprocity is the most effective way to become benevolent.[180]

In light of human psychology, sympathy plays a role in generating benevolence. Mencius advises King Hsuan of *Ch'i* to employ a method of practicing benevolence by generating sympathy (*ce*). He explains how the king should maintain a mind unable to bear the sufferings of others. "The attitude of a virtuous person towards animals is this: once having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he

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[179] 15-24.
[180] 7A- 4.

cannot bear to eat their flesh."[181] An example of the application of this attitude by the king is given: When the king sees an ox shrinking with fear on the way to sacrifice, he orders the use of a lamb instead, out of a mind of sympathy.[182] In advising the king, Mencius says that the ruler should have this kind sympathy in ruling a country. Furthermore, Mencius argues that everybody has the mind of sympathy.

C. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The framework of self-transformation in early Buddhism and in classical Confucianism in terms of realization of the central virtue is similar. First, they concur that the virtue of compassion/benevolence is required for the task of self-transformation. Second, the outlines of the method employed to achieve the virtue is similar. In my observation, the major ethical task for a self-transformative person consists of two parts. First, from the perspective of the self, one should restrain oneself in the field of bodily desires, the use of language, and the activities of the mind. As a result of this kind of restraint, one can overcome one's untamed, instinctive, and restless character. Maintaining an optimal self-development through this restraint, one is capable of moving toward further development. This task of further development occurs in the second stage of self-transformation. From the perspective of interactions with others, one can achieve the highest level of self-transformation by embodying compassion/benevolence in oneself.

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181 1A-7.

182 1A-7. Since the "shrinking" of the ox made the king replace him with a lamb, we wonder whether the lamb did not shrink. The text does not elaborate. However, we can tell that whether the lamb shrank or not does not matter as long as the king did not see it; for the king, having an instant sympathetic feeling from seeing the shrinking ox is more important than having a thinking-based-sympathetic-feeling from imagining a shrinking lamb.

The virtues of self-restraint and self-overcoming share similar ideas in common. In both systems, self-restraint or self-overcoming is a fundamental basis for self-transformation. Furthermore, both are located within the context of moral achievement. Self-restraint or self-overcoming is involved from the beginning to the end of self-transformation. One begins by restraining oneself in order to transform oneself. The culminating point of restraint or overcoming is the full realization of compassion or benevolence. The role and locus of self-restraint and self-overcoming are integral to the process of self-development, or self-transformation.

Even though the relationship of restraint to compassion and overcoming to benevolence is similar, the two systems deal with restraint in different styles. Regarding bodily restraint, the early Buddhist approach is phrased more in the negative since it emphasizes the negative effects of uncontrolled sensory faculties. Reflection on the negative side of sense pleasure is part of the process of self-restraint. The negative effects of indulgence in sense pleasure through the six sensory faculties is visualized and examined. Restraint requires that the six sensory faculties be properly controlled.

In terms of the physical senses, the classical Confucianist approach to self-restraint is less negative. There is no disgust at sense pleasure or at indulgence in bodily desires. Instead of emphasizing the negative effects of sense pleasure, it notes the dangers of losing the higher virtues by losing control of bodily desires. Seeking only bodily satisfaction is viewed in contrast to the practice of higher virtues. Caring only for bodily desires is harmful because it makes one blind to cultivate of virtues. A close relation between "only seeking bodily desire" and "losing virtue" is pointed out.

As discussed, the purpose and the locus of self-restraint/self-overcoming in the process of self-transformation of both systems are similar. However, their approach to it takes different formulations in terms of bodily restraint. The early Buddhist approach contains more reflection on the negative effects of non-restraint. The classical Confucianist approach is somewhat less negative; its emphasis is on the tension between restraint and non-restraint.

Another point in the different formulation of their approach applies to restraint of speech and mind. In early Buddhism, the six sensory faculties are categorized into three fields: body, speech, and mind. By restraining the three fields of action, the Buddha recommended correct behavior, speech, and thought. Restraint of the three fields leads to purity and non-attachment.

It is interesting to note that the Buddha determines three categories of self-restraint, instead of six categories based on the six sense faculties. This choice is very significant in the context of ethical action. For the Buddha, truthful and useful talk is extremely important for the moral goal. The mind, as a locus of moral feeling and thought, influences the other five sense faculties. Human moral behavior is expressed through bodily actions. Therefore, the Buddha necessarily highlights three categories of self-restraint rather than six.

The three fields of restraint are also noted in classical Confucianism. In classical Confucianism, not indulging bodily desires leads one to see and nurture higher virtues. Nurturing higher virtues has to do with nurturing the mind. From the perspective of restraint of the mind, self-restraint becomes a nurturing of the mind. "To reduce the

number of desires" is suggested as a way of cultivating the mind. Together with nurturing the mind, "not losing the mind" and watching over one's character are also suggested as means of restraining the mind. Restraint of speech is also required; it means taking responsibility for what one says. Focusing on consistency between speech and action, restraint of speech is emphasized.

Self-restraint in the two systems is explained in terms of the three fields. Even though the explanations of bodily restraint are the same, the explanations of restraint of speech and mind are not the same. Early Buddhism puts emphasis on purity and non-attachment, while classical Confucianism highlights nurturing the mind and responsibility for actions of speech.

The principle of self-restraint is mentioned in both systems. Eschewing the two extremes, both systems take the middle way. The middle way is especially stressed in the act of taking "neither much nor little" food. Consequently, asceticism as an approach to self-restraint is not adopted. Basic material needs are not rejected in the context of self-restraint. As long as material things do not overwhelm a person and do not destroy virtues, they are not harmful but useful. A self-restrained person develops the capability to accept and use material things for the purpose of moral practice and transformation. This shows the pragmatic position of both regarding material objects.

Furthermore, self-restraint contributes to developing and promoting autonomy, self-respect, and self-confidence. Autonomy, respect and confidence are fundamental for realization of compassion or benevolence. Without them, one is not able to consider others or further virtues.

Perhaps the idea of self-restraint in both systems contains a certain kind of self-assertion. Standing aloof from the idea of self-negation or self-annihilation, they adopt affirmative and assertive self as fundamental for self-restraint. The idea of self-assertion provides a springboard for self-modification, self-improvement, and self-transformation. Since both systems accept the empirical self, it may be assumed that there is some form of self-assertion, with empirical self a leading subject of self-assertion. On the basis of asserting the empirical self, the self continues to modify, reassemble, and reconstitute itself through restraining itself.

What constitutes self-assertion? It seems to be constituted of inherited human nature, such as dispositions, tendencies, impulses, and instincts whatever good or bad. The task of self-restraint, then, is to modify, reconstitute, and refine these tendencies in the light of self-restraint. Dewey points out the nature of this kind of self-restraint:

> We inherit our impulses and our tendencies from our ancestors. These impulses and tendencies need to be modified. They need to be curbed and restrained. So much goes without saying. The question is regarding the nature of the modification; the nature of the restraint, and its relation to the original impulses of self-assertion. Surely we do not want to suppress our animal inheritance; nor do we wish to restrain it absolutely-that is, for the mere sake of restraint. It is not an enemy to the moral life, simply because without it no life is possible.[183]

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[183] John Dewy, "Evolution and Ethics," Evolutionary Ethics, eds. Matthew Nitecki et al. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) 101.

Gradually, on the basis of self-assertion, the self becomes refined as a result of restraint. Being grounded on self-restraint, self-assertion is at the root of the empirical self that is the subject of self-transformation. The process of restraining and refining the empirical self is an integral part of self-transformation. Self-assertion, self-restraint, and self-transformation are intertwined in the empirical self.

Another point that needs clarification is the role of reflection in the process of self-restraint. Early Buddhists use the method of concentration (*samādhi*) for developing self-restraint. Concentration plays a role in the whole process of self-restraint of body, speech, and mind. Self-restraint is achieved by concentrating at every single moment. Moreover, early Buddhist concentration is necessarily bound up with right understanding (*paññā*) and virtues (*sīla*). These form a triad in the system of self-restraint and transformative character of morals. Somewhat differently, reflection (*ssu*) in classical Confucianism is related mainly to restraint of the mind. Reflection as a way of restraining the mind is used for "not losing the mind." Even though reflection is mainly used for the restraint of the mind, it needs to be applied to speech and body as well.

As has been shown, in spite of some differences, the basic framework of self-restraint and self-overcoming are similar in both systems. The two systems greatly emphasize self-restraint/self-overcoming in cultivating virtues and morals. This is very significant because this implies several features of their ethical thinking. Let us consider the common features that are revealed in the emphasis of self-restraint/self-overcoming.

Firstly, ethics is involved not only with the self interacting with others, but also with being alone. Modern ethics in general focuses on the domain of interaction with another or

others. For example, modern moral philosophers would not consider ethics to be involved when I think, sit, or eat alone. Many moral schematas reflect concern for the social or common good rather than the individual's virtue or moral cultivation. The issue of individual moral cultivation is not a major concern.[184] Contrarily, the two ethical systems are greatly concerned about virtue or moral cultivation even when an individual alone is concerned. When one thinks, sits, or eats alone, one is required to think right, without evil or discursive thinking, to sit at a proper seat correctly, and eat at a proper time in a correct way. Even in the absence of another person, virtues or morals constrain a person. In other words, each individual's moral practice is greatly valued even in the domain of solicitude.

Secondly, the ground of moral practice is found within oneself in both ethical systems. The self is seen as a mirror that reflects and reveals the conduct of oneself and others, utilizing one's internalized moral criteria for determining moral reasoning, judgments, and actions. One's internalized moral criteria are rooted in a commonly shared universal moral concept and play a role in justifying one's own particular morality within the commonly shared universal morality. One questions within whenever one encountering moral conflicts and problems. One solves them on the basis of internalized moral criteria rather than depending on externally constructed laws. To apply internalized moral criteria requires one to exercise autonomy. Cultivating and exercising each individual's autonomy in moral actions have an important place in the ethics of the two systems.

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184 In this context, the recent writings of some scholars such as Williams and MacIntyre is significant. Interestingly, focusing on Aristotelian ethics which emphasizes individual cultivation of virtue, they commonly point out the importance of the individual's virtue and its cultivation, rather than theorizing or formalizing morals.

Thirdly, the main focus of the ethics of the two systems requires one to examine and cultivate oneself continuously in the direction of self-transformation and the establishment of a good character. Self-examination and self-cultivation aim at gradual self-transformation. This precisely indicates the main focus of the ethics of the two systems, which is building a good character and leading a good inner life without undermining concern for the social good. The ethics of character building[185] in the domain of self-restraint/self-overcoming in particular emphasizes self-control and aims at decreasing non-autonomous influences in moral judgments and actions; one is not passive but active in generating moral actions. Non-autonomous-based influences such as inherited dispositions and environmental conditions do not override the autonomous will of a person in building character. Controlling non-autonomous-based influences, one develops and maintains one's wholesome dispositions and moral excellence. Therefore, the person as a possessor of an autonomous will, more than anything else, plays a major role in building character. This means that one takes responsibility for one's own present dispositions or constitutions, and therefore one's character. This indicates that the two systems would reject the notion of "constitutive luck" which undermines self-control and personal responsibility in moral actions.[186] This is because factors such as inclinations, capacities,

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185 The ethics of character building can be called virtue ethics in modern ethical terms. As a virtue ethics, early Buddhist and classical Confucianist ethics focus on establishing an excellent character or formulating good dispositions. In other words, their main concern is given to character or dispositional quality (mode of being) prior to moral rules or actions (doing). Therefore, their virtue ethics differs from the utilitarian ethics that is concerned about consequences of actions and from the deontological ethics that is concerned about unchanging moral laws.

186 "Constitutive luck" as one type of "moral luck" has recently been developed by Williams and Nagel. Challenging the Kantian notion of "immunity of morality to luck," they argue that on the practical level there is a domain where human morals are affected by luck. In other words, Kantian human free will or good will cannot be independent from luck or unforeseen contingencies. Here let us consider "constitutive luck" without considering other kinds of moral luck. While Williams leaves the notion of constitutive luck

and temperament are assumed to be constantly modified and formulated in the process of character building. Early Buddhists and classical Confucianists, similar to the proponents of constitutive luck, think that there are individual differences in constitutions. However, they differ in emphasizing that constitutions, especially in the domain of morals, are constantly modified and formulated in a desirable direction by a person's will and efforts, and therefore are controllable. They do not assume that one's own constitions are given in fixed forms and beyond control. Therefore, one has a responsibility for one's own constitutions and actions. In this regard, the two systems would not accept the notion of constitutive luck. Furthermore, they might regard constitutive luck in morals as illusory. Similarly, the two systems, unlike the hard determinist position, would not argue that one's character is ultimately shaped by inherited or environmental factors, and that therefore one can find a source of responsibility somewhere outside oneself. Taking a practical stance, not rejecting inherited and environmental influences which are determining components in building character, early Buddhists and classical Confucianists emphasize moral responsibility for actions. The determined components of one's character is not strong enough to exempt one from moral responsibility. In this consideration, they take a soft determinist position allowing that there is no antithesis between determinism and moral responsibility.[187]

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vague, Nagel makes it clear. For Nagel, the question of what kind of person we are is not just a question of what we are deliberately, but also of our inclinations, capacities, and temperament (Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979) 28). A person's constitutions-such as inclinations, capacities, and temperament--contribute to making moral decisions and actions. Furthermore, there is a paradox between morality and constitutive luck. It is important to point out that, for Nagel, constitutions are understood as given, fixed, and unchangeable rather than cultivated, unfixed, and changeable. He does not seem to consider constitutions as active and formulated.

187 Paul Edwards, "Hard and Soft Determinism," Problems of Moral Philosophy ed. Paul Taylor (California: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1972) 313.

It is important to notice that the two systems' rejection of constitutive luck and hard determinism is rooted in their notion of morality in terms of character building that emphasizes an autonomous will. They consider constitutional change in character building to be moral cultivation. Constitutions are in the process of formulation and hence there is always room for improvement in building of character. Character building requires one to formulate good constitutions: Virtues or morals are ultimately fused into constitutions in the building a good character. At this point, constitutions themselves become habitual in a form of virtues and hence one does not need to continue to make efforts to be virtuous or moral. This idea is similar to the Aristotlian notion of virtue. For Aristotle, virtues are acquired and, in their final development, become second nature; they become second nature through habituation, and so one does not need to make a special effort to be virtuous or moral. This may be considered the perfection of character. The two moral systems considered here and Aristotle may agree that "morality refers to excellence of character"[188] and that a primary problem of ethics is the problem of what kind of a person one wants to be.

So far, we have discussed self-restraint as one of the two dimensions of the ethical task of a self-transformative person. Turning to the other dimension--the self interacting with others--let us consider synthetically and comparatively the main virtue of a self-transformative person. The task of this section is divided into two parts. First, focusing on the developmental process of compassion/benevolence, we see that the principle of extending the virtue from oneself to others is a common sequence. Also we will discuss

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188 Judith Andre, "Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck," Moral Luck, ed. Daniel Statman (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) 137.

some differences that are laid out in the common sequence. Second, analyzing the inner functional mechanism of the virtue of compassion/benevolence, we will see its inner psychological mechanism. The inner mechanism will reveal: (1) The rule of taking the other's position plays a role in extending the virtue. (2) Sympathy and reason cooperate in generating the virtue. Humean, Kantian, and recent feminist perspectives will be brought into the discussion. The discussion will show that the two systems' ethical positions are grounded on neither self-regarding nor other-regarding action, but both-regarding action. This agrees with Rawls' notion of justice, which is "reciprocity." We will also see that both the Humean and Kantian perspectives are adopted in the notion of the virtue and the notion of caring of feminist ethics is similar to that of the virtue.

As I claimed, in early Buddhism and clssical Confucianism the development of compassion/benevolence begins with the self that has achieved a certain level of self-restraint/self-overcoming; a certain level of self-restraint/self-overcoming is required to develop the virtue further. According to early Buddhism, having restrained the self is at least possessed of a purified mind and a non-attached attitude. In classical Confucianism, self-overcoming is stressed even more as the way to the development of benevolence. While early Buddhism emphasizes the mind of purity and non-attachment, classical Confucianism focuses on the mind of firmness through self-overcoming. Even though the point of emphasis is different, they share a common ground, namely, the restrained/ overcome self. Now the self is ready to progress further toward the level of compassion/ benevolence.

In general, the process of developing compassion is not different from the progress of developing benevolence. In terms of the order of development, compassion/benevolence follows a similar sequence. It begins to develop from oneself and is extended to others: the principle is to extend the virtue from oneself to others. Apparently, it is not taken as a given moral principle that is universal and abstract. It begins from one particular self in a specific context. Its developmental root is the restrained/overcome self. As the self develops self-restraint/self-overcoming, one extends the virtue toward all human beings. The self aims at including a maximum number of beneficiaries of the virtue.

To summarize the specific phases of the development of the virtue of compassion/ benevolence: At the beginning step of the development of compassion, the self, possessed of self-restraint, considers its own welfare. One considers others not in an active form, but in a negative and passive form; one should not covet others' gain, just as one should not despise one's own gain. Gradually, consideration of others' welfare is generated in an active form. The scope of compassion is extended as one develops concern about more people, beginning from closely related ones such as family, friends, and co-workers, to less closely related ones such as strangers. One's concern is extended to all of humankind and to the gods. Finally, one includes all sentient beings. At this point, compassion becomes a universal idea.

At the beginning of the development of benevolence, the self dedicates itself to the practice of overcoming. Building a firmly established self by "overcoming the self," the self prepares for the next development, i.e., "returning to ritual." Now, the self practices benevolence in the family; benevolence is mainly located in the relationships between

parents and children, and between sisters and brothers. Especially, expressing love toward parents is a crucial task in practicing benevolence in the family. Gradually, benevolence is extended to acquaintances such as friends. Finally, benevolence is extended to all people in the world.

As we see, the main virtue moves in the direction from the self to others, from one to many, or from concrete to abstract relationships; the sequence of extending the virtue is significantly similar. The extending principle of the virtue is always self-based; it is not given from a selfless ground. Considering that the self is the ground for the development of the virtue, we would expect that the two systems do not generate a kind of extrme virtue such as self-sacrifice. This position will be discussed in chapter V.

In spite of the similar mode of thinking in developing the virtue, there are several significant differences. The first difference emerges from the Confucianist dictum: "self-overcoming and returning the rites." In classical Confucianism, self-overcoming is regarded as a returning ritual that one immediately brings development of relationships with others. This identification of the two concepts--self-overcoming and returning ritual--leads classical Confucianists to emphasize more the aspect of self-overcoming. This is not to say that early Buddhism considers self-restraint to be less important. The difference regarding this point would be as follows: Early Buddhists do not explicitly demonstrate an obvious connection between self-restraint and compassion, or explain how to move from self-restraint to compassion. By contrast, classical Confucianism makes a clear connection between self-overcoming and benevolence.

In order to see the reason for this difference, first let us consider the urgent and fundamental motivations for developing self-restraint/self-overcoming. For early Buddhists, the first urgent motivation for developing self-restraint is to liberate oneself from suffering. For them, compassion for others does not come simultaneously with self-restraint. For the classical Confucianists, the motivation for self-overcoming seems to presuppose the idea of benefiting others; it has as its purpose to govern and, through governing, to benefit people. So self-overcoming is identified with benefiting people.

The second difference between the two systems regarding compassion/benevolence emerges from the extreme emphasis of filial piety in classical Confucianism. Benevolence toward parents is greatly stressed. A son/daughter should be always benevolent through being filial.[189] Although it appears that the benevolence of a son/daughter toward parents is highlighted rather than a parent's benevolence toward children, the benevolence of the parents to a son/daughter is also considered important. The virtue of friendliness between them proves the mutuality of benevolence. The benevolence between them (and the benevolence between brothers/sisters) is a beginning point for the development of benevolence. This extreme emphasis on filial piety as a core of benevolence, in the form of mutual love, is a distinguished characteristic that is not found in early Buddhism.[190] Furthermore, the benevolence of filial piety serves as a foundation of harmony (*ho*).

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[189] This likely causes a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the relationship between parents and children. In the misunderstanding, parents subjugate children and children are obligated. In order to see this understanding is not correct, let us consider the main virtue between them. It is not righteousness, order, separateness, or trust that are applied to the other four relationships but friendliness (*yu*). "Friendliness" presupposes not superiority/inferiority, subjugation, or demand but equality, mutuality, or voluntariness. This relationship, as Rosemont understands, is qualified by humanity rather than obligation. Henry Rosemont, A Chinese Mirror (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1991) 76.

[190] The same extreme degree of emphasis on benevolence toward parents is not found in the development of compassion. Here the point is that early Buddhism does not emphasize compassion for

The third difference between the two systems emerges from the different scopes of the beneficiaries of the virtue. While early Buddhists aim to extend compassion to all sensient beings, classical Confucianists aim to extend benevolence only to all humankind. This difference is apparently based on the difference between their views on the human locus in the universe. In both systems, human beings are considered supreme beings because they have an incomparable capability for moral development. However, the two systems perceive human beings differently in relation to other beings. In early Buddhism, all sentient beings are closely connected with each other due to the principle of dependent arising and the theory of kamma. So long as human beings are not enlightened and are continuously wandering in wandering existence, they can always be born as other types of creatures. In other words, humans are in a close connection with other species because they can take birth as other species and other species can take birth as humans. This naturally implies that all sentient beings should be taken care of. Although connections with other creatures are indicated in classical Confucianism, classical Confucianism does not imply such an intimate connection betwen humans and other species. Instead, human beings are the matrix of connections with other species and utilize them for their own benefit in harmonious relationships. This system does not admit the idea that humans can be reborn as other creatures.

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parents as much as classical Confucianism does benevolence. The Buddha certainly does emphasize serving parents saying that one can never repay parents (BGS 1.56) and teaching respect for parents (MLS 2.224). Moreover, he mentions supporting parents in a proper way (Sn 14-29).

The different degrees of the emphasis on love toward parents have a historical explanation. One possible reason can be found in their cultural differences. We do not see a strong family value in early Indian culture as much as we see it in early Chinese culture. Moreover, the Buddha had two kinds of audience, monks/nuns and lay people, and the former did not live in a family. The audience of Confucius and Mencius was assumed to have exceptionally strong family ties.

With regard to the inner mechanism of the virtue, the two systems present a uniform answer. In order to see the inner mechanism, it is necessary reconsider the reason for and the method for developing the virtue. The reason why one should be compassionate/ benevolent is well stated in their respective texts: (1) "One who knows what is suitable for oneself would not hurt anyone in the world."[191] (2) "Do not do what you do not want others to do to you."[192] The argument runs as follows: One does not want to be hurt and one knows compassion is suitable; this means that one wants to be taken care of compassionately. In the same way, one does not want to be treated in a way that one does not like; this means one wants to receive benevolence from others. Interestingly, the reason for being compassionate/benevolent is based on a self-oriented motivation; I do not want to be hurt or disliked by others. The first apparent motivation for the virtue is not solely for the sake of others. Psychologically, then, consideration for others, as an altruistic action, is extended on the basis of a self-oriented motivation. This shows that other-oriented actions are not separable from a self-oriented motivation.

The method of extending compassion/benevolence is observed in the principle of extension that gradually includes more people as beneficiaries of the virtue. In extending compassion/benevolence toward more people, one takes oneself, one's family or acquaintances, strangers, and all beings into consideration in sequential order. In applying the principle of extension, the rule of taking the other's position is taken. At the very instance of generating compassion/benevolence, one puts oneself in the other's position and identifies oneself with the other.

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191 Sn 13-10.
192 15-24.

When one puts oneself in the other's position, sympathy arises in one's mind. In fact, without having sympathetic feelings, compassion/benevolence cannot evolve. When one sees another's sadness or suffering, one's mind enters into the other person's situation, identifies oneself with the person and feels what the person feels. At the moment when one feels what the person feels by projecting one's mind, sympathetic feelings arise. As discussed earlier, the early Buddhist system gives a significant value to the mind penetrating others' hearts. Similarly, cultivating sympathy is obviously a way of practicing benevolence in the classical Confucianist system as illustrated by the case of King Hsuen.

Even though sympathy, as a kind of emotional feeling, is an essential and predominant component of the virtue, the virtue requires another component in order to be duly exercised. It has to rely on a role of reason. As seen in section III.1.(2), the action of "perceiving of another's heart (or the action of projecting into another's heart) with one's heart and knowing another's heart" apparently occurs in compassion. The action of knowing another's heart presupposes knowledge about another's situation. For example, sympathetic feelings for a hungry or dying person is not possible without perceptual knowledge of his/her sad situation which may include information about the person's background. This kind of perceptual knowledge is a precondition for developing the compassion of the Buddha. His sympathetic feelings for sentient beings are rooted in his perceptual knowledge of their sufferings as embodied in the four sequential life pattern.[193] His recognition of their sufferings is a prerequisite for his sympathetic feelings and so

[193] The four sequential life phases are birth, old age, sickness, and death. According to the Buddha, because people do not understand the impermanence of the self, of all phenomena, and of all dispositions, they become attached to them. As a result, they are dispositionally conditioned while they are undergoing, birth, old age, sickness, and death.

compassion. Furthermore, compassion involves a process of inference about another's situation. Without a process of inference, compassion cannot be generated and transferred to the many other fellow beings who are in similar situations. It is notable that knowledge and the process of inference both rely on the function of reason.

Thus, benevolence requires both sympathetic feelings and reason. As we have seen, Mencius clearly explains the concept of extension (*t'ui*) to King Hsuen. For him, benevolence should be extended through sympathetic feelings. Such extension requires reasoning. In the case of Mencius' advice to the king, the king needs to extend sympathetic feelings from the ox to the people ruling the country. The reasoning of the king involves an application of sympathetic feelings for the ox toward the people. In other words, one encounters a similar situation, one recognizes that the situation requires the same sympathetic feelings, and one extends it through the process of reasoning. Moreover, as Kwong-loi Shun thinks, this kind of reasoning is a kind of "analogical reasoning."[194]

However, the interpretation of Mencius' position on the nature of sympathetic feelings and of reason is controversial. The crux of the controversy is how much weight Mencius gives to reason in the development of benevolence. Most scholars admit that reason is involved in the king's case, but their explanations are different. In Shun's interpretation of Mencius, reason plays a significant role; as mentioned, he argues that logical reasoning is introduced. Also, Wong and Ihara admit that there is a cognitive dimension in the development of sympathy of the king's case. Wong argues that the king has a reason for

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[194] Kwong-loi Shun, "Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16 (1989): 322.

action; in the Mencius' illustration, this involves feeling the ox's suffering.[195] Even though Ihara does not think that Mencius' exposition involves a strong sense of reason, he admits the cognitive role of reason in sorting out features of particular situations on the basis of salience.[196] It is important to note that, whatever the language scholars use for explaining the role of reason in Mencius' illustration, they share a common ground: all agree that intuitive and cognitive understanding of the situation or the object, which qualifies a type of reason, is required for generating benevolence. Thus, benevolence requires perceptual reasoning or rational understanding as a fundamental component.

Generally, it is assumed that sympathetic feelings and reason are not of equals standing since they have different degrees of power in generating compassion/benevolence. It seems that sympathetic feelings play a major role and that reason takes a subsidiary role. In other words, the emotional component is in the forefront, supported by reason.

Before we move further, let us consider the nature of reason that interacts with sympathetic feelings. As we have seen, this kind of reason is not a high level of reasoning. It is not a systematic and logical inducion or deduction; rather, it is closer to intermediate and intuitive perception. Regarding the nature of this form of reasoning, Blum provides a clear explanation. He differentiates it from the Kantian sense of reason by arguing that "it does not carry the intellectualist connotations of involving moral reflection and judgment."[197] Further, he argues that this kind of reason "requires only a certain kind of

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195 David Wong, "Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?," Philosophy East & West ns 41.1 (1991): 38.
196 Craig Ihara, "David Wong on Emotions in Mensius," Philosophy East & West ns 41.1 (1991): 52.
197 Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1980) 129.

understanding or apprehension of others, and of what one aims to do, which might not involve moral reflectiveness and judgment."[198]

The interconnection between sympathetic feelings and reason in developing compassion/benevolence seems to be similarly observed in Hume's moral philosophy. More precisely, we observe it in his thoughts on the relationship between sentiment and reason. As we know, Hume thinks that sentiment or sympathetic feeling is a source of morals. But it does not seem to be equally well-known that cognitive knowledge is included in his concept of sentiment; before one has sentiment, one needs to understand circumstances and relations in a cognitive way by exercising reason. Furthermore, Hume seems to think that understanding affects the variety and degree of sentiment. We read this interconnection between sentiment and reason in the following passage: "In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame."[199]

Similarly, compassion/benevolence necessarily involves both sympathetic feelings and reason in its function, extension, and development. In sympathetic feelings emotion and reason dynamically cooperate in generating compassion/benevolence. The basic formula for developing the virtue would be that one has perceptual understanding about a situation, feels sympathy, and generates the virtue in their dynamic cooperation. By a more advanced cooperation of emotion and reason, one can intensify, modify, and refine the

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198 Blum 129.

199 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1991) 132.

virtue. In other words, the formula can be repeated. For example, the person can have more understanding about a situation and then, with a deeper understanding of the situation as more terrible and pitiful way, he/she will have stronger sympathy. As a result of cooperation of emotion and reason, he/she will have a stronger sense of compassion/ benevolence. In this context, we are reminded of how the reflective method, concentration and reflection, as tools for exercising reason, are important in developing compassion/ benevolence.

The scope of extending compassion/benevolence by using both emotional and rational capacities should not be limited. It should move continuously toward either all sentient beings or all humankind. Here a tough task seems to lie ahead. It arises from the fact that in having sympathetic feelings and developing the virtue of compassion/benevolence, one has to transfer the virtue from the concrete level to the abstract level in having sympathetic feeling and developing the virtue. To extend compassion/benevolence is not abstract at the lower or limited level where one encounters specific situations. To extend the virtue of compassion/benevolence begins in a specific situation which is not idealistic, abstract, impersonal, and non-contextual but rather experiential, concrete, personal, and contextual. When one moves on toward the higher, unlimited level, however, one has to deal with the idealistic, abstract, impersonal, and non-contextual level. This task is on the final level, where one should be compassionate/benevolent for either all sentient beings or all humankind. How can one be successful at this level? At this stage, the exercise of reason on a still higher level is required in a reflective way. This level of reason is not limited to simply understanding situations. Connecting an experienced specific personal case to a

non-experienced, unspecified, impersonal case is the main task assigned to reason. After all, all sentient beings or all humankind as a whole can be considered in the person's mind and attitudes in more tangible and more personal perception. On this level, compassion/ benevolence becomes a universal and world-wide ethical ideal. Furthermore, it seems to become a universal law in the Kantian sense.

To clarify further what I attempt to explain here, there are at least two types of reason cooperating with sympathetic feelings in the development of compassion/benevolence. The first type is exercised in understanding situations and the second type in extending the virtue to a universal level. The former is exercised in experiential, concrete, personal, and specific situations; the latter is exercised on a non-experiential, abstract, impersonal, and general level. The Humean moral perspective is an illustration of the first type and the Kantian moral perspective is an illustration of the second. By combining both the Humean and the Kantian moral perspectives I claim that the virtue originates from both emotional and rational aspects of human beigs. In order to realize the overall characteristics of compassion/benevolence in terms of the role of sympathetic feelings and reason, both the Humean and the Kantian moral perspectives must be synchronized.

This position can be explained more clearly by referring to more recent scholarships. The feminist ethicists, Gilligan and Noddings who have done stimulating work on relational care ethics, show how reflective reason can be helpful in developing an attitude of caring, which in their usage of the terminology, can be understood as compassion/benevolence. Even though they do not share exactly the same ideas on emotion and reason in caring, since Noddings is an anti-Kantian in a much stronger sense

and highlights all human beings' innate tendency to care, they hold a similar standpoint when they argue that care is developed with the help of reason. Gilligan, in addition to recognizing responsibility, emphasizes understanding, reflection, critical reinterpretation of relationships, she also recognizes selfishness in developing care. Noddings holds that a caring mind is innate, and that a strong desire to be moral in the process of caring is reflectively generated from this more fundamental and natural desire.[200] Furthermore, the innate caring mind can be cultivated by education.

Gilligan and Noddings reject the Kantian argument for universality in morals. Human relational or caring ethics, they feel, is not grounded on a formal abstract idea. Rather, caring as a universal moral sense/principle depends upon individuals' specific experience and their contextual understanding. They emphasize tangible relationships, active interactions, concrete experiences, specific situations, and contextual understanding for an ethics of care. From these, the mind of caring and the actions of caring are generated; they are not generated from an abstract law. To summarize the position of Gilligan and Noddings: (1) care, as a kind of emotional feeling, receives help from reason for its transition and development; (2) care is captured in concrete relational experiences. In these two aspects, we see that the concept of care reflects the Humean perspective and is similar to the concept of compassion/benevolence.

A more recent interpretation of the Kantian perspective on compassion/benevolence is Nagel's argument on altruism. Nagel, a Kantian, argues that altruism is solely grounded on reason. Even other motivations relating to altruism depend not on emotional aspects, such

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[200] Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 83.

as desires, but "formal aspects of practical reason."[201] Assuming that compassion/ benevolence is one type of altruism, or a basis of all altruistic actions, we can compare Nagel's position with the two systems under consideration here. Obviously and strikingly, the standpoints of early Buddhists and classical Confucianists are different from Nagel's, since according to both systems compassion/benevolence is based on both emotion and reason. However, as we have discussed, compassion/benevolence has a higher, abstract level of development. On this level of development, it primarily relies on abstract, rational reflection rather than being triggered by concrete personal sympathy. If this understanding is correct, the development of compassion/benevolence should include the abstract level of development initiated by rational moral thinking at its final stage. Its development on this level seems to have an advantage that does not exist on the concrete level of its development. For example, I wonder whether one will be able to compassionate/ benevolent to a group of people such as murderers, criminals, and enemies whose committed actions are unforgivable. In this case, it will be difficult to develop a mind of sympathy naturally. Some might argue that one must be compassionate/benevolent simply because one should be; the reason why one should be is just because they are fellow human beings or that one should follow a rational moral command. However, the early Buddhist idea of compassion and the classical Confucianist idea of benevolence would require one cultivate sympathetic feelings ultimately. The only difference, with respect to the concrete level of development, is that sympathetic feelings in this case come later on,

201 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978) 15. His adamant position regarding altruism is expressed as follows: "...One has a *direct* reason to promote the interests of others--a reason which does not depend on intermediate factors such as one's own interests of one's antecedent sentiments of sympathy and benevolence" (14-5).

at the abstract level; probably, this sympathetic feelings will be developed only after making strenuous rational efforts. This kind of compassion/benevolence is primarily developed through a sense of "ought" rather than a sense of genuine sympathy, fitting in more with a Kantian framework, but this analysis may not be completely applied to the two ethical systems since the rationally generated compassion/benevolence asks one to cultivate a sense of sympathy eventually.

To clearify the main point: Sympathetic feelings are prior to rational moral thinking at the concrete level, but the rational moral command to be compassionate/ benevolent is prior to sympathetic feelings at the abstract level. Regarding these two levels of development, one more point needs to be made. It is obvious that early Buddhists and classical Confucianists suggest the development of compassion/benevolence on the basis of the concrete level of experience. This is understandable; since early Buddhist ethics and classical Confucianist ethics are always based on concrete experiences with other parties, the main transformative virtue occurs within the boundary of experiences of the parties. However, there is an abstract level of development; otherwise, how could one be compassionate/benevolent to all sentient beings or all humankind collectively? This level of development seems to have significant ethical value. The presupposition of the virtue on this level is the interconnectedness of the whole universe or of the whole human world, which provides a strong sense of wholeness; its culmination is realization of the welfare of the whole universe or world. "Interconnectedness in the whole universe or world" implies

limitlessness of the virtue in achieving it.[202] At this point, it becomes an ethical ideal; an ethical task that requires ceaseless effort is given to humans.

Even though the Humean perspective seems predominent in developing the virtue, to hold a Kantian characteristic on the abstract level would be appropriate in the ethical frameworks of early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. In principle, both traditions would say that one should be compassionate/benevolent to all creatures or all humankind; after all, this seems to become an imperative or a rational command as "a sense of ought."

With regard to altruism from the perspective of compassion/benevolence, we can recapitulate as follows. The early Buddhist and classical Confucianist positions on altruism do not allow altruism in extreme forms such as self-sacrifice. They suggest that one should take care of both oneself and others. The desirable form of the altruistic attitude is one which is cognizant of and aims at the welfare of both self and other without ignoring or harming. This attitude of both-regarding is a result of sticking a compromize between the attitudes of self-regarding and other-regarding. First, self-regarding is transformed into other-regarding and then the two attitudes are compromised and combined. Interestingly, Gilligan's research shows the same framework. She lays out three stages of transition in developing caring. The transition occurs two times: (1) from self-regarding to other-

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202 'Interconnectedness in the universe or world' is a theoretical ground for 'limitlessness of the virtue' in both systems. We may find another theoretical ground in the early Buddhist usage of terms. In early Buddhism, cultivating limitless (***aparimāṇa*** or ***appamāṇa***) mind (***cetanā***) is very important in obtaining the moral goal. On one hand, the term (***aparimāṇa*** or ***appamāṇa***) is used to emphasize cultivating the mind and cultivating a loving mind limitlessly. The ***Sutta-nipāta*** says that one should cultivate a limitless mind (***mānasam aparimāṇam***) towards all beings (Sn 149) and should have a limitless loving mind (***mettāṃ mānasam aparimāṇam***) toward the whole world (Sn 150). On the other hand, the term is used in the context of discussing freedom. For example, one who has a limitless mind (***appamāṇacetasa***) is identified with one who holds a liberated mind (***cetovimutti***) and liberated wisdom (***paññāvimutti***) (KS 4.119). In a word, practicing the virtue of compassion limitlessly, cultivating the mind limitlessly, and cultivating the loving mind limitlessly are means to achieve the early Buddhist moral goal.

regarding, and (2) from other-regarding to both-regarding. According to her, depending upon an understanding or realization of the interdependent relationships between self and other, the transitions take place. When one makes the second transition, the conflict between self and other or between selfishness and responsibility dissolves. Expressed in her own words, she says: "Seeking the solution that best protects both herself and others, she[203] defines morality in a way that combines the recognition of interconnection between self and others with an awareness of the self as the arbiter of moral judgment and choice."[204] From the perspective of "both-regarding" in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism, one can consider the problem of justice. The notion of justice in the two systems can be simply expressed: Everyone's interest should be equally weighted without diminishing or ignoring even one single person's interest. Taking the idea of mutual benefit or advantage, the notion of justice treats both the interest of the self and of others equally. Rawls, the Kantian liberal, who understands justice as the principle of reciprocity, addresses precisely this same idea. Rejecting the utility principle of utilitarianism because this principle is not compatible with the idea of mutual advantage,[205] he claims that "It is not justice that some should have less in order that others many prosper."[206]

Even though early Buddhists, classical Confucianists, and Rawls share a similar notion of justice, there is a conspicuous difference in their conception of benevolence/

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203 The case for this obsevational analysis is one pregnant female whose name is Ruth. She has to make a judgment about a second pregnancy whose timing conflicts with her completion of an advanced degree. Her moral dilemma is located in the situation where the self-regarding action, finishing her degree, conflicts with hurting an unborn child.

204 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 96.

205 Because, in the principle of utility, one's interest can be ignored and victimized in the name of a common maximum interest.

206 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971) 15.

compassion. While benevolence is extraordinary morality for only a few in Rawls' thought, it is ordinary morality in the thought of the former two systems. For Rawls, benevolence, as one of the virtues of "the love of humankind," is supererogatory and not for ordinary persons because it is beyond natural duties and obligations.[207] So benevolence is perceived to be on a higher level than right and justice. On this higher level, self-sacrifice, which is unconcerned about self or self-interest, can be exercised. Yet according to my analysis of compassion/benevolence of the two systems, the idea of self-sacrifice is hardly justified.

At this point, one may worth ask: "Why is self-sacrifice not justified?" An answer seems to have already been given in the claim that compassion/benevolence is ordinary morality, because everyone can practice and realize it. Everyone can practice and realize it because it is grounded on concrete, experiential, and contextual human relationships. It is naturally generated and gradually cultivated from inside the human mind. It is not a purely abstract moral command which is formally postulated.

Rorty, the contemporary anti-Kantian pragmatist, argues essentially the same idea regarding compassion/benevolence in terms of "solidarity." His notion of "solidarity" is one which emphasizes concrete situational contexts containing the same virtue of compassion/benevolence, a similar framework for developing it, and a similar way of extending it to encompass an ever-greater number of beings. Rejecting the Kantian slogan, that humanity antecedently exists, Rorty argues that we should keep extending our sense of "us" to other people, to develop a larger scope of solidarity. He writes:

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207 Rawls 478-9.

Keep trying to expand our sense of "us" as far as we can. That slogan urges us to extrapolate further in the direction set by certain events in the past- the inclusion among "us" of the family in the next cave, then of the tribe across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyond the mountains, then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and, perhaps last of all, of the menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work).[208]

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[208] Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge UP, 1989) 196.

CHAPTER IV. REALIZATION OF THE MAIN VIRTUE

In the previous chapter, I tried to show how the whole mechanism of the main self-transformative virtue is developed in the case of an individual alone. I focused on how a person internalizes and extends this virtue, beginning with self-restraint/self-overcoming, and ending by extending it to many people. In this chapter, I shall attempt to show how this virtue occurs in specific forms in the context of social conventions. From the perspective of social conventions, the self-transformative person has the essential task of realizing the virtue through present social customs and institutions.

Although the task of realizing compassion/benevolence is apparently based on the present social customs and institutions, this does not mean that the entire set of the present social customs and institutions should be accepted. However, since early Buddhism and classical Confucianism are not revolutionary but reformative, the task is to realize this virtue without causing radical social changes: One can try to utilize and modify given social customs and institutions when establishing a compassionate/benevolent society.

In establishing a compassionate/benevolent society, education and politics provide major institutional bases and play an essential role in both systems. We will see how compassion/benevolence is delivered through educational activities and political ideas in the two systems. In both systems, educating people is a type of compassionate/benevolent activity, and politics is a means of extending compassion/benevolence.

A. EARLY BUDDHISM

(1) <u>An Educatioal Activity</u>

A crucial characteristic of the Buddha that differentiates him from other previous buddhas is his firm motivation to share the content of his enlightenment (***dhamma***) with all other sentient beings out of compassion. Soon after he liberated himself from suffering and remained enjoying the happiness of enlightenment, he turned to see other beings who were subject to suffering. Out of compassion for others, he made a firm decision to preach what he realized at the time of enlightenment. He traveled all approachable places in order to share it. His whole career after obtaining enlightenment was dedicated to benefiting people by sharing his doctrine (***dhamma***).

The Buddha's firm resolution continues even at the last moment of his death. When ***Māra*** (the personification of death) urges him to die soon at the time of his death, he shows strong compassion toward people; he does not want to die unless his doctrine (***dhamma***) is properly established:

> I shall not die, O Evil one! until the brethren and sisters of the Order, and until the lay-disciples of either sex shall have become true hearers, wise and well trained, ready and learned, carrying the doctrinal books in their memory, masters of the lesser corollaries that follow from the larger doctrine, correct in life, walking according to the precepts-until they, having thus themselves learned the doctrine, shall be able to tell other of it, preach it, make it known, establish it, open it, minutely explain it and make it clear-until they, when others start vain doctrine easy to be refuted by the

truth, shall be able in refuting it, to spread the wonder-working truth abroad.[209]

For the Buddha, spreading his doctrine to monks/nuns and lay people was a lifetime project and it has been continued even after his death. Through his disciples, his compassion has been continuously transferred. They believe that the Buddha was born for happiness of people and out of compassion for the world.[210]

The Buddha told his disciples to go every where and preach the doctrine (*dhamma*). So his pupils traveled many places with the assigned mission. They were supposed to work for the highest moral goal, freedom (*nibbāna)* or happiness (*sukha*), for themselves and to teach the doctrine to others as well. Making efforts to promote the happiness of others was weighted as important as working for their own happiness. Since the activity of teaching is done with the thought of compassion for others, it is a way of practicing and accelerating compassion for one's fellow human beings. More specifically, they cultivate compassion through the action of teaching. Therefore, compassion enables others to realize the truth of compassion and to cultivate compassion in the actor's own mind. Compassion should be extended and deepened without any boundary. The compassionate action of teaching should continuously reach larger number of people; in the same way cultivation of compassion would be deepened continuously as a result of repeated compassionate actions.

At this juncture, one may raise a question. Why did the Buddha and later disciples consider the activity of preaching the doctrine to be a major compassionate action? Two

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209 DA 3.112.
210 GS 2.14.

answers are possible. First, they believed that the doctrine is a raft to ferry over the ocean of suffering (***dukkha***) and could be utilized by everybody. In other words, they believed that the doctrine brings good and happiness. As long as there are beings who suffer, they, out of compassion, make known the doctrine to the people and instruct them of the noble way of life (***brahmacariya***) for their good and happiness.[211] Second, a clear awareness of people's suffering and a motivation to share the doctrine with them in order to eliminate that suffering involved an act of compassion. The rationale of this approach is as follows. Imagine a person who just had a satisfactory meal and has a motivation to share his/her food with a starving person out of compassion. He/she knows the starving person's suffering and has a sympathetic motivation to help him/her by providing food. Similarly, just as providing food is an act of compassion for the starving person, so is teaching the doctrine an act of compassion for people who suffer.

As we have seen, teaching and sharing the doctrine with others is to extend compassion toward them. Traditionally, compassion has been understood as a virtue that necessarily involves others, not just oneself. This is not a proper understanding of compassion, however, since compassion has two aspects; the action of compassion is not only to make people free from their suffering but to free oneself as well. This interpretation of compassion agrees with the early Buddhist position in relation to welfare (***aṭṭha***). Recall that it puts equal emphasis on the benefit (***hita***) for both oneself and others.

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211 DA 3.120.

At this point, I want to bring up an interesting implication of the principle of dependent arising with regard to compassion. Under the principle of dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), the action of compassion is a required virtue for the Buddha and his pupils even for their own life. Their life is connected with others interdependently. The disciples of the Buddha are expected to necessarily contemplate on this aspect of life. One of ten conditions that must be contemplated (*paccavekkhati*) is that "my very life is dependent on others (*parapaṭibaddhā me jivikā*)."[212] To see people interdependent or to see the world interrelated is one of the major roles of contemplation.

Freedom or happiness needs to be explained in the light of the principle of dependent arising. The disciples' freedom or happiness is associated with the freedom or happiness of the whole world. When others suffer, no enlightened one is able to have real freedom or happiness. This shows that a compassionate action is thus necessary even for oneself. In this sense, we can say that compassion is both a voluntary virtue for oneself and an involuntarily assigned duty when it involves others. I have a duty to be compassionate for others. Teaching and sharing the doctrine are ways of being compassionate for others. Hence, I have a duty to teach and share the doctrine.

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212 GS 5.62.

(2) Politics

a. Politics by Righteousness (*dhamma*)

Politics in early Buddhism, in my interpretation, is understood in the context of realizing compassion. The purpose of institutional politics is to benefit others by actualizing compassion; the purpose of politics is to actualizing compassion in all of the world. As a result, politics rightly understood and practiced will mean happiness for all.

The early Buddhist political idea is simple. It does not present a sophisticated system of political or social organization. It is based on the single idea, establishing morality (***dhamma***) or righteousness (***dhamma***), through politics. This idea is demonstrated in the early Buddhist position on kingship. The king should be, above all others, an exemplar in moral character. If the king is a genuine embodiment of moral character, concern for the welfare and happiness of people will follow naturally. So morality is taken as the foremost and fundamental qualification for kingship. This shows that the king is not only a worldly leader and protector of people's happiness but also a moral exemplar whose morality is presumably based on righteousness. As a matter of fact, the king has a twofold character, being both a worldly and a *dhammic* conqueror; if we analyze the concept of 'king,' we observe a king is both a worldly ruler and an embodiment of righteousness in politics.[213]

Reynolds observes an important characteristic of kingship in early Buddhism. As he observes, there is a close relationship between righteousness and kingship.[214] Having

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213 One of the most complex terms, ***dhamma*** in general means the doctrine of the Buddha, indicating his whole teaching. Since a major concern of his whole teaching is morality, we can understand one aspect of ***dhamma*** as refering to morality. This is indeed true in politics. If we want to specify ***dhamma*** in politics, we may further define ***dhamma*** as "righteousness."

214 He illuminates the nature of the early Buddhist concept of king in his article, "The Two Wheels of Dhamma." He argues that the early Buddhist concept of king incorporates other-worldly soteriology and

accepted kingship "as the normal and appropriate mode of government,"[215] the early Buddhists disseminate righteousness (***dhamma***) in governmental institutions. As the result of incorporating the two elements, they articulate the ideals and institutions of kingship in terms of morality (***dhamma***). The ruler's task is "the maintenance of order and justice" in society and his rule should be in accordance with righteousness.[216]

Worldly order and ***dhamma*** as righteousness are interconnected in the early Buddhist political ideas. It would be interesting to see how worldly power and righteousness are harmonized without running into conflict. As we have discussed, the Buddha does not recognize any conflict between righteousness (***dhamma***) and politics. Rather, the Buddha considers that political institutions can be utilized, through righteousness, to promote the welfare of people. He tries to show how the king can rule a country by righteousness (***dhamma***) or how righteousness (***dhamma***) can be realized by a righteous king.

The early Buddhists, from the time of the Buddha, maintained a close influential relationship with the kings. They provided advice to the kings. We observe that one of the Buddha's main audiences was the royal family. In response to the advice of the Buddha, the royal family provided strong material support to the Order (***saṅgha***). Mutual help and exchange between the political authority and the Order mirrors the rulers attempt to apply

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concerns for worldly order; "...early Buddhism incorporated strands of other-worldly soteriology, an interest in more immediately accessible soteriological goals, and a concern for the establishment and maintenance of proper order in the world" (Frank Reynolds, "The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early Buddhism," The Two Wheels of Dhamma ed. Smith Bardwell (Chambersberg: American Academy of Religion, 1972) 7.

Even though my position is fundamentally different from his position in some respects; he sees ***dhamma*** as other-worldly soteriology. This position is not acceptable in my interpretation of early Buddhism. However, I share one observation with him: the connection of ***dhamma*** and the idea of kingship in early Buddhism.

215 Reynolds 12.

216 Reynolds 13.

morals (***dhamma***) to their political institutions. The Buddha considered the usefulness of political institutions to be the extent to which they assist in the realizing of righteousness.

As already pointed out, the primary characteristic that indicates a king's good ruler is moral excellence. To reveal his moral excellence, he must present himself as a model for the people. The legalization of the rules is not a major concern since it is believed that the king presenting himself as a moral person can prevent the people from doing immoral things. For the king, the main task is the establishment of himself as a model of a righteous king. The Buddha thought that keeping the king within the boundaries of the moral world is one way of encouraging the people themselves to be moral. When the king is not righteous, neither are the people: "At such time, monks, as kings are unrighteous (***adhammika***), the ministers of kings also are unrighteous. When ministers are unrighteous, brahmins and householders also are unrighteous. Thus townsfolk and villagers are unrighteous."[217]

More specifically, the principle of governing is to provide moral environments in order to encourage people to be righteous. The king should be a forerunner in creating the moral environment. He, as a moral exemplar, is on the top of a hierarchy that shows a gradual moral influence on the ministers in the middle and on all people at the bottom. When the hierarchy based on morality functions well in terms of moral actions, people encourage each other to be moral. When it does not function well, the people will not be encouraged

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217 GS 2.84.

to be moral. The Buddha presents this idea by contrasting the worthy man (*sappurisa*) and the unworthy man (*asappurisa*).[218]

This type of king is known as a *dhamma rājā* (a righteous king) or a *cakkavatti* (a wheel turner). The meaning of the two terms-- to rule by righteousness (*dhamma*) or to turn a wheel of righteousness (*dhamma)*--is practically the same. There is no doubt that the righteous king or the wheel turner is, for the early Buddhists, the ideal ruler.

The concept of the righteous king appears as the Great Elect (*Mahā sammata*) in the *Aggaññā-suttanta*. The Great Elect is the primary concept of kingship in the texts. He was elected by all of the people or a majority of them at the time when immoral and evil things started appearing among people in order to handle wrongdoings and tangles between people.[219] Since his position is set up for the purpose of morality, he is presumably a morally respected person.

We observe several important points from the concept of the Great Elect. First, he is chosen by the people, depending upon their need; the scope of his work is limited by the people. He does not have any power that is not based on the people's will. He is only a performer of the tasks which are required by people. Theoretically, he is just a civil officer

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218 The worthy man encourages faith (*saddha*), modesty (*hiri*), conscientiousness (*ottappa*), and so forth. The unworthy man encourages another non-virtues activities such as unbelief (*assadha*), shamelessness (*ahirika*), recklessness (*anottapa*) and so forth. (GS 2.231-32) People should follow, serve, and honor one who is superior (*adhika*) to themselves in virtue (*sila*), concentration (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*paññā*), and should not follow one who is inferior to (GS 2.107-08).

219 The criteria for choosing the Great Elect are: handsome (*abhirūpa*), good-looking (*dassanīya*), dignified (*pāsādika*), and of great ability (*mahesakkha*). There are some of the physical characteristics that generally command respect from the ordinary people even before they come to know his moral character. Specifically, he is in charge of carrying out his obligations by expressing his indignation rightly, and by censuring and banishing the people rightly (DA 3.88). The ruler can solely dedicate himself to these responsibilities without concerning himself about his own needs, for people give him a proportion of their rice as a payment.

to serve people. This idea sharply contrasts with the Brahmanical tradition that the king is thought to be anointed by God and to have absolute power over all people. Second, the Great Elect does not have authority to tax people for himself. His pay is given by people's voluntary decision in compensation for his job. Third, a contract is made between the Great Elect and the people; he works for them and they pay him. This contract defines the boundary of the power of the Great Elect and of the right of the people. The Great Elect is a subject of the people in terms of his livelihood. In other words, people have economic power over him since he is dependent for his sustenance solely on what he receives from the people. For that matter, "he is not different at all from the rest of the community except in so far as his personal qualities of handsomeness, efficiency and popularity were concerned."[220] The exercise of excessive power over the people is not part of the concept of the Great Elect. Fourth, we observe there is a clear distinction between the ruler as a non-physical worker and the people as physical workers. The ruler's livelihood is dependent on his mental labor and the people's livelihood is dependent on physical labor.

The Great Elect's two other developmental names more clearly show the nature of his obligation. He is secondly known as ***Khattiya,*** meaning the Lord of Fields. The ***Sutta*** does not explain why he is called the Lord of Fields. An explanation is provided by P. Dissanayake; he is called this "in the sense that he had the last word in disputes relating to the rice field."[221] This is a reasonable explanation because the ***Sutta*** indicates that one of the major roles of the Great Elect is to act as a mediater when there is a need to settle disputes relating to the fields of rice. The third name is ***Rājā*** because he pleases others by

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220 Piyasena Dissanayake, Political Thoughts of the Buddha (Colombo: The Ratnakara Press, 1977) 70.
221 Dissanayake 68.

righteous government. Having considered these two names of the Great Elect, we find two things about him. First, from the name ***Khattiya***, his main role must be associated with the fields of rice. He is in charge of mediating people's disputes by providing a right judgment on the basis of righteousness. Second, as a result of his right judgment, he must be able to please people. In this way, he takes the role of a judge.

The Great Elect, as we have seen, is more associated with the concept of the righteous king (***dhamma rājā)*** than with the concept of the wheel-turner (***cakkavatti***). Even though it is clear that the righteous king which is shown in the concept of the Great Elect is to please people by providing a solution on the basis of morality, we have not gotten a rich illustration about the righteous king from the examination of the Great Elect's other names. The concept of the righteous king is more clearly and richly revealed in the concept of the wheel-turner. We will see this soon. Before we move on for this, let us consider an extremely significant role of the concept of the Great Elect in its historical context.

The idea that people elect their own leader for themselves must be perceived as a revolutionary idea in the early Buddhist times. Consider that the early Brahmanical notion of the origin of a king cannot be thought without connecting with the notion of "divinity"; the king is either annointed by the God ***Brahma*** or sanctioned by the gods.[222] As a result,

222 With regard to the origin of the king in Brahmanism, the view of divinity and contract seems to be a reasonable understanding. In the perspective of the divine origin, the king is appointed by Brahma, and in the perspective of contract, there is a contract between the king and brahmans (Chales Drekmeier, Kingship and Community in Early India (Standford: Standford UP, 1962) 137, 250). Notice that for the case of latter, the notion of divinity plays an important role; in making a unilateral contract, the king considered as the heir of *Vishnu* grants the brahmans' privileges at the cost of his divine ordination. For both cases, the notion of divinity intervenes. After all, the idea of contract is based on the notion of divination. The intervention of the notion of divinity is a crucial political thought of Brahmanism. In other words, "social contract and divine origin meet in a shadowy union" (Drekmeier 250).

the Brahmanical notion of kingship emphasizes the king's power over the people or the previleged brahman class. Furthermore, it imposes the absolute notion of duty on the people rather than the people's right to the king. In contrast, the notion of the Great Elect, by implication, emphasizes the people's choice and power rather than anything else. It rejects explicitly the Brahmanical notion of the divine kingship. Since there is no idea of "divinity" or superpower attached to the Great Elect, one can say that it is purely based on people's will and choice. In this context, one may argue that a main aim of the concept of "the Great Elect" is to reject the Brahmnaical ideology. The early Buddhists seem to be satisfied with refuting the traditional ideology by presenting their own notion of the king, so they do not develop this concept further. The further development of the notion of kingship continues with the notion of the wheel-turner (*cakkavatti*). The concept of the righteous king becomes much richer and clearer with the emergence of the concept of the wheel-turner.

The notion of the wheel-turner expresses the significant moral values of the righteous king in the ***Cakkavatti-sihanāda Suttanta***. The wheel-turner ***Cakkavatti*** appears as a monarch turning a wheel of righteousness (***Dhammacakka***). Depending upon righteousness (***dhamma***) and respecting righteousness, the wheel-turner should provide the protection for all people including the army, the nobles, vassals, and brahmans etc.[223] He should protect even animals such as beasts and birds. Also, he should keep his country away from wrong or immoral things. His rule by righteousness should not allow any person to be poor. Wealth should be shared with the poor.[224] When righteousness is

223 DA 3.65.
224 DA 3.62.

exercised, the celestial wheel (***dibbaṁ cakkaratanaṁ***) keeps turning; when righteousness declines, the wheel sinks down and disappears in the country. The disappearance of the wheel is indicated by the appearance of poverty, stealing, and punishment. When this situation continues, poverty and stealing keep growing, and violence and murder occur. Consequently, the degree of punishment increases; a sharp sword or death penalty comes into use. Moreover, there is an increase in abusive speech and idle talk, lack of filial piety to parents, lack of religious piety to holy men, and lack of regard for the head of the clan. As people abstain from these evil behaviors and practice virtues, a righteous wheel-turning-king ruling by righteousness appears. Significantly, he rules not by the scourge or the sword but by righteousness. He turns the wheel of righteousness.

The concept of the moral king in a strong sense emerges very clearly with the concept of the wheel-turner that emphasizes solely righteousness in the mystical story. The concept of the wheel-turner emphasizes not only the way of ruling by righteousness but also righteous quality of the ruler.

The moral quality of the ruler is to be proved before he exercises his kingship. The son of the wheel-turning-king can be appointed by the wheel-turning-king when the father decides to renounce. However, the appointment does not prove the son worthy to be the next king. The son has to prove his moral (and also practical) worth for himself. If he is qualified to be the next ruler, the wheel continues to turn. Otherwise, the wheel stops turning and disappears. In the process of approving the king, there is no appearance of the Brahmanical notion of divinity.

Another way to emphasize the moral quality of the wheel-turning-king is shown in his parallel appearance with the Buddha himself. As the worldly ruler is described as the king turning the wheel of righteousness, so the Buddha himself is described as a king. The king constantly watches all people and animals and exercises his sovereignty according to righteousness; the historical Buddha (as well as any future Buddha) constantly watches the three fields of actions and rolls the unsurpassed wheel of righteousness in accordance with morals.[225] The Buddha exhibits the character of the king and the Buddha as an enlightened one.

This duality is also presented by juxtaposing the future ***Cakkavatti Sankha*** and the future Buddha ***Metteyya***.[226] When righteousness or morality is arising again among the people, ***Sankha*** and ***Metteyya*** will appear. Since the idea of the future Buddha seldom appears in the ***Pāli Nikāyas***, to bring ***Metteyya*** up in this context is very significant. It should be pointed out that, even though ***Metteyya*** is in a juxtaposition with ***Sankha***, it is presented after the latter is introduced in the ***Sutta***. This seems to suggest that here the image of the Buddha is used for substantiating the quality of the king rather than in the reverse.[227]

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225 The worldly king and the Buddha are described in the almost same phraseology: "Herein, monk, a king who is a world-monarch (the phraseology for the Buddha-Just so, monk, the ***Tathāgata***, that ***Arahat*** who is a Fully Enlightened one), the just and righteous ruler in dependence on ***dhamma***, honoring ***dhamma***, respectful and deferential to ***dhamma***, with ***dhamma*** as his banner, ***dhamma*** as his standard, with ***dhamma*** as his overlord, keeps constant watch and ward amongst the folk (for the Buddha-the actions of his body, speech, and thought)" (GS 1.94-95).

226 DA 3.74.

227 However, this seems to be an exclusive case that goes astray from the general style which is a mutual way. In general, as the worldly king obtains a moral image from the Buddha as an embodiment of morals, so the Buddha obtains the king's image from the worldly king as an embodiment of power. This mutual way of interpretation appears appropriate since the texts frequently make a juxtaposed parallel with the two images. Furthermore, the image of the conqueror of the Buddha, through morals, is backed up by the image of the worldly king. For the Buddha certainly has the image of the worldly king and he is

For the point of our discussion, I want to stress that the moral image of the king is taken from the moral image of the Buddha. Since the worldly king is possessive of moral nature, he is supposed to conquer the world not by military force but by morality or righteousness. Moreover, he should benefit all people with compassionate politics if he wants to realize righteousness fully.

So far, I have tried to show how the early Buddhists emphasized the importance of the moral quality of the genuine ruler. Two ways were highlighted. First, the early Buddhists traced back the moral character of the genuine ruler to the notion of the wheel-turner. The king's moral character is more strongly established by the fusion of the concepts of the righteous king *(dhamma rājā)* and the wheel-turner *(cakkavatti)*. Notice here the implications of the two terms: "to please people" and "*cakkavatti* cannot exist without moral quality." The combination of these two can be addressed: The righteous king as the turner of the wheel of righteousness rules people in accordance with righteousness in order to bring their welfare.

The second way was to characterize the genuine ruler by juxtaposing the image of the Buddha in a metaphorical parallelism. The worldly king should conquer the world by righteousness; just as the Buddha conquers the world of morality. These two ways served to highlight the early Buddhist political idea, which was to govern by righteousness and benefit all beings. In other words, the purpose of politics is to achieve through righteousness the highest moral goal, freedom or happiness, for all people.

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illustrated in a combination of the two images. As a matter of fact, the Buddha was a wheel-turning king in accordance with morals in his previous life. At that time, he as a moral king possessing the king's seven germs conquered the world and stabilized the country (GS 4.54).

b. The Way to Maintain Righteousness (*dhamma*)

So far, emphasizing moral character, we have been mainly using the term ***dhamma*** in the sense of morals: by "to rule by ***dhamma***" we mean "to rule by righteousness" that can also replaced with "morals." In the next section, we will examine meanings of ***dhamma*** further in the political context. In this section, we will discuss the meanings that are revealed in the expression: "the way of maintaining righteousness (***dhamma***)."

It would be proper to understand "to rule by righteousness" is to maintain righteousness in politics. The answer to the question as to how one can maintain righteousness is found in the Buddha's advice to the monks. Insisting that harmony (***sāmaggi***) in the Order should be maintained, he states that the monks should proclaim "not morals (***dhamma)*** as not morals (***dhamma***)," and "morals (***dhamma)*** as morals (***dhamma***)."[228] On another occasion, he tells the monks: to indicate that what is not moral is moral will eventually cause the disappearance of true morality.[229] Interpreting these two passages in the context of politics, we can take "righteousness" for ***dhamma***.

Consider the repetitive expression (***adhammam adhama*** and ***dhammam dhammo***) stating the way of maintaining righteousness. It appears initially to be singularly unhelpful. It uses the term "***adhamma*** (not moral)" and "***dhamma*** (moral)" without providing specific contents to distinguish one from the other. What are we to make of this?

There are several responses. First, the term ***dhamma*** itself is complex. The whole range of ***dhamma*** is hardly described (let alone captured) in a specific definition; when it

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228 "***adhammaṁ adhammo ti dīpenti dhammaṁ dhammo ti dīpenti***" (A 5.74).
229 GS1.13.

is addressed specifically, only a part of it is revealed. This is because ***dhamma*** consists of numerous types and levels of meanings. For example, "***dhamma***" can indicate a type of knowing implying moral practice such as dependent arising (***paṭiccasamuppāda***) or the five virtues (***pañcasila***). Also, we can have different levels of "***dhamma***" depending upon levels of practice; certainly, ***dhamma*** for a novice monk/nun will be different from ***dhamma*** for a senior monk/nun: This is the same case for lay people. Since the totality of meanings of ***dhamma*** is so vast and complex, the Buddha seems to take the repetitive form in order to express the way of maintaining ***dhamma***.

Secondly, the repetitive expression reflects the Buddha's perception of the flexibility of ***dhamma*** in its applications depending upon the differences of individuals and situations. This flexibility of ***dhamma*** as an applicational diversity does not mean its core message changes. The flexibility indicates that ***dhamma*** takes various shapes in revealing itself as the same human body takes different clothes depending upon its level, size, personal character, and season. The core meaning of ***dhamma*** is single and invariable, while the expression is multiple and infinitely variable.[230] Depending upon different types of people and of socio-historical situations, the same single core meaning of ***dhamma*** produces different phrases and guidelines that fit each type of person and of situation. ***Dhamma*** has great diversity in its phraseology, yet it carries an underlying unity in it.[231]

I have suggested two answers to the question as to why the way of maintaining ***dhamma*** is expressed in the repetitive form. In fact, the two answers are not different.

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230 Lamotte Etienne, "The Assessment of Texual Interpretation in Buddhism," Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Donald Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988) 13.
231 George Bond, "The Gradual path as a Hermeneutical Approach to the Dhamma," Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Lopez 41.

They reveal the same nature of ***dhamma***. The complexity of the term ***dhamma*** is partly a reflection of its applicational flexibility.

The repetitive description of ***dhamma*** and its implication should be applied to politics as well. When the Buddha says "to rule by righteousness (***dhamma***)," I believe that he does not mean to rule by a fixed single form of righteousness. Rather, laying out a form of righteousness, he must allow for flexibility in the diversity of its applications.

c. The Principles of Politics: Meaning of Ruling by Righteousness

When the repetitive expression, "claim ***dhamma*** as ***dhamma*** and claim not ***dhamma*** as not ***dhamma***," is applied to politics, what does it mean? In other words, what does "to rule by righteousness (***dhamma***)" mean?

To see the first meaning of "to rule by righteousness," let us recall the previous discussion. We saw that its main meaning is to govern for the sake of benefiting people on the basis of compassion and benefiting people simply means assisting in their realization of happiness. Here what I want to consider is the scope of people benefited in the historical context.

As is well-known, the Buddha rejected the Brahmanical theory based on the fourfold order of society which was claimed to be divine in origin and was, therefore, absolute.[232] In the ***Aggaññā-sutta***, we see that the division into the four classes is based on their functions in the society, so early Buddhist politics did not aim to benefit a small group of

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232 Dissanayake 73.

people or a certain privileged class. It aimed at the welfare of the whole group of people without any discrimination.

The idea of equality of the four classes as beneficiaries of "to rule by righteousness" is significant when we consider the Buddha's contemporary socio-political circumstances. The idea of equality challenged the contemporary Brahmanical concept of law (*dhamma)* that justified the inequality of the four classes. The brahman class as a privileged class dominates other classes; the law (*dhamma*) does not rule the brahmans but they rule the law. In other words, they are beyond the law. The Buddha considered that this is injustice. One of his strategies to challenge the perceived injustice was to claim that all are equal in following and applying the righteous law (*dhamma*). He claimed repeatedly that the righteous law (*dhamma*) is the highest among each class of people.[233] The point of this claim is that the righteous law should be equally applied for everyone. Thus, one may argue that "to rule by righteousness" means to reject the privileged class and to apply the righteous law equally: to rule not by brahmans but by the righteous law. Here the dictum, "to rule by righteousness," is used for breaking down the inequality of the socio-political structure and endeavors to bring about the happiness of all.

Secondly, "to rule by righteousness" means not to rule by punishment. Use or need of punishment itself means deterioration of righteousness and a lack of moral qualification on the part of the ruler. An important role of the ruler is prevention of possible immoral acts and crimes rather than punishment after they occur. He should guide people to do good by

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233 For example, having explained the evolution of each class in the *Aggañña Sutta*, he states that the righteous law (*dhamma*) is the highest among this folk (*dhammo settho janetasmin*).

providing exemplary actions. Since the point of rule is to lead people to do good, no special attention is paid for creating specific rules for criminals and wrong doers.

Thirdly, "to rule by righteousness" means minimization of the power of the ruler. Not endowing the ruler with great power gives some autonomy to each individual. The optimistic belief in the individual's capability to do good is laid out. The belief in each person's autonomy and capability to do good explains why the early Buddhists do not address and emphasize laws. Giving the individuals room to exersize their autonomy, the ruler does not need to intervene in all the affairs of individuals. What he has to do is to establish righteousness in dealing with his affairs. He does not give specific orders to individuals. Individuals deal with their affairs on the basis of righteousness that is learned from the modeling of the paradigmatic ruler. Thus, they may exercise freedom and creativity in carrying out their responsibilities.

To be sure, there is no evidence which shows that the Buddha encourged the ruler to formulate rules and laws in order to control people. In fact, for the Buddha to increase the number of rules indicates deterioration of morality. When the situation is deteriorating and morals are declining, more rules are made.[234] Making more rules and laws would mean a failure of "ruling by righteousness" and of presenting a paradigmatic model.

d. Politics and Nature

From the previous discussion, we saw that that rulers and political institutions appear when human morals have declined. There would be no need to have rulers and political

234 MLS 3.116.

institutions if humans were moral. At the earliest time of the evolution of the world, when the human conducts were moral, there was no consideration given to political systems. This means that the most natural and best society is the society without immoral behaviors and political systems.

In early Buddhist political thought, just as politics is connected with human morals, so too it is connected with nature. There is a correlation between politics and nature. Recall that, when the ruler and the ministers are righteous, the people are righteous; when they are not, people are not. Furthermore, when a non-righteous situation continues, nature itself goes wrong and is not favorable to human life. The solar system does not take its proper course; days, seasons, and years are out of joint; the weather is not favorable; rains and crops are not seasonal. Finally, all these unfavorable phenomena bring unhealthy results to humans.[235] Logically, the poorer political leadership is, the more cruel nature would be to humans. However, poor political leadership does not directly cause unfavorable nature. It directly leads to the moral deterioration of people and indirectly leads to natural misfortune.

This correlation between politics and nature (or, politics and people's morality) reflects the Buddha's way of perceiving. As everything is in a related chain, humans and nature are correlated in the principle of dependent arising. As the world of human morals is related to the world of phenomena, so the deterioration of human morals is interconnected with natural misfortune. On the other hand, if we consider a symbolic implication of natural misfortune in terms of human conduct, we can say that immoral politics can make people

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[235] GS 2.84.

immoral and the immoral people can harm nature. This is the early Buddhist position: Politics, human conduct, and natural phenomena are closely interconnected and influence each other.

e. A Compassionate Action of Lay People: Giving (*dāna*)

For the lay people, giving or charity (***dāna***) is an essential virtue and is a way of practicing compassion. The notion of ***dāna*** in early Buddhism has two characteristics. First, it implies a sense of sharing. Regardless of how much or how little property or goods one possesses, everyone can offer something. In order to give something to others, one does not need to own a lot because giving is not dependent on how much one owns but dependent on the mind of sharing. Second, the notion of giving (***dāna***) considers both a giver (***dāyaka***) and a recipient (***patiggahaka***). *Dana* is not "giving away" everything to others without considering oneself.

The virtue of giving for lay people seems to be considered as valuable as the homeless life of monks/ nuns.[236] Giving is presumably recommended to one who wants to remain in lay life, while "going forth" is recommended to one who wants to lead a monkish life. Lay people can choose a "going forth" life but the monks/nuns cannot choose giving. Giving is apparently assigned only to lay people. Giving is mostly encouraged from lay people to the monks/nuns or from lay people to lay people, but it is not encourged from the monks to

[236] The Buddha equally emphasizes giving (*dāna*), going forth (***pabbajjā***), and support of mother and father (***mātāpitunnaṁ***) as three things enjoined by the wise (***paṇḍitapaññatta***) and good (***sappurisapaññatta***) (GS 1.134).

lay people or from the monks/nuns to the monks/nuns. Since the monks/nuns do not own material items and live on donations by the laity, this seems to be natural.

However, there is for the monks an equivalent virtue of giving. Preaching the doctrine of the Buddha (***dhamma***) to lay people is the virtue of giving. The two different types of giving reflect two different life styles. The Buddha clearly made a distinction between the life styles of the monks/nuns and the laity. Householders (***gahaṭṭha***) can be good disciples by following their rules of conduct, which are different from the rules for the monks/nuns. Householders cannot fulfill the monk's/nun's practice (***bhikkhu dhamma***).[237] As the Buddha defines a monk's/nun's life differently, so he differentiates monk's/nun's giving from lay's. Therefore, the virtue of giving in terms of material things is applicable only for lay people.

The monks/nuns are not allowed to possess material things except a few items. Also, individual accumulation is not allowed; relying upon almsfood, they have to live from day to day. Having only a few items is a fundamental virtue for them. On the contrary, for lay people, accumulating wealth is encouraged as long as it is obtained by lawful (***dhammika***) ways through diligent labor.[238] One of the reasons for encouraging lay persons to be wealthy seems to be based on the early Buddhist emphasis on diligence. For common people, an incentive to be diligent is necessary: Being wealthy is a reward of hard work.[239] Accordingly, "sloth and non-exertion is an obstacle to wealth." While the monks

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[237] Sn 393.

[238] GS 2.76. In accumulating wealth, diligent work is greatly stressed. The early Buddhists use the following terms to discribe its importance: "by rousing energy (***uṭṭhānaviriyādhigatehi***)," "accumulated by strength of the arm (***bāhābalaparicitehi***)," and "earned by sweat (***sedāvakkhittehi***)."

[239] Moreover, the Buddha addresses that "great wealth (***bhoga***) through industry" is one of five gains of a well-doer (DA.3.91).

never enjoy having material things, lay people can enjoy wealth. Obtaining wealth for the lay seems to be praised as being as valuable as moral actions of the three fields.[240] Obviously, people can enjoy their wealth. However, enjoying wealth alone is immoral and brings downfall.[241]

The question thus becomes how to share wealth with others. The Buddha's answer is to use wealth rightly in a certain order. Significantly, the order of sharing is the same as the order of extending compassion: Sharing is to be done from closely related people to less closely related people.[242]

In another ***Sutta***, the Buddha presents the recipients of giving in different categorizations. Depending upon the level of moral achievement, he suggests fourteen groups from the first fully enlightened one to the thirteenth, a morally poor person (***puthujjanadussila***). And the fourteenth is giving to animals (***tiracchānagata***).[243] This ordering seems to reflect better the early Buddhist ethical position in the sense that on the one hand, the order is decided by the level of moral achievement, and on the other hand, animals as beneficiaries of compassion are included. Here we notice that the order of sharing is decided on the basis of the moral achievement of the recipients. Without excluding any sentient beings as the recipients, priority will be given to a morally better

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240 Bliss of wealth is compared with bliss of good moral actions. On one occasion, the Buddha mentions four kinds of bliss: the bliss of ownership (***atthisukha***), of wealth (***bhogasukha***), of debtlessness (***ananasukha***), and of blamelessness (***anavajjasukha***) (GS 2.77-79).

241 The ***Sutta-nipāta*** markedly tells, "having ample wealth (***pahūtavitta***), assets and property, enjoying them alone--this is a cause of one's downfall" (102).

242 First, one should make family, employees, and friends happy and cheerful, after making oneself happy and cheerful. Second, one should be secure against all misfortunes whatsoever. Third, one should share wealth with relatives (***ñati***), guests (***atithi***), departed apirits (***pubbapeta***), the king (***rājā***) and gods (***devatā***). Fourth, one should share with recluses (***samaṇa***) and brahmans (GS 2.77).

243 MLS 3.302.

achieved person. Since it is very clear that offering to morally achieved people is worthier than offering to less achieved people, we can say: Depending upon the achievement of morals, the Buddha justifies a differential treatment. Perhaps, the differential treatment based on the criterion of morality can be justified as long as the principle of equality, "to treat a similar case similary and a different case differently," is followed. For the Buddha, a person's morality is greatly considered as a criterion for what he/she deserves.[244]

As the monks' preaching activity is a way of practicing compassion, so the virtue of giving for the lay people is a way of practicing morals. The givers' "being virtueous (*sīlavanta*)" and "being morally good (*kalyāṇadhamma*)" parallel the recipients.' From the perspective of givers, they should be virtuous and morally good in order to make a purified offering.[245] The action of giving itself alone would not be meaningful; morality should be carried in the action of giving.

Also, the giver's sincere and gladsome mind is important at the time of giving. He/she should have threefold parts. The Buddha tells: "Herein, monks, before the gift he is glad at heart (*sumana*); in giving the heart is satisfied (*cittaṁ pasādeti*); and uplifted is the heart (*attamana*) when he has given."[246] Perhaps, to have a glad mind means to be joyful at that time of giving without having a proud mind. In the Buddha's own words, "' You must

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244 In this context, another fact needs to be considered. Early Buddhism emphasizes offering to the Order and the Enlightened One rather than to the lay people. The reason for this may be explained in the same way, namely, in terms of the criterion of morality. Without contradicting this explanation, one may provide different reasons for this. First, the monks/nuns that are a non-labor group and live on almsfood day after day and need to be constantly supported. In a way, they are in an urgent situation, even though they choose that life style. Second, while not discouraging householder's life, the Buddha wants to emphasize homeless life which requires more intensive and constant moral practice.

245 The Buddha analyzes offerings into four in terms of purification of offering: (1) the offering purified by both the giver and the recipient. (2) the offering purified only by the giver. (3) the offering purified only by the recipient. (4) the offering purified neither both sides (MLS 3.304).

246 GS 3.236. These three-fold parts parallel the receiver's lust-, hate-, and delusion-free mind.

not be satisfied just by the thought': 'we have served the Order with gifts of the requisites.'"[247] In addition, the giver's mind should be completely pure and empty without thinking of any consequential reward out of the action of giving. The action of giving itself always requires psychological purification at a profound level.

Even though the Buddha tells not to expect any reward as a result of the giving action, he frequently speaks about rewards as well. For the people practicing the virtue of giving, worldly happiness and rebirth in heavenly world as rewards of the action of giving seem to be promised. In the light of motivation, for the giver there should not be any connection between the virtue of giving and its outcomes. In the light of consequence, the virtue of giving is connected with good results such as wealth and heavenly-born. This is clearly illustrated in the texts.

The early Buddhist paradigmatic giver ***Anāthapiṇḍika*** appears as an extremely wealthy lay man. His wealth makes him able to cover the pavement all the way to ***Jetavana*** monastery with gold coins. As Strong notices, in spite of this lay man's donation of great amount of money to the monastery, he still seems to be wealthy. "The more ***Anāthapiṇḍika*** gives, the richer he seems."[248] Using common sense, we may think giving decreases wealth and may assume a countervailing relationship between giving and wealth. However, a reciprocal relationship between them seems to be laid out. This is understood, as Strong does, by kamma theory. The logic of kamma theory is that ***Anāthapiṇḍika***'s wealth is a result of lavish giving and lavish giving will bring more wealth. Thus, giving

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247 GS 3.152.

248 John Strong, "Rich Man, Poor Man, Bhikkhu, King: Asoka's Great Quinquennial Festival and the Nature of ***Dāna***," Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics , eds. Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1922) 109.

and being wealthy are not countervailing but reciprocal. This logic seems to explain another early Buddhist thought; they encourage both accumulating wealth and giving away.

B. CLASSICAL CONFUCIANISM

The problem of how a self-transformed person benefits other people within the boundary of conventional customs and institutions in classical Confucianst ethical system is embodied in the idea: The person needs to be engaged in the activity of "governing (*cheng*)."

An important thing that needs to be highlighted here is that "governing" in classical Confucianism does not necessarily mean that the person should be a government officer. Theoretically, politics in classical Confucianist thought is involved wherever human relationships and human affairs exist. It begins with one's closest and most natural relationship, family relationship. Confucius provides an unexpected answer to one of his disciples who asks why he is not engaged in politics (*wei cheng*). Confucius quotes one of the passages of The Book of History: Simply by being filial (*hsiao*) and being friendly (*yu*) to brothers one can do politics.[249] Replying to him, Confucius re-defines the conception of governing. To stretch his notion of politics further, one may say that wherever the person goes and whomever he/she meets, he/she actually is engaged in the activity of governing.

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[249] 2-21.

However, classical Confucianism in its theory focuses on governmental activities at a state level. It deals at great length the problem of how to govern a country. Let us focus on this.

As the development of benevolence begins from a few closely related people towards many less closely related people, so does governing. The way of extending benevolence from a few to many seems to be a principle of governing. Governing requires the same mental attitude involved in serving one's own family. In order for the whole world to benefit by the activities of governing, one must extend the mind of serving one's own parents and of loving one's own children.[250] Benefiting people in terms of politics is nothing but making people comfortable by whole-hearted caring.[251]

(1) <u>An Educational Activity</u>

Before we move on to the main discussion on the classical Confucianist thought of governing as a way of benefitting people, we must consider the classical Confucianist idea of "teaching (*jiao*)" as another way of benefiting people. Consider that Confucius' and Mencius' lives are dedicated to teaching. The audience is mostly intellectual elites and political leaders. Teaching involves how one should work for people through governmental institutions. By engaging in their contemporary political arena, they can directly influence the common people. Through teaching, they can influence them directly; some of the students will accept governmental offices, and the political leaders will

250 1A-7.

251 When Tzu-lu asks what Confucius has set his mind on, he expresses this idea in an unpolished statement: To make the old comfortable, to make friends trust, and to cherish the young (5-27).

respond to their advice. Thus, teaching is as meaningful as governmental participation. In terms of joy of life, Confucius enjoys teaching much more than serving people through political institutions. For Confucius, gathering and teaching intelligent students is one of the three joyful undertakings.

Even though teaching is considered as a joyful thing, it is also considered as a difficult and continuing task.[252] In the practice of teaching, one should be diligent; this is not easy even for a sage.

In classical Confucianism, teaching is closely bound up with learning. The parallel appearance[253] of teaching and learning introduces a mutual relationship between them. Teaching always reflects what the teacher learns. Since teaching is supposed to convey the teacher's most current knowledge obtained from the most current learning, the students will have access to such knowledge. In this way, the learning of the students reflects the teacher's updated learning. Thus, the teacher's learning itself would become the students' learning. The teacher's learning is for both oneself and for the students. Just as the teaching of the teacher is an activity for the people's benefit, so the learning of the teacher itself is an activity for the students' benefit. This becomes clearer when we consider that learning is a life-long project in Confucius' and Mencius' thoughts. Just as one should learn constantly, so one should teach constantly. One can help people to benefit through both teaching and learning activities. In the process of benefitting others, what one learns becomes the content of what one teaches.

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252 7-2.

253 7-2, 34.

(2) Governing

Being engaged in political institutions is another way to benefit others. Why is "being engaged in political institutions" an activity of benefiting others? We can find an answer to this by looking at the aim of governing of classical Confucianism. The aim of governing is addressed in one of Confucius' definitions of governing. He says that "governing (*cheng*)" is to make those who are near, pleased (*yue*) and to make those who are far away, come (*lae*).[254] For the ruler should make those people who are far away pleased when they come near; the ultimate goal of governing would be "to please people." He also defines governing as "to give extensively to the common people and provide help to the multitude."[255] This definition is also understood in the sense of pleasing people by giving extensively and by helping them. Theoretically, the ruler should please all people. However, this would not be practically possible. Classical Confucianists seem to be aware of this: It is hard to please all.[256] Considering all these three remarks, we may say that the purpose of governing is "to please as many people as possible."

The goal of governing would be the goal of righteousness (*yi*), that is, to ultimately realize the Way (*tao*),[257] the highest goal of Confucianist politics. Explaining the reason why a virtuous person (*chün tzu*) has to take a government office, Tzu-lu comments that the sage wants to practice righteousness. Even though the sage knows that the Way is not able to be practiced in certain situations, he, at least, tries to practice righteousness.[258]

254 13-16.
255 6-30.
256 4B-2.
257 15-7.
258 15-7.

Righteousness, as the way to be followed by people,[259] is also a way of governing under an assumption that governing must require a way for many people because governing involves many people. However, to practice righteousness cannot be an ultimate goal of governing. The ultimate goal is to realize the Way. Mencius explains that Confucius took a government office in order to practice the Way.[260]

a. The Quality of a King

What kind of ruler is needed and what mode of governing is required in order to realize the aim of governing? The classical Confucianists consider the quality of the ruler extremely important in governing. The traditional Confucianist words expressive of the best ruler are, "inner sageliness and outer kingship (*nei sheng wai wang*)." The ruler as a moral paradigm of all people should possess characteristics of a sage.

A prime character of a virtuous person is to cultivate himself: What a virtuous person holds on to is to cultivate himself (*hsiu shen*).[261] To cultivate himself is a way of cultivating good character and of being virtuous. The virtuous person, as a qualified ruler, should never lose sight of cultivating himself through two ways of learning (*hsüeh*). First, the virtuous person learns by understanding the past traditions through the Classics. This type of learning is not a mere imitation of the tradition. Rather, it is a creative interpretation of tradition in a way relevant to the contemporary social situation. To recall, Confucius is not a just transmitter of the tradition. Critically applying the past tradition to

259 6A-11.
260 5B-4.
261 7B-32.

the present time, the virtuous person is able to find a creative and proper way of living in his own present situation. Secondly, the virtuous person learns by observing others' behaviors. He utilizes all observed behaviors, regardless of their good or bad, in improving his own conduct.

One implication of "cultivating himself" through learning is that one should modify and improve one's conduct by reflecting and examining it continuously. Thus, the ruler should always have room for self-improvement, yet he has to present morally right actions in the present time. With a possibility of constant improvement, the ruler should be a model for the people. In classical Confucianism, the fundamental principle of ruling is to present the ruler as a paradigm of right actions; as long as the ruler is able to be a paradigmatic model, he can rule the people without any obstacle.

The ruler's morality influences the conduct of the officials of the government and their conduct in town influences the behavior of the people. The model is continuously extended from top to bottom in the governmental hierarchy. This model of extending principle of the model is concisely put in words: cultivating himself (*hsiu shen*), regulating family (*ch'i chia*), governing country (*chih kuo*), and making the whole world peaceful (*p'ing t'ien hsia*).[262] The point of this principle is that the ruler governs a country by establishing himself in righteous conduct and by encouraging people to follow him. In Mencius words,

> When those above have no principles and those below have no laws, when courtiers have no faith in the Way and craftsmen have no faith in measures,

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[262] Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973) 86-87.

> when gentlemen[263] offend against righteousness and common people risk punishment, then it is good fortunate indeed if a state survives.[264] When the prince is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is dutiful, everyone else is dutiful; when the prince is correct, everyone else is correct. Simply by rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm basis.[265]

When the ruler is internally qualified enough in terms of self-cultivation and self-modeling, he is able to expose and utilize his internal qualifications for exercising external rulership. His internal moral quality flourishes among people through political institutions. Consequently, the whole society becomes part of the ruler's internal moral achievement. Here we see the classical Confucianist attempt to fuse the personal ethical achievement and social and political amelioration. This is the fusion of the concepts of "inner sageliness and outer kingship." By implication, successful governing is never possible without being accompanied by the ruler's moral achievement.[266]

The paradigmatic legendary sage kings, Yao and Shun, are a presentation of the fusion of "inner sageliness and outer kingship." Their moral achievement is the main criterion on the basis of which they are elevated to kingship. The significance of their stories in the context of our discussion is that the criterion disregards their class of birth. To be born in

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263 Here 'gentlemen' is a translation of *chun tzu*. In our term is 'a virtuous person' for this.
264 4A-2.
265 4A-20.
266 David Hall and Roger Ames seem to stretch this Confucianist position. They rightly argue that there is the absence of distinctions between the private and public interest, between ethical and political concerns, and social and political spheres. David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987) 160, 176.

a royal family is not necessary condition to be a ruler. They are chosen by the people and accompanied by the mandate of Heaven; they are recommended by the present ruler and accepted by Heaven and the people.[267] In this selection process, their moral quality is identified and certified. In contrast, the opposite model of the kings, Jie and Zhou, represents a hallmark of moral deterioration.

When the morality of the perfect kings, Yao and Shun, is actualized, people naturally prosper and grow morally. They do not need to control people and to give specific orders because they voluntarily follow them. Ruling a country is not carried out by attending to all in detail and in a rush but in a peaceful manner, and by himself being righteous. Confucius makes this point clearly:

> The Master said, "If a man is correct in his own person, then there will be obedience without orders being given; but if he is not correct in his own person, there will not be obedience even though orders are given."[268] The Master said, "If a man manages to make himself correct, what difficulty will there be for him to take part in government? If he cannot make himself correct, what business had he with making others correct?[269]

b. A Proposition of Politics: Rectification of Names

One may ask whether the morality of the ruler is sufficient enough to rule a country. If we look closely at the concept of "rectification of names (*cheng ming*)," which is the

[267] 5A-5.
[268] 13-5.
[269] 13-13.

hallmark of the method and purpose of Confucianist politics, we will have a positive answer. As we will soon see, the most important implication of the rectification of names is "to build values." To build values is to establish the ruler correctly. This is all that is needed to rule a country.

In the social context of classical Confucianism, Confucius and Mencius have a specific reason to emphasize rectification of names. Mencius stresses it as a way not to let people fall into the heresies of Yang Chu and Mo ti.[270] He shows concerns about how Yang Chu's and Mo ti's views mislead people. Thus, the urgent thing for him was to dispel the wrong views by rectifying names[271] in order to recover a good society from the disordered society tainted by them. To dispel wrong views or to rectify names naturally enables the right views and moral values that inform people what is right and how to achieve them. Mencius believes that the fallen Way of a sage can be recovered in this way.

I have explained rectification of names in the light of Mencian historical context; it means the establishment of right views and values. The point that it connotes values needs to be discussed more from the perspective of the classical Confucianists' understanding of language. For them, language has a descriptive and prescriptive function. Language in the form of words, names, and sentences reveals human morals and values that are always accompanied with human affairs. Therefore, language and values are associated with each

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270 3B-9.

271 In order to refute their words, he had to be good at refuting; when Kung-tu Tzu asked him why he was fond of disputation (*pien*), he said that he did not have an alternative except having the method of reputation even though he was not fond of it. Obviously, what he meant was that he had to dispel wrong views by the method of disfutation.

other.[272] Name or naming, as part of verbal expression, indicates factual human affairs and contains moral values. When one names correctly and perceives its meaning, one will know how to perform the affairs correctly. Thus, rectifying names is crucial in indicating how one is supposed to perform one's own affairs properly. This idea of Confucius is expressed tersely in explaining why rectification of names is important and should be the first thing in ruling:

> When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman[273] names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned.[274]

For the purpose of identifying the ruler's task in the matter of rectifying names, let us consider the only definition available: "Let the ruler be a ruler (*chun chun*), the minister a minister (*chen chen*), the father a father (*fu fu*), the son a son (*tzu tzu*)."[275] Notice here

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[272] In other words, name and meaning are associated. The mutual association of naming and meaning in terms of the contribution of name to meaning and the construing of name from meaning is clarified by Hall and Ames. In their interpretation, "Name means both 'to mean' and 'to name.' 'To name' is to contribute meaning, and 'to mean' is to construe names" (Hall and Ames 272).

[273] 'Gentleman' is a virtuous person (*chün tzu*).

[274] 13-3.

[275] 12-11.

that the ruler's task is "to be a ruler." Recall that, from the previous discussion, the ruler's fundamental task is "to establish himself correctly." Let us analyze semantically the two expressions indicating the ruler's task. "To be a ruler" not specifying the task of the ruler begs a question: What does "to be a ruler" mean? The answer is "to establish himself correctly." At this point, returning to the question whether establishing oneself correctly is sufficient enough as a qualification to rule a country, we see a positive answer. When rectification of names is defined as the ruler's main task, "to be a ruler," that task is identified with "establishing himself correctly."

The next question is as follows: How should the ruler, as a chief person who is entrusted with rectifying names in the whole country, deal with the other three categories of rectification of names that are applied for the ministers, fathers, and sons? Here the concept of the paradigmatic ruler should be applied again. The ruler's task is to provide a moral paradigmatic model by performing his task, namely, "establishing himself correctly." His task is not to give orders on what ministers, fathers, and sons should do. They themselves should identify and perform their own tasks on their own. This understanding fits the classical Confucianist position that allows autonomy and creativity of individuals in acting morally.

There is another consideration involved. Rectification of names should be understood in relation to the differences of environments and personal characters. Depending upon the difference of social environments, people will have different roles and responsibilities. For example, a son's role in parental relationship is not the same in all the various social environments. Furthermore, even under the same social environment, depending upon

differences of their characters, they perform their roles and responsibilities differently. As the assigned or perceived roles and responsibilities are different because of the environmental differences, so the qualities of their performance will be different because of the differences of characters. So, rectification of names should be understood in relation to these two factors. This framework of understanding of rectification of names leads to the second method of understanding.

The above consideration implies flexibility of rectification of names. Its flexibility can be divided into two parts: the flexibility of its contents based on different social contexts and the flexibility of quality of its performance based on personal differences. Due to the very nature of this flexibility, one cannot attempt to define "rectification of names" specifically. Its diverse contents and ways of achieving them are not to be expressed in precisely defined words. Thus, its definition is repetitive.

Why does rectification of names allow this flexibility? One answer can be found in one of the features of the Confucianist notion of governing. The term indicating "to rule" or "to govern," *cheng*, is not limited only to the affairs of governmental administration in the official sense. It aims at dealing with all human affairs and moral problems in every social context. They can hardly be numerated and specified because of greatness in their number and diversity. Furthermore, they are differently handled depending upon environmental and individual differences. Here the task of politics is how to handle this greatness and diversity. Politics and political concepts need to be flexible for this greatness and diversity. Rectification of names in a repetitive phrase seems to fit this need.

c. The Principles of Governing

Since rectification of names provides a formula for ruling a country, we may be able to find answers to the following question by examining other aspects of the classical Confucianist political thought. How should the ruler rule a country? Two points will emerge as answers to this question.

The first is to rule from a mind unable to bear the sufferings of others (*pu jen chih hsin*) or the mind of benevolence (*jen hsin*). Being sympathetic toward the people is a fundamental and necessary quality of the ruler. The mind of benevolence is very much emphasized: If a non-benevolent person takes a high position, that person tends to disseminate evil among people.[276] Whether the ruler can obtain a country or not depends on whether he is benevolent or not: Safeguarding a country is also dependent on the ruler's benevolence.[277] The Confucianist principle, "if you want to straighten others up, you should correct yourself first," is applied here: If the ruler is benevolent in governing the people, the ministers will be; if the ministers are, the people will be. An unconditional belief in the power of benevolence leads to the idea that if the ruler is not successful in governing, he should ask himself whether the quality and quantity of his benevolence is good or sufficient enough. Mencius expresses this idea with an analogy:

> Benevolence overcomes cruelty just as water overcomes fire. Those who practice benevolence today are comparable to someone trying to put out a cartload of burning firewood with a cupful of water. When the fire fails to be extinguished, they say water cannot overcome fire. For him to place

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276 4A-1.
277 4A-3.

himself on the side of those who are cruel to the extreme, and in the end he is sure to perish.[278]

A specific application of benevolence of the ruler is participating in the joy or happiness of the people in their suffering and worrying.[279] The ruler should share everything with the people. For example, he enjoys common people's music[280] more than that of the privileged class. Enjoying a certain privileged culture is not part of royalty. Also, sensitivity to the people's suffering is greatly emphasized.[281] The suffering of the people is identified with ruler's suffering. Here governing seems to be nothing but taking care of people in the same way as one takes care of oneself.

Secondly, in governing the ruler should follow righteousness (*yi*). Righteousness is important as a means of realizing benevolence. For Confucius, who does not mention it as much as he does benevolence, benevolence serves as the fundamental virtue while righteousness plays a subordinate role. Even though it plays a subordinate role to benevolence, it is not unimportant. It is indeed righteousness that provides support for benevolence. The case of the son seems to show this relationship. It is not straightness (*zhi*) implying righteousness for a son to report his father's behavior to an officer. The son should cover up his father's behavior when the father stole a sheep.[282] Confucius clearly addresses the question of righteousness in this case. A question here needs to be asked: Why does Confucius think reporting is not righteous? In this case the parental relationship

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278 6A-18.
279 1B-3.
280 1B-3.
281 5A-7.
282 13-8.

is involved and, as we discussed in the previous chapter, a son should be filial and benevolent in any situation. Reporting the father's behavior and letting him be punished would be a unfilial behavior; as a result, the son would abandon the virtue of benevolence.[283] If we look at the case in the light of benevolence, Confucius' notion of righteousness contains benevolence as a core virtue. In other words, even though it is not explained explicitly, in the mind of Confucius, benevolence as a leading virtue holds a position of priority over righteousness.

Without contradicting the above understanding, another way of looking at the case is possible. Righteousness has been understood as a flexible concept rather than a fixed rule.[284] Since any classical Confucianist virtue has a concrete situation and its application is considered in that situation, righteousness should be also flexible depending upon the specific situation. The case of the son can be seen from this perspective; the case could be a special case where righteousness is applied flexibly. In most cases, to report the thieves to the officer would be right.

Pointing out the flexible nature of righteousness, one may argue that Confucius is not concerned with objective principles. However, this does not fully reflect Confucius'

[283] If the case does not involve the parental relationship, what would be Confucius' answer for righteousness? His answer must be "reporting" since he perceives righteousness as "to raise straightness and set people over the crooked" (2-19).

[284] For example, Antonio Cua argues that: (1) Confucius does not concern himself with objective principles and (2) Confucian righteousness does not consider the discovery of objective principles even possible in its application to concrete situations. For Antonio, Confucian righteousness is based on particular circumstances rather than fixed objective principles. Antonio Cua, "The Status of Principles in Confucian Ethics," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16 (1989): 280-81. He is right when he emphasizes the importance of circumstance in the exercise of righteousness. However, his argument seems to be too strong in the sense that he rejects any objective principles in Confucius' notion of righteousness. I do argee with him in understanding righteousness as a flexible concept. But my position will differ in arguing that there is an objective principle.

position. For example, as I pointed out in the son's case, benevolence is considered as the first (objective) principle in the practice of righteousness.

The two ways of looking at righteousness through the son's case show that righteousness is flexible in accordance with benevolence. Both righteousness and benevolence are applied together, and benevolence is the core of righteousness. Combining both in practice, the ruler must take care of his people by benevolence and employ them by righteousness.[285]

For Mencius, righteousness obviously has place equal to benevolence. They are an inseparable equal pair in governing. Righteousness is given a position parallel to benevolence and is always referred to in conjunction with benevolence.[286] The ruler seems to be perfectly qualified in exercising both. Mencius makes the remark that all people become benevolent and righteous, when the ruler is benevolent and righteous.[287] For him, benevolence is the mind of a person and righteousness is his road.[288] It is implied that the ruler's benevolence is to be fulfilled by extending the mind of not-harming others and righteousness is to be completed by extending the mind of not-stealing.[289]

This righteousness contrasts with profit (*li*).[290] Mencius understands 'profit' as selfish interests that can be pursued by an individual, a group, or a country. Righteousness is

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285 5-16.

286 Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991) 237.

287 4A-20, 4B-5.

288 6A-11.

289 7B-31.

290 Mencius gives a piece of advice that the ruler should not look for profit for his own country because if he does, everyone will look for their own profit; there is only benevolence and righteousness (1A-1).

realized in not looking for selfish interests in favor of both each individual and a certain collective multitude. It rejects both individual and collective egoism.

As Confucius allows flexibility in application of righteousness, so Mencius does. The flexible application is observed in the case of a drowning sister-in-law. In ordinary situations, for a man not touching his sister-in-law's hands is righteous. But in an urgent situation where she is drowning in the water, saving her by touching her hands is righteous. In this life-imperiled situation, as in the case of the son, benevolence seems to be carried in a form of righteousness. Holding benevolence as a principle, righteousness is flexibly exercised.

The classical Confucianist flexible notion of righteousness always requires right understanding of situations and intelligent judgment. This is because righteousness does not set an absolute rule and is exercised under a principle of benevolence. In order to exercise flexible and benevolence-guided righteousness, one should use another cooperative virtue, knowledge (*chih*). On the other hand, properly known righteousness should be carried in a form of ritual (*li*). Here ritual is helpful in exercising righteousness. In cooperating with knowledge and ritual, righteousness is properly performed. When righteousness is properly performed, it carries benevolence as its essence.

Having discussed benevolence, righteousness, knowledge, and ritual together in terms of how the ruler should govern the country, we can now see that the four Confucianist virtues function dynamically when interacting. However, singling out the first two virtues, we may call governing of classical Confucianism "governing by benevolence and righteousness (*jen yi cheng chih*)." Even though we simplify the Confucianist idea of

governing by reducing it to the two virtues, benevolence and righteousness, we are sure that they presuppose the other two, ritual and knowledge.

When the ruler governs a country in accordance with benevolence and righteousness, virtue (*te*) will be actualized among the people. This is possible by presenting a paradigmatic model of the ruler who leads the country by virtue. When the ruler is able to do that, he is able to honor benevolent persons and to employ virtuous persons.[291] Consequently, the whole country will be virtuous. This type of governing by virtue is compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place.[292]

The ruler's virtue influences and empowers each individual to exercise virtue autonomously; his virtue empowers each person to be virtuous. Virtue is power in its applications to the context of politics. Thus, in the sense of "to move others without exerting physical force," virtue (*te*) had been translated into potency.[293] Virtue as potency is transfered from the ruler to people not by external force but autonomous power. The ruler does not need to make special efforts to facilitate the transference. Literally, he rules a country "without taking any action (*wu wei*)."[294] "Ruling by virtue" is to rule the country without taking any action.

The idea of governing by virtue helps to explain the other aspect of the Confucianist idea of governing: It is unfavorable to both strict legalism and militarism. The ruler should

291 2A-5.
292 2-2.
293 Angus Graham, Disputers of the Tao (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1991) 13.
294 15-5.

govern a country not by legal rules (*fa*) and punishment (*hsing*) but by virtue.[295] Confucius thinks that people may stay out of trouble when they are governed by legal rules and punishment, but they will not feel shame (*ch'ih*); if they are governed by virtue and ritual, they will have a sense of shame and will correct (*ko*) themselves. Confucius' opposition to legalistic governing shows his enterprise. For him, true governing does not consist in keeping people from doing something that probably is not right, but in helping them to cultivate moral autonomy and to act right voluntarily. Cultivating moral autonomy helps people to have moral conscienciousness, and so they will try to act morally regardless of what the legal rules tell them. This is because they feel shame when they have done what they are not supposed to do. To cultivate a sense of shame is one of the goals of governing by virtue, and is characteristic of an autonomous moral being. Furthermore, Confucius thinks that good governing ought to aim at correcting and improving people's behaviors.

It is interesting to see how this political thought of Confucius is reflected in Chinese legal thought. Chinese legal thought shows "oposition to the very idea of written legal rules."[296] The ancient Chinese political tradition does not show enthusiasm for codifying laws. For example, it fears creating contentiousness by codifying criminal law. It takes unwritten customary law (ritual) seriously. This position reflects Confucian virtue- and

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[295] 2-3. This is not to say that Confucius totally rejects use of legal rules and punishment. Rather, he emphasizes "ruling by virtue" by which he means to prefer use of customary law (*li*) to the use of formal law (*fa, hsing*). As commonly interpreted, there is a contrast between customary and formal law. However, as the common interpretation assumes, the contrast is not sharp and exclusive. Ames who rejects the exclusive contrast between them argues that formal law is complementary (Roger Ames, The Art of Rulership (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983) 115-16).

[296] Kenneth Kipnis, Legal Ethics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986) 31.

autonomy-based-politics that rely on customary law or ritual (*li*) rather than on formal law (*fa, hsing*). Intuitively, we see a tension between writing legalistic rules and appealing to the individual's virtue and autonomy. Consequently, classical Confucianism and the ancient Chinese political tradition are not concerned about codifying laws.

Let us consider Mencius' political thought. Even though Mencius agrees with Confucius in thinking that ruling by virtue is better than ruling by legal rules and punishment, he nevertheless recommends, in some cases, the use of heavy punishment. For those who fight to gain lands or cities even capital punishment is light; those who rely on war deserve the most severe punishment.[297] Though it gives no chance to reform, capital punishment (*zhu*) should be given to the robber who killed people.[298] Mencius' position is stricter than Confucius'; he allows the ruler to use capital punishment. Mencius thinks that deliberate murderers should not be given a chance to reform themselves because their crimes are too inhumane.

Under the same principle of governing, governing by virtue, classical Confucianism does not recommend governing by force. Mencius clearly makes a point that governing by force (*li*) should be abandoned. Here force must mean compelling people to follow involuntarily. This power can be physical, positional, or financial. If the ruler uses this power in governing, he will not be able to get genuine support from the people. Under this power, communication through a compromise and persuasion cannot take place among them. While the ruler does not obtain obedience when he rules by force, he obtains

297 4A-14.
298 5B-4.

grateful and sincere obedience when he rules by virtue.[299] However, there is for Mencius a case that justifies the use of military force.[300] The logic of justification of using military force is to carry out the Confucianist political idea: to save the people from the tyrants, and to establish righteousness. The purpose of using military force is to punish cruel tyrants such as Jie and Zhou.[301]

The principle of governing, governing by virtue, is applied in order to create a hierachical relationsip between nations and between the ruler and the people. The proper hierachical order between the two is based on "being virtuous" and "being obedient": A big country (or a ruler) should be virtuous, while small countries (or the subjects) should be obedient. The principle of locating the power between nations is that the small countries follow and serve the big country.[302] The big country centralizes power to itself and takes care of and leads the small countries by virtue. The moral superiority of the big country leads the small counturies to obey and serve it voluntarily. On the other hand, regarding the hierachical order between the ruler and people, the classical Confucianists think that all people have to obey the ruler.[303] This is the case only when the ruler has

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299 2A-3.

300 When people of other countries suffer because of tyrants, the ruler can attack (*zheng*) the countries in order to save the people (3B-5). In this case, the people eagerly wait for the attack to be saved from the tyrants.

301 Confucius' position on attacking is different from Mencius.' Confucius never praises any use of military power. He does not even seem to be interested in talking about it. When he is asked a question about military formations, he answers that he does not know and leaves the country (13-1).

302 4A-7.

303 In fact, the order between the ruler and the people can be subdivided: (1) a hierachical order between the ruler and the people, (2) between the ruler and the government officers, (3) between the government officers and the people, (4) between the government officiers and the government officers, and (5) between the people and the people. So, the order is not just in the scope of politics. It takes place in the whole society. This is because the classical Confucianist idea on governing aims to cover the whole society. However, here I do not include the fifth. The others belong to the ruler and the people relationship.

authority by his virtue. Recall that the ruler is approved of by the people because of his self-cultivated morals and he can be removed by them when he loses his virtue. So long as he exercises authority based on virtue, the people are obligated to obey him. This is a kind of contract tacitly made in terms of virtue and obedience.

As we have seen, classical Confucianism emphasizes governing by benevolence and righteousness, and thereby governing by virtue. Even though there is so much emphasis on the ruler's morality, classical Confucianism also addresses the ruler's duties in governmental affairs. The ruler is in charge of distributing material goods to the people and educating them to be good.[304] Furthermore, he should provide jobs for all people so that they can support their dependents,[305] and give a special concern to these four groups: old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, and young children without fathers.[306] Correspondingly, people should pay taxes. There is a tacit contract between the ruler and the people in terms of "taking care" and "paying tax." Consequently, there is a distinction between mental labor and physical labor, or the ruling class and the common people. Mencius makes this clear.[307]

d. Governing and Nature

Nature is an object of governing in classical Confucianism. To prevent natural disasters and to use nature in a favorable way for human life is one of the tasks of the ruler.

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304 3A-4.

305 He should always be sure that the people do not starve; by ensuring that people do not lose their jobs, he will prevent people from committing evil behaviors and crimes (1A-7). For the ruler to provide means of living is a fundamental requirement in governing (1A-7).

306 1B-5.

307 He says, "There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule; the latter are ruled. Those who rule are suported by those who are ruled" (3A-4).

However, it is not justified to conquer nature simply in order to take advantage of it. On the contrary, nature and humans are mutual in their ideal relationship.

In relation to political thought, nature is perceived as an indicator that reflects social and political situations. When the socio-political situation is right and good, nature will be hospitable. Thus, the ruler's task is to keep nature hospitable to human life. Nature is to be controlled to enable people live in cooperative and harmonious relationships. This line of thought begins with the stories about the three legendary kings.

In the time of Yao, reversing the water from its natural course caused floods and deprived the people of a settled life. King Yao appointed Yu to control it. Yu successfully controlled it. Consequently, he removed obstacles and annihilated the birds and beasts harmful to the people. What is implied here is that the ruler should be able to control nature and make it helpful and hospitable to people's lives. Furthermore, sageliness of the ruler conduces to hospitality of nature to people's lives. On the contrary, the opposite type of a ruler is associated with disagreeable and harmful nature. The tyrants damage nature and create bad natural conditions by ruling improperly.[308]

It is interesting to see the idea that natural disaster can be prevented by the sage kings, and that people's suffering can be caused by the tyrant kings who ruin nature without considering people's livelihood. There is a direct correlation between hospitable nature, the peaceful world, the orderly society, and the well-living people. Similarly, the unfavorable

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[308] They made ponds by pulling down houses so that people became homeless. They made parks by taking people's fields so that people lost their livelihood. With the increase of the number of parks, ponds and lakes, the birds and beasts arrived. Gradually, human society fell into in disorder and heresies and violence arose (3B-7).

environment, the hostile world, the disorderly society, and the ill-living people are directly related. There are dynamic interactions between nature and governing.

To point out a more significant observation, let us consider a subtle relationship between the classical Confucianist political idea and its locus in nature. As we saw earlier, the main political idea, to state in brief, is to benefit people through governing by virtue. If we want to identify the ultimate political idea, we may say that it is to realize the Way (*tao*). Human beings have their Way in living together in nature, and nature has her own Way in moving constantly. The classical Confucianist idea of realizing the human Way through the framework of politics means, in my understanding, to follow a moral life that is necessarily connected with the political idea and to harmonize (*ho*) with each other in the human society. Furthermore, humans should harmonize with nature by living in human's Way. Following their Way and wanting to be in harmony with nature, they need to follow the Way of nature since they are unavoidably related to its Way. Here the political idea, as the representation of human's Way, is to be connected with the Way of nature in an agreeable way. This means that the political idea is to be placed in the locus of the Way of nature. Therefore, we can say that the human's Way, represented as the political idea, is also to follow the Way of nature. When the human's Way is not followed, the political idea cannot be realized, nature will be ruined, and the Way of nature will be in disorder.

e. Governing and Wealth

Even though the classical Confucianists do not discuss wealth (*fu*) which in relation to their political ideas, they do hold a position. The most significant point is that they emphasize the role of the ruler and of morality. As we have seen in the previous section, the ruler has an obligation to guarantee means of livelihood for the people.[309] With regard to the obligation of the ruler, morals, and wealth, the next two points need to be addressed: (1) The obligation of the ruler is to prevent people from doing wrong, and to lead them to live rightly by providing a means of living. (2) People should be provided with means of living that also provide a wealth that goes beyond merely supporting themselves. Morals and wealth are fundamentally required in being.

The accumulation of wealth for all people is desirable under one condition: to accumulate in a right way in a right environment.[310] Confucius believes that, as long as society is healthy, all people can be rich if they work hard. In other words, the people should be provided with a good social environment where all people can be rich in accordance with the quality and quantity of their labor. In an unhealthy society, to be rich is immoral. A firm belief of the classical Confucianists regarding wealth is that living right and diligently in a healthy society will naturally bring wealth. In brief, to obtain a great amount of wealth is closely related with social and personal morality.

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309 Mencius' reason for this argument is as follows. If people do not have the means of livelihood to support themselves, they will not have a constant mind (*heng hsin*); if they do not have a constant mind, they will go astray, fall into excess, and do wrong.

310 Confucius says, "It is a shameful matter to be poor and humble when the Way prevails in the state. Equally, it is a shameful matter to be rich and noble when the Way falls into disuse in the state" (8-13).

With regard to the ruler's wealth, we observe its close relationship with people's wealth; the ruler's wealth is based on the people's wealth. When the people have sufficient wealth, the ruler has sufficient wealth; when their wealth are insufficient, the ruler's is insufficient.[311] When people lack wealth, the ruler should not be wealthy. If the ruler is wealthy when the people are not, he is required to distribute his wealth.[312]

Theoretically, the ruler's wealth is obtained from the people's tax in recompense for his work of governing. As we saw earlier, Mencius and Confucius consider the act of governing as a mental labor which is compared to the people's physical labor. In Confucianist ethics, diligence (*qin*) is a virtue for both the ruler and the people. Thus, the ruler is required to work hard in the same way as the people do. In order to set an example he should work hard and not allow his efforts to slacken.[313]

C. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

According to my understanding, the main virtue of early Buddhism forms itself in social customs and institutions much as that of classical Confucianism does. In other words, both systems adopt the method of education and of politics in order to realize compassion/benevolence in society. Thus, the self-transformative person's task is to be engaged in the activities of education and of politics. The activities are performed not in a revolutionary way but in a reformative way. They do not involve radical social change.

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311 12-9.
312 3A-4.
313 13-1.

Utilizing existing social systems, the two systems want to establish a compassionate/ benevolent society where most people get benefit.

In both systems, education is a way of realizing the main virtue and thereby benefiting the people. However, the nature of education is different. In early Buddhism, the intention to share the doctrine of the Buddha (*dhamma*) with the people is motivated by a strong feeling of compassion for the people who suffer. Its purpose is to free them from suffering and to bring happiness. The Buddha's resolution is very determined; he does not want to die until all people know the content of his enlightenment (*dhamma*). In classical Confucianism, teaching is to help people to cultivate themselves and, eventually, to serve people. For the former, teaching is for both themselves and others in the sense that it is a way of practicing the virtue and of benefiting people. Under the principle of dependent arising, the activities of compassion are necessary as each person is connected with others. One's happiness is necessarily connected with others' happiness. This also requires compassion. For classical Confucianists, the motivation of teaching is to enable intellectuals to cultivate their virtues and to let them do public services eventually in the arena of politics. One of the characteristics of the classical Confucianist notion of teaching is as follows. A teaching activity is closely bound up with a learning activity; teaching reflects learning and learning reflects teaching in mutual relationship. Even though teaching contributes to the realization of benevolence, it is not perceived as a necessary means. On the other hand, for the early Buddhists it is mandatory as a way of realizing compassion.

Regarding the purpose and method of politics, the two systems share common ideas. The purpose of politics is to realize compassion/benevolence. Eventually, it aims to bring about the happiness of all: The main task of the ruler is "to please people." Thus, the realization of righteousness as *dhamma* and rightousness as *yi* have the same goal. Accordingly, freedom (***nibbāna***) and the Way (*tao*) have the same goal. At this point, the goal of politics seems to be identified with people's happiness and, ultimately, with freedom and the Way as the highest moral goal. One who wants to interpret the highest aim in a different way may hesitate to accept this identification. Our approach is to consider both freedom and the Way being morally achieved. They represent happiness obtained through a moral life. Moral achievement is either individual or collective. In the arena of politics, they should be achieved collectively. From what follows, the way of politics of the two systems will be examined, and we will then see more clearly why the ultimate goal of politics should be interpreted from the perspective of morals.

Politics in both systems is solely based on morals. Its principles originate from the single most important concern, namely, morality. Morality takes place at the beginning, middle, and end point of politics. Politics is preceded by morals and ends with moral achievement. Then, how are morals implanted, cultivated, and held constantly in politics? The two systems highlight the ruler's moral quality. The king as the person responsible for ruling the country should be a moral exemplar. Simply by being a moral exemplar in the political arena, the king can implant, cultivate, and maintain morals in all human affairs. The extent to which politics is successful depends on the king's morality, and consequently on the people's morality. Therefore, both systems underscore the king's moral quality.

As we discussed at great length, the moral character of the king is revealed in the concepts of "the two wheels of ***dhamma***" of Buddhism and "inner sageliess and outer kingship" of Confucianism. The worldly king should be morally qualified by embodying morals in order to be a moral king. He turns the two wheels of worldly order and righteousness (***dhamma***). In this way, the early Buddhists combined worldly governmental institution and righteousness. As a result of combining these two, they presented a moral king and emphasized his moral quality rather than his practical capability of dealing with affairs. The same idea can be found in classical Confucianist political thought. Without having inner moral character, no king holds kingship. The king, as a qualified king like a virtuous person, has the moral character of a sage.

Let us look more closely at how the moral character of the ruler is stressed in the two systems. The concept of a moral king is represented by the image of the wheel-turner (***cakkavatti***). The wheel-turner appears as a monarch turning a wheel of righteousness (***dhamma***). Depending upon righteousness, he protects all people and even animals. As long as he rules by righteousness, the affairs of the country continue peacefully without crime. If he does not rule by righteousness, morals decline and poverty, robbery, violence, murder, and their punishments appear. In such an environment, the wheel disappears. The wheel that disappeared can re-appear when the ruler exercises morals by ruling righteously. In this way, the concept of the wheel-turner highlights both the ruler's moral quality and the way of righteous ruling. The moral quality of the wheel-turning king is further emphasized by juxtaposing him with the Buddha. The future wheel-turning king *Sanka* and the future Buddha *Metteyya* are juxtaposed for the same purpose. They appear

when morality increases. In this kind of juxtaposition, the image of the Buddha, an embodiment of morals, is used for substantiating the moral quality of the king. Similarly, classical Confucianism emphasizes the ruler's moral quality in its own way. It focuses on the ruler's internal moral quality. When the ruler's internal quality is good enough in terms of self-cultivation and self-modeling, he is capable of ruling a country. In this way, the ruler's internal ethical quality has a chance to be realized in the socio-political arena. If we were to pinpoint the final internal achievement of the self-transformed person in classical Confucianism, this achievement would be obtained from the external realization of the self in the socio-political arena. The external achievement, which aims to benefit people by being engaged in social and political activities, is certainly the highest moral achievement. Similary, for the early Buddhists, the external achievement of the self by realizing compassion in society is the highest moral achievement.

This emphasis of the ruler's morality needs to be reconsidered in the light of the positions of the two systems with regard to law. Since the ruler's morality is considered most important in ruling, neither system greatly values creating law and ruling by law. Yet they do not completely reject the use of law either. At this point they agree. The difference appears from the point of emphasis. While early Buddhism emphasizes equal application of righteous law (***dhamma***) regardless of the fourfold class distinction, classical Confucianism emphasizes a limit of law because it is based not on autonomy but force.

It is hard to tease out their views on how far law is able to contribute to moral cultivation in politics. While the early Buddhist notion of righteous law makes us think that law can be helpful for human moral cultivation, the classical Confucianist notion of

the written official law (*fa*) seems to maintain a skeptical position. Considering the notion of the righteous law of early Buddhism and of the written official law of classical Confucianism, we may say that the former more reflects the naturalist position, and that the latter reflects the legal positivist position.[314] However, it would be hard to determine exactly what position they may take toward naturalism and legal positivism if one only looks at their notion of law. This leads us to a consideration of their emphasis on the morality of the ruler in light of the law.

It is important to notice that the politics of the two systems depend on the ruler's moral quality rather than law. Note, conversely, that modern politics is based on laws rather than on the character of a leader. Not denying that law can be helpful for human moral cultivation, and therefore not denying its possible role for it, they seem to appeal to the quality of the ruler as an example of moral embodiment. In other words, because of the recognition of the weight of morality in politics, they emphasize the king's quality by virtue of morals.

Let us consider the implication of the emphasis of the morality of the ruler in the context of modern legal theory. Considering the emphasis of the moral element in politics, we doubt that the two systems would advocate the modern legal positivist position. Consider the argument of the modern positivist Hart, who makes a complete separation

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314 In order to understand this point more clearly, the meaning of law needs to be explained. In early Buddhism, righteous law would mean both unwritten customary and written official law. In the case of classical Confucianism, law would mean not unwritten customary law (*li*) but written formal law (*fa*), particularly criminal law (*hsing*). The notion of righteous law, to some degree, must reflect naturalism claiming that law presents morals. In classical Confucianism, while the notion of the unwritten customary law reflects naturalism, the notion of the written formal law reflects legal positivism claiming that law does not need to be connected with morals. (Notice that by law (*fa*) the classical Confucianist means not unwritten customary law (*li*) but written official law (*fa* and *hsing*).

between laws and morals, and therefore holds that morals are not required for laws. This argument would be questioned by the two systems. They would think that the laws, if they are the main tools of government as in modern politics, cannot be effective without having moral implications, morals, and moral embodiers for them. This is because they think morals and moral embodiers are necessary in ruling. Thus, the dictum of the modern positivists, "the fidelity to laws," indicating independence of the laws from morals and not considering the embodiers of the laws, would be rejected by both systems. When law makers or rulers do not take moral responsibilities to be faithful to laws, laws will not function and the country will not be ruled properly.[315]

In theory, the king's moral character is noticed by the people before or when he becomes king. The first king, the Great Elect (***Mahā sammata***), was elected for the purpose of handling wrong doings and tangles between the people when immorality started appearing. His position was presumably set up in order to solve moral problems by exercising his moral qualities. Similarly, the classical Confucianist king having the quality of a virtuous person or a sage was presumed to exercise his moral qualities. The ruler's self-cultivation was stressed in obtaining his moral qualities both before and after being a ruler.

315 Interestingly, a critic of Hart, Fuller argues that laws contain their own implicit morality by which he means a ruler or a law maker's morality; "Law by itself is powerless to bring this morality into existence (Lon Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law," Philosophical Problems in the Law, ed. David Adams (Belmont: Wadsworth publishing Company, 1992) 70). In his example, the monarch as a creator of laws should keep his words or laws and face the responsibilities of his position. Unlike Hart, he emphasizes the morality in the law. The two systems would agree with Fuller and argue further: They would argue that laws are not effective without morals in them.

An interesting point that emerges when observing the exemplary kings such as the Great Elect or Yao and Shun is the relationship between the ruler and the people. As the Great Elect was elected by the people, so were Yao and Shun with an additional recognition of the will of Heaven. The credibility of the rulers was obtained by the people's recognition. Since they became rulers by the people's power, their power was based on the people's power. Moreover, the rulers should have a caring mind for the people and the people must trust in them. This seems to be an unspoken consensus between the rulers and the people.

When the ruler works for the people and takes care of them, he is assumed not to do physical labor but to do mental labor. He can solely focus on governmental affairs without being concerned about his livelihood because the people support him. The two systems agree that the people should materially support the ruler. For the Great Elect, the people collect rice as a payment for him. In classical Confucianism, people pay taxes. In both systems, there is no inequality of classes based upon the differentiation of labor. There is only a functional distinction based on the division of labors.

Even though the nature of contract is not explicitly laid out in the two systems, a contract between the ruler and the people is laid out. In early Buddhism, the Great Elect works for the people on the basis of morals and the people support him. In classical Confucianism, there is more emphasis on the morality of the ruler and the obedience of the people, and the contract involves the work of ruling and paying tax. In both systems the contract seems to be made in the process of choosing a ruler. When early Buddhism argues that the ruler is elected by the people's opinion, it rejects the Brahmanical notion of

the divine ordination of kingship. In the case of classical Confucianism, the king is not selected only by people's opinion. Recommendation by other kings and recognition by Heaven play a role.

So far, our comparative analysis has been focused on the purpose and way of politics. Politics aims at realizing the highest goal, happiness of the maximum numbers of the people, through morals that are paradigmatized by the ruler. The moral ruler plays an important role as an exemplary moral person. When the ruler is successful as a moral paradigmatic person, the ministers and officers follow. When the latter do well, common people follow. In a word, early Buddhists and classical Confucianists believe that the ruler as a moral paradigmatic person at the top influences the people all the way to the bottom.

With regard to the issue of "maintaining righteousness (*dhamma*)" and "rectifying names" which are considered as the core of politics, the two systems share common points. Neither system expresses specific details regarding maintaning righteousness or rectification of names. They provide only a formula in a repetitive expression. We now discuss the reasons why the formula is presented without specific details. First, the term *dhamma,* and so righteousness itself is too complex to be expressed in a specific definition because it consists of numerous types and levels. Secondly, the more philosophical reason, the repetitive expression indicates the flexibility of righteousness in its applications. Depending upon the differences of individuals and situations, righteousness should be defined in a flexible way. This flexibility of righteousness is applied in the arena of politics where the main task is to maintain righteousness.

Let us consider rectification of names for the purpose of comparison. First, our point in discussing rectification of names was to show that "establishing the ruler correctly" is sufficient enough to rule a country. Rectification of names and "establishing the ruler correctly" are identified as the single core of politics. Since the former is the major task of the ruler and is identified with the latter, the latter is sufficient to rule a country. Rectification of names contains right views and values. This was argued on the basis of a consideration of the historical context of Mencius' times and of clarifying the association of name and meaning in the process of rectification of names.

In identifying the ruler's function in the rectification of names, "being a ruler" means "establishing the ruler correctly" by truly realizing right names and values attached to the names. Here moral performance of the ruler was greatly emphasized. The ruler sets a paradigmatic model for the other three categories of people in the act of rectification of names. When morals are exercised in ruling, the whole country is governed well.

In order to understand rectification of names, let us consider its flexibility. When perceiving one's role and responsibilities, this flexibility will be senstive to differing social contexts, and personal differences of character. Such flexibility reflects the classical Confucianist political enterprise that deals with all human affairs in the whole society. Thus, in order to bring about flexibility of in rectification of names, and therefore in the political enterprise, the definition of rectification of names ought to be in a formula in a repetitive expression without providing its specific contents and methods.

It is hard to pinpoint the early Buddhist political thought on the notion of "rule by righteousness" because the early Buddhists do not discuss it in detail. On the other hand,

classical Confucianism is more concerned to express its political thought. In other words, classical Confucianism is more concerned about politics as a tool for achieving benevolence and happiness of people than early Buddhism.

However, regardless of their degree of concern, they share a similar view with regard to politics and formulating its framework. They think politics affects all human affairs in the whole society and its scope is not limited. Thus, depending upon differences between environments and individuals which characterize the flexibility of human society, "ruling by righteousness" and "rectification of names" should be flexible in their applications. In order to show the flexible applications, the two concepts are in a repetitive expression.

Political ideas expressed in a repetitive expression, requires a special attention in the context of a modern legal theory. Let us consider one of the moral concepts of law, the indeterminacy of law. According to Hart who explains it for the first time, all rules have the duality of "a core of certainty" and of "a penumbra of doubt" when they are brought in particular situations under general rules.[316] He thinks that all rules have "a fringe of vagueness" or "open texture,"[317] but the penumbra area is far smaller than the area of core. The penumbra area is taken more seriously by legal realists. They think this area, so the indeterminacy of law, is more pervasive and deeper. For them, there is always a cluster of rules relevant to one case and vagueness of any one of the rules.[318] This notion tells us that there are competing rules for a certain litigated case in one legal system and therefore a judge's interpretation of the case and an application of a certain rule are necessary. In

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[316] H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford UP, 1961) 119.
[317] Hart 120.
[318] Andrew Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin," Philosophical Problems in the Law , ed. David Adams (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992) 119.

other words, there is no one exactly applied rule for the case before we interpret the case and select a rule for it among the competing rules. This notion of the indeterminacy of law clearly reveals the main argument of legal realism that law is not fixed but flexible depending upon various circumstances and individual applications. This position is helpful to understand why the two systems take the repetitive way of expressing their political principles. Due to the awareness of the differences of situations and individuals, they do not give a fixed political rule. Rather, in order to express the applicational flexibility of their political principles, they present only a formula in a repetitive expression. Indeed, legal realism and the two traditions are aware that a fixed rule is practically futile by virtue of the diversities of circumstances and individuals.

Since there are competing rules, one may think that the flexible nature of law and ruling hinders us from having a comprehensive principle encompassing all rules. The scholars of the Critical Legal Studies follow this position. For them, there is no possibility of having a guiding emcompassing principle for all competing rules. On the contrary, Dworkin thinks we can have one emcompassing principle. According to him, a certain higher order principle is weightier than others and it can harmonize and encompass others. This idea is based on the assumption that there is a coherence resolving the indeterminacy of law. This appears to be theoretically possible. It would not be possible practically unless all human beings have the same values and generate a coherence in law. The two systems see our diversities in valuing and do not attempt to formulate a single encompassing principle. It is important to notice that the political idea in a repetitive expression is not an encompassing principle for all diverse rules but a formula to imply the

flexible applications of the political principles. It is clear that the two traditions agree not with Dworkin but the scholars of the Critical Legal Studies with regard to the matter of the encompassing principle.

Since the repetitive expression is just a formula indicating the general nature of politics, it is natural that it itself does not reveal the specific contents and methods of politics. In spite of non-disclosure of them, we could recount several more specifically conceivable principles of ruling in descriptive words. Furthermore, through the conceivable principles, we could also clarify the meanings and implications of "to rule by righteousness" and "rectification of names."

The implications of "to rule by righteousness" are as follows. First, it aims to benefit people on the basis of compassion. Furthermore, it aims at bringing happiness of all sentient beings including animals and gods. With regard to people, they are equal beneficiaries of ruling-by-righteousness regardless of what classes they belong to. To rule by righteousness means to reject any privileged class. Secondly, it implies non-dependence on punishment. Use of punishment indicates decline of morals. The point of ruling is not to punish people but to correct their wrong behaviors. Thirdly, it implies the minimization of the power of the ruler. Minimization of the ruler's power allows maximization of each individual's autonomy and conduces to minimization of the number of rules. Increasing the number of rules indicates deterioration and disappearance of morals. In a word, benefit and compassion, correction and autonomy are the core ideas of the principle of "to rule by righteousness."

In classical Confucianism, ruling is performed from a mind unable to bear the sufferings of others or from the mind of benevolence. Obtaining and maintaining a country is solely dependent on the ruler's benevolence. The ruler shares both delight and worries with the people. The ruler should be sensitive to whatever the people feel. Secondly, the ruler should follow righteousness. In Confucius' thoughts, the flexibility of the application of righteousness is part of ruling by the principle of benevolence. Benevolence as the core of righteousness and righteousness as the form of benevolence are interwound. Righteousness in its flexible application calls for consideration of situations and this makes benevolence an objective leading principle. In Mencius' thoughts, righteousness takes benevolence as a parallel in that they cooperate. But benevolence still plays a guiding role in its flexible application.

Confucius and Mencius share the same view that righteousness is flexibly exercised in accordance with benevolence, depending upon the situational contexts. Because of this flexible nature of righteousness, right understanding of the situational contexts and intelligent judgment become necessary. Thus, knowledge is required in applying the flexible righteousness properly. In addition to knowledge, ritual is also required to assist one to perform righteousness properly in a certain socio-historical context. In the classical Confucianist thinking, even though benevolence and righteousness are two guiding principles in ruling, knowledge and ritual also dynamically interact in the matter of governing. One the other hand, ruling by benevolence and righteousness can be perceived as ruling by virtues (*te chih*). As mentioned, it is to rule by presenting the paradigmatic model of the ruler. This way of ruling, obviously, recommends neither strict legalism nor

militarism. Therefore, the classical Confucianist way of ruling does not attempt to force people to follow the rules or laws. It is thought that following them out of fear or force is not desirable. This is because the whole point of ruling is to let people cultivate virtues voluntarily. Furthermore, the classical Confucianists think that ruling should focus on cultivating each individual's autonomy. Being virtuous from the mind of autonomy is what the Confucianists eventually seek for. So, to be able to feel shame is important when they do not do right or are not virtuous. Also, to be able to correct themselves is equally important when they see what should be corrected. With the mind of self-censorship based upon a sense of shame, being virtuous voluntarily is one aim of Confucianist politics. With a motivation of self-improvement in terms of virtues, constant self-correction and self-improvement is another aim.

As we have seen, in both systems the main ideas regarding the principles of ruling are very similar. The ruler's moral quality and moral government based on the ruler's moral quality are crucial. The ruler should have a mind of compassion/benevolence that makes him sensitive to what and how the people feel. Holding sensitivity, the ruler should identify with the people's suffering as his own. Also, not attempting to over-exercise his power, he should let the people exercise their own autonomy. In fact, the method of ruling by morals is rooted in cultivating and developing the people's autonomy in good actions. In spite of these similarities regarding the principles of politics, there are distinctive differences.

Recall that, unlike the classical Confucianists, the early Buddhists include animals and gods as beneficiaries of politics. This difference must be based on the difference of the metaphysics of morals in the two systems: kamma theory deals with all sentient beings

equally in terms of transmigration in the continuously wandering world. *T'ien ming* theory on the other hand deals with humans as moral beings exclusively and differently from other beings. In other words, this difference is based on the difference of their views of the world: the dependently-arisen-world verses the human-centered-world.

There is another difference in the political thought of the two systems. According to classical Confucianism, there is a hierachical order between nations, and between the ruler and subjects in terms of moral superiority and obedience. For example, a big country (or a ruler) is required to be morally superior, while small countries (or the people) are obligated to obey. Since obedience is solely based on moral superiority, obedience is not required when moral superiority is not possessed.

The hierarchical order is necessarily connected to the concept of centralization in the whole world, and also within one country. Many countries are hierarchically centralized around one big country; people are around the ruler. Interestingly, the hierarchical order and centralization goes beyond the boundary of politics. As the scope of politics covers the whole of society, so the scope of the hierarchical order and of centralization covers the whole world and all people. It is hard to find these kinds of thoughts in early Buddhism. Even though the early Buddhists implied hierarchical influence on morality from the top to the bottom, they did not seem to accept the hierarchical order and the idea of centralization in the sense of classical Confucianism.

With regard to relation to nature, the political thoughts of the two systems agree. One point of similarity is that the quality of politics, the moral status of society, and the phenomena of nature are closely connected. Good politics generates a good society and

favorable nature. When politics does not go right, society deteriorates morally and natural phenomena tend to be hostile. In other words, a healthy society in a peaceful natural environment presupposes right politics. Furthermore, the two systems highlight a correlation between politics and nature. Their relationship is positive, mutual, cooperative, and harmonious. When the political leaders are right, nature becomes hospitable. When they are not right, nature may become hostile.

Even though, by and large, the views of the two systems on the relationship of politics to nature is very much alike, we should not miss this subtle difference. The classical Confucianists attempted to a greater extent to control nature. In fact, for them nature is an object of governing: Making nature cooperative and useful for people's lives was perceived as a task of government by the legendary kings. While we observe the ruler's conscious efforts to control nature in classical Confucianism, we do not observe this in early Buddhism. For the latter, nature becomes hospitable without making conscious efforts but simply by following morals in the matter of ruling. Regardless of this subtle difference, both systems share the view that nature reflects the quality of politics.

In both systems, wealth did not seem to play a great role in politics. The extent to which political systems dealt with wealth in the social arena was not specified except, in the case of classical Confucianism, where there was recognition of the need for a system to deal with tax. According to both systems, the ruler should provide the people with their means of living.[319] However, according to classical Confucianism, even though the

[319] One may argue that this is for a nation to take responsibility for full employment of the people in the sense of modern politics. Furthermore, one may also argue that this is an example of a social security system. I think both arguments are reasonable. However, the latter argument is more convincing since we

guarantee of a job by the state was for the sake of keeping the people on the moral track, it is significant that the ruler had a responsibility to enable the people to obtain their basic material needs. On the other hand, although we do not think of wealth as surplus of material needs at this level, it is significant that all people have the potential to be wealthy since they have the means to be wealthy. In early Buddhism, the ruler's specific responsibility with regard to employment of the people is not clearly spelled out. It simply states that the ruler must take the responsibility of taking care of and protecting people.

"Giving" or charity is a unique virtue realizing compassion in early Buddhism. Since its equivalent concept is not found in classical Confucianism, there is no need to recapitulate the notion of "giving" again in detail. Instead, let us consider some similarities that can be observed relating to the concept of giving and the classical Confucianist attitude toward wealth.

It is important to note that in both systems wealth is explained in terms of morals. There is an order in the actions of giving in accordance with the levels of the moral achievement of the recipients. The person on the higher level has a priority to be a recipient over the person on the lower level. The fact that the early Buddhists stress the recipient's moral level is worthy of note since giving is itself a moral virtue and the whole view of wealth is based on morals. Similarly, the moral basis of wealth is emphasized in classical Confucianism. In both systems, "to be wealthy" and "to be moral" are positively correlated; when one acts morally, one becomes wealthy naturally. Wealth is considered an outcome of being moral.

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have a specific example to support it in the text. Recall that the ruler has special concern for the persons who do not have a firm family bond, those such as orphans and widows.

Since accumulating wealth is a positive value in both systems, they encourage people to accumulate wealth. Yet accumulating wealth requires the fulfillment of certain conditions. The major conditions are "being right"and "being diligent." The third condition, a healthy society, is added in classical Confucianism. When the society is not healthy, being wealthy is a shame; when the society is healthy, not being wealthy is shameful. In a good society, everyone can be rich by making diligent efforts in a right way. Theoretically, as time goes, the number of wealthy people and the degree of wealth increase as long as the society is healthy. In classical Confucianism, the increase of wealthy people naturally brings wealth to the king because people will pay more tax. Logically, in a healthy society, there may be continuous increase of wealth without limit for both people and the king.

In the early Buddhist thought, logically wealth will not increase without end, because of the emphasis on the virtue of giving. Logically speaking, the relationship between wealth and giving appears to be in counterbalance. However, wealth seems continuously to increase in spite of the constant actions of giving; recall the example of ***Anāthapiṇḍika***.This seems to appeal to common people because they need an incentive to practice the virtue of giving. From the perspective of the moral sense of common people, wealth and giving should not be in a relationship of counterbalance but that of reinforcement. While counterbalancing seems to emphasize the attitude of non-expectation of rewards, reinforcement underscores the promise of rewards for the actions of giving. Although one may not expect any reward for the actions of giving, rewards such as worldly happiness or rebirth in heaven are promised. In this way, wealth and giving, and

non-expectation and rewards are positively correlated; the more the giving, the more the wealth; the less expectation, the more rewards. Although the classical Confucianists do not explicitly state this, they would agree with the early Buddhists.

The early Buddhist view on wealth and the virtue of giving seem to suggest a solution for the problem of distribution or redistribution. In modern political philosophy, the problem of redistribution has been approached in terms of institutionalizing redistribution systems. The Buddhist approach seems to be different because it does not consider the problem of distribution as a problem of institutionalization or politics. They want to solve it by appealing to each individual's voluntary moral consciousness and action. For them, the attitude of giving based on the mind of compassion, and therefore the actions of giving, are fundamental in solving the problem of distribution. To recall, how much a giver owns does not matter in the actions of giving. What matters is the individuals' moral consciousness or the mind of sharing.

The moral consciousness of "the mind of sharing" is based on a certain psychological attitude regarding wealth; and this is to be satisfied with a certain minimal amount of wealth. In order to be satisfied with this amount, one is required not to have grand desires. Psychologically speaking, it would be true that the bigger the desire, the less the satisfaction obtained. Practically, one may have two ways of satisfying one's own desires. One way is to decrease one's desires to a minimum level of satisfaction. The other way is to obtain all that one desires. The latter way is generally more difficult to satisfy since desire is limitless, and it grows constantly like a creeper (*mahāluva*).[320] Taking the

[320] Dh 162, 334.

former way does not mean the annihilation of desire itself; it is desire at an appropriate level in the middle way between "too little" and "too much." To decrease desire to the minimum level where one becomes satisfied provides one with room for the moral consciousness of the mind of sharing. This moral consciousness leads one to find out a desirable way to spend the rest of the amount of what one owns after taking the minimum amount for oneself. In early Buddhist thought, one of the most virtuous ways is to give away the rest of the things to others.[321] To be satisfied with the minimum amount[322] and to help others with the rest is an attractive moral consciousness that early Buddhist ethics offers. There is no doubt that this moral consciousness takes a form of giving or sharing.

As pointed out, the emphasis on the mind of giving and actions are unique in early Buddhism; there is no apparent equivalent in classical Confucianism. However, the idea of a giving mind and action would be valued in classical Confucianism as well. Even though classical Confucianism does not articulate the virtue such as giving, it encourages one to live a simple life not possessing much. Moreover, it suggests a life of sharing things in a difficult situation.

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321 Regarding the way of giving away, we notice that it is perceived through the same framework as that of extending compassion/benevolence. One extends the action of giving away from those who are closer to oneself, to those who are further away. Also, one should give away according to both self- and other-regarding principles.

322 I am indebted to E. F. Schumacher for arguing for "satisfaction with minimum amount." I would like to bring some of his interpretations of Buddhist economics into the present discussion. Characterizing Buddhist economics as simplicity and non-violence, he explains its simplicity as follows. In the Buddhist way of life, "amazingly small means lead to extraordinarily satisfactory results." Also, he observes that the aim of consumption is "the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption." In addition, he argues that "it is not wealth that stands in the way to liberation but the attachment to wealth; not the enjoyment of pleasurable things but the craving for them." Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (London: Harper & Raw publishers, 1973) 54. He thus pinpoints the essence of the early Buddhists position on wealth and welfare.

As we have seen, the early Buddhist appeals to each individual's voluntary moral consciousness such as the giving mind or sharing attitude and an action accompanied by it rather than formal institutions with regard to the problem of redistribution. The classical Confucianist would agree this solution since it gives more weight to the individual's moral autonomy than to any type of formal legalization.

CHAPTER V. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE VIRTUE

In this chapter, I shall examine how the main self-transformative virtue, compassion/ benevolence, is to be interpreted from the perspective of the problem of moral objectivity. A meta-ethical position will be taken in dealing with this issue.

The problem of the objectivity of morals may be discussed from at least three perspectives. First, we can discuss the objectivity of morals from the perspective of facts and values. This perspective involves the problem of whether facts or values can be objective and of whether they are consistent. Second, we can discuss the problem of whether certain moral rules or virtues are objective. This perspective deals with their universal acceptibility for everybody regardless time and place, and so with the question as to why "objective" needs to mean universal in "some" absolutistic sense. Third, we can discuss the issue from the perspective of practice. More specifically, how one can be objective when considering both one's own interest and that of others. From the first perspective, we shall see the early Buddhist and classical Confucianist general position on facts and values. From the second perspective, we shall see how a certain virtue--in our case, compassion/benevolence--can be universally accepted in both systems. We shall see that objectivity of virtues should be understood not in an absolutistic sense but in a universal sense. From the third perspective, we shall examine the meaning of impartiality between the self and others in both systems. In order to begin the first and second discussions, I shall introduce a recent argument concerning objectivity.

A. A RECENT ARGUMENT CONCERNING MORAL OBJECTIVITY

Williams, who presents one of the most influential criticisms of traditional ethics, claims that the formulation of the distinction between the practical and the theoretical, or value and fact, or *ought* and *is* misguided. According to Williams, the distinction has been challenged by positivists, and after all, the basic distinction in the traditional sense is doubted by prescriptivists. Accepting the challenge and the doubt, Williams carefully reformulates the distinction in terms of the scientific and the ethical.[323] Interestingly, not rejecting the fundamental distinction, he reformulates it in his own terms. He claims that "in relation to ethics there is a genuine and profound difference to be found."[324] The core idea of the distinction between the scientific and the ethical in terms of convergence is expressed as follows: "In a scientific inquiry there should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of the convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how things are; in the area of the ethical, at least at a high level of generality, there is no such coherent hope."[325]

Williams' ambitious enterprise makes a clearer contrast between facts and values by selecting the proximity-proof-terms, the scientific and the ethical. In his thinking, the scientific is non-perspectival and therefore aims for an absolute conception. He assumes that there is one single correct scientific truth for a certain phenomenon of the world. Unlike perspectival knowledge that does not involve an absolute conception, the non-

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323 It may be questioned how Williams could be successful in making this distinction by using these terms. For the scientific is not something clearly separated from the theoretical; similarly, the ethical is not something separated from the practical. Since my interest in his argument is to show one of the rigorous efforts to make distinguish the practical and the theoretical, I shall not pursue this issue.

324 Williams 135.

325 Williams 136.

perspectival science can avoid a possible fusion with perspectival values. Being based on the sharp contrast between the scientific and the ethical, he argues for the objectivity of scientific knowledge and the non-objectivity of ethical knowledge. That is he argues for the convergence of scientific knowledge and the non-convergence of the ethical knowledge.

Objecting to the claim that it is impossible to obtain objectivity of scientific knowledge or convergence of science, and that science is no more than a human description of the picture of the world "already there," Williams argues that one can have objective scientific knowledge by holding the "absolute conception" of the world.[326] The absolute conception of the world makes it possible to have a non-perspectival view "in a way to the maximum degree independent of our perspective and its peculiarities"[327] and to maintain "the various perspectival views of the world."[328] We notice that he postulates the absolute conception as non-perspectival. For him, the whole notion of the absolute conception can serve to make a distinction between "the world as it is independent of our experience" and "the world as it seems to us."[329] Here it is important to be clear that he makes a clear-cut distinction between the absolute conception of the world independent of human experience, and the world as perceived by human experience. To perceive the former world by the absolute conception is non-perspectival, convergent, and therefore scientific. It is different from perspectivally knowing or knowledge which is not convergent.

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326 Williams 137-39.
327 Williams 138-39.
328 Williams 139.
329 Williams 139.

For Williams, there is no room for non-perspectival convergence apart from the scientific. He takes the notion of convergence as a criterion of objectivity. As we expect from this position, he does not see any possibility of convergence in ethics, and therefore of objectivity of ethical knowledge or ethical values since the social world is different from the physical world. In the social world, human beings cannot live without a culture and there are many different cultures in which they live, differing in their local concepts.[330] However, Williams considers a different sort of ethical objectivity of morals which is essentially different from the scientific objectivity. A form of objectivism that he considers is not "the objectivist view of ethical life" but "an objective grounding or foundation to ethical life"[331] that he looks for in thick ethical concepts. More specifically, thick ethical concepts such as courage, coward, lie, and gratitude are concrete and differ from abstract thin ethical concepts such as right or wrong.

Even though thick ethical concepts are important in arguing for the objective grounding of ethical life, Williams does not provide a clear conceptual explanation of them. He appears to find an objective foundation of ethical life in "a shared way of life"[332] within a specific culture. On the basis of a shared way of life that assumes common desires and interests, humans can develop a practical convergence for ethical life. In this way of thinking, he seems to think that the thick ethical concepts, although they are open to being unseated,[333] are to be embedded and so to survive in a particular society. In other words, they are the groundings for maintaining common moral practices stably and constantly.

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330 Williams 150.
331 Williams 152.
332 Williams 171.
333 Williams 200.

More importantly, positive thick ethical concepts themselves seem to be common moral practices. The term "the world-guided" that controls the thick concepts must be understood in this context. "The world-guided" as "the facts"or "the user's perception of the world"[334] provides shared common moral practices. However, the thick concepts themselves are the best and most appropriate criteria for objectifing the moral grounding. After all, the thick ethical concepts, although they are perspectival, can constitute general ethical knowledge or belief. For Williams, this way of being objective is the "only" and "intelligible" way of objectifying morals or ethics.[335]

In brief, Williams' two main arguments are presented: (1) There is a fundamental distinction between fact and value that is replaced with that between the scientific and the ethical in terms of convergence. In explaining convergence of the scientific, he postulates the concept of the non-perspectival absolute. (2) There is an objective ethical grounding on the basis of the thick concepts. Focusing on these two arguments, we will examine the problem of moral objectivity in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism in the following two sections. Williams' first argument will not follow in both ethical systems. Morever, we will see that the absolute conception is not postulated in order to capture the objectivity of fact in either system. Williams' second argument will be accepted. Considering compassion or benevolence as a thick concept, we will see that it is a virtue for an objective moral ground, and that the virtue itself is convergently sought.

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334 Williams 141.
335 Williams 154.

B. NON-SEPARABILITY OF FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL PRACTICE

Factual knowledge and moral practice are not separable in early Buddhism. Rather, they are cooperative in their relationship. The former presents a reason or ground of moral practice, and the latter deepens factual knowledge. For example, factual knowledge of dependent arising in the physical world necessarily leads one to practice the virtue of compassion. Interdependence of the whole world and the self implies having compassion for every human and sentient being. Practicing compassion deepens understanding of dependent arising in concrete life. Thus we may say: dependent arising, as one type of factual knowledge itself, which is obtained by seeing the things as they have become (***yathābhūta***), carries the implication of moral practices. The term wisdom (***paññā***) that can indicate dependent arising precisely reflects inseparability of knowledge and practice, and is obtained through practice. Furthermore, knowledge contained in practice consists of the famous triad of Buddhist practice: wisdom (***paññā***), virtue (***sīla***), and concentration (***samādhi***).Virtue as containing knowledge is on a par with knowledge that is contained in practice and wisdom. Concentration in the triad serves to strengthen the ties between the other two. In and through concentration, wisdom and virtue are mutually developed and strongly connected.[336]

In the early Buddhist system, the term ***dhamma*** clearly shows the inseparability of factual knowledge and moral practice. As we saw in chapter four, it refers to the world of phenomena or the constituents of the world, principles explaining the world, and good

[336] It is worth noticing that the Buddhist standard or way of moral life, the eightfold path, is analyzed into a triad (the first three into wisdom, the middle two into virtue, and the last three into concentration) and so the eightfold path also shows an inseparable tie between knowledge (right knowing) and practice (right acting).

conduct or moral actions. "The plural form ***dhamma*** often expresses the idea of dependently arisen phenomena (***paṭiccasamuppanne dhamme***)" and refers to "the virtues in the world of dependently arisen phenomena."[337] The singular form ***dhamma*** means both the principle of dependent arising (***paṭiccasamuppāda***) and the moral principle that are derived from the dependently arisen phenomena and moral virtues. It is very significant that the phenomenal world, its understanding, and behavioral requirements of that understanding, are inseparably interconnected. This position is expressed in the Buddha's epistemological position.

The Buddha's epistemological position reconfirms the non-separability of factual knowledge and moral practice. Firstly, he is not interested in speculation on things or questions that are not related to moral life. Advising ***Māluñkyāputta***, who is eager to hear the Buddha's answers on metaphysical questions, he says not to spend time speculating on questions that are not fruitful for moral life. They are neither useful (***atthasamhita***) nor connected with the noble way of life (***ādibrahmacariyaka***). Also, they do not get rid of aversion, nor do they bring about dispassion, tranquillity of mind, higher knowledge, enlightenment, or freedom.[338] This pragmatic position is epistemologically based on his middle way position between substantialism and nihilism. This leads him to reject the following positions: (1) Whatever we perceive, there is an absolute objective entity that is not perceived through human sensations. (2) What we perceive is a mere presentation of the mind and the phenomena of the world are simply illusions. For him, both positions are

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[337] David Kalupahana, History of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992) 68-69.
[338] M 1.431.

problematic either because they undermine the human capacity for perception or negate the phenomena of the world. He gives equal value to both human subjectivity and the objectivity of the phenomena of the world. Neither overrides the other. Thus, he does not reject the value of human perception. Recognizing a measure of certainty without rejecting it altogether because of the imperfections of perception, he gives value to it in a moral context. Within limits and without absoluteness, certainty regarding the presently perceived phenomena in a particular place is taken to be significant in its value for moral life. Based upon that certainty, one can have a certain moral judgment without commiting oneself to absoluteness regardless of time and place.

Similarly, inseparability of factual knowledge and moral practice is observed in classical Confucianism. Factual knowledge cannot be true knowledge unless it is examined and practiced in human (moral) actions. In other words, true factual knowledge is perceived and confirmed in and through (moral) actions. Factual knowledge becomes finally validated after it is applied to actions. Since factual knowledge and moral practice validify each other, they cannot take place without one another.

In classical Confucianism, the term "Way (*tao*)" expresses the inseparability or interconnectedness of factual knowledge and moral practice. The Way is both an object of knowing and a content of practice. Every human action is supposed to fit the Way. In this sense, learning an activity and its result, factual knowledge, becomes knowledge of values or morals. The latter necessarily involves value judgments. After all, knowledge is realized in the Way in and through actions. Since the Way is involved in knowledge and action and humans are engaged in both all the time, it should easily be perceived. Mencius thinks the

Way is like a broad road and it can be easily known. For him, the only problem is that people do not look for it.[339]

Factual knowledge, as we have seen, is realized in the Way in and through actions. Temporally, this factual knowledge has priority over actions. After this knowledge is realized in the Way, one is engaged in another type of knowledge: Knowing the Way. When one understands what one does (*hsing*), or notices what one does repeatedly, one will know (*chih*). The two levels or kinds of knowledge are bound with the notion of the Way. Factual knowledge together with practice is contained in the Way. Knowledge of the Way is attained when one is aware of one's realization of the Way through factual knowledge and practices.

The Confucianist idea of learning also shows the inseparability of factual knowledge and moral practice. Confucius suggests two types of learning: (1) learning from the tradition of the Classics of the ancestors such as The Book of Poems or The Record of Rites. (2) learning by observing others' behavior, either bad or good. The first purpose of the two types of learning is self-cultivation. Reading poems and books of the ancients is to know them and make friends,[340] by which he means to know their way of life and their personality rather than to know factual historical things. As a result, one is supposed to learn from the behavior of the characters, and take them as paradigmatic figures for one's own transformation. In Confucianist thought, the focus of the whole process of knowing through the books that of in self-transformation, or self-cultivation in terms of morals or values. So the first type of learning, in fact, is the same as that of the second type. It is rare

339 6B-2.
340 5B-8.

for the term "learning (*hsueh*)" to be used in a context where there is no notion of moral cultivation. Conceptual or factual learning that does not carry practical value for human actions is not found in classical Confucianism. In other words, learning and so knowing always occurs in the context of (moral) actions or of improvement of one's behaviors. This unique character of learning or knowing is based on the epistemological position of classical Confucianism.

Metaphysical questions that are perceived to be unrelated to human morals are not to be pursued. In chapter two we have seen Confucius' position regarding the gods and spirits. He says one should not speculate on them. For one will never sufficiently understand or serve humans. Reflecting on the gods and spirits does not bring practical or pragmatic results for human moral life. The objects of epistemology are to contribute to the human world within the boundaries of human perception and understanding. Confucius never encourages mere speculations on the things beyond the boundaries. In addition, he does not seem to assume any ultimate reality behind the phenomenal world. The phenomena of the world have value as they are perceived; they are neither undervalued nor overvalued.

So far, we have seen that there is no separation or distinction between factual knowledge and moral practice in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism; they complement one another. Also, there is no indication to show that factual knowledge is different from the scientific. Recall that Williams has to postulate the non-perspectival absolute conception for convergence of the scientific. He has to do that because he thinks there is one single truth which is perceived in a non-perspectival way. There is no

indication to show that the two systems assume one single truth beyond non-perspectival human perception. Rather, they focus on the significance of the present perception without being obsessed by the nature of human perception itself. They acknowledge the face value of the present perspectival human perception for moral transformation. So long as it is helpful for moral transformation, they may be willing to accept the Goodmanian pluralistic world view which argues for "multiple actual worlds" on the level of experience. Perhaps, it would not be absurd to say that the two systems can accept "multiple actual worlds" as a temporary tool of moral generation as long as they contain real experiences requiring moral actions. Indeed, when one is serious about a pattern of moral actions in the face of the new experiences in the world, those experiences will give new meanings to the world. As these actual worlds cannot be reduced to one noumenal world, so they cannot be mere seeming worlds. In this epistemological attitude, a substantialist tendency looking for the "view from nowhere" will be abandoned. Instead, the person in this attitude finds facts and values attached to the facts from the present experiences in a perspectival view.

For this person, the problem of facts and values is perceived in the light of an on-going-process or continuation. Furthermore, the understanding of facts and values can be developed continuously in a perspectival view. In this position, it is hard to assert a single, absolute, and exclusive fact or value. There is an open-ended perspective that is ready to develop or improve one's own understanding for "a better fact and value." Hilary Putnam seems to be right when he understands objectivity not in terms of "a best unique version" but in terms of "a better and worse version."[341] Indeed, an open-ended perspective should

[341] Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Sall: Open Court, 1987) 77.

allow a new possible perception or conception of the things that impact on or provide human values. This kind of position will lead us to conclude that the two systems do not stick to one strict certainty or objectivity with regard to world views, knowledge about the world, or values. Yet they do not abandon a possible certainty or objectivity that is not absolutized and not fossilized in the scope of human experience. We may call this position a soft objective view on knowledge. When this attitude is exercised in the area of values, as we will soon see, it will also take the form of a kind of soft objectivism in similar ways.

C. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE VIRTUE IN TERMS OF ITS UNIVERSAL ACCEPTABILITY

There are some commonly or universally acceptable moral rules or virtues regardless of historical times and different cultures. Concerning virtues, early Buddhism and classical Confucianism agree that there are certain virtues that we commonly look for. Not discussing all virtues of the two ethical systems, let us consider how a certain virtue, compassion/benevolence, is universally accepted.

In general, in what sense is a universally accepted virtue possible? Williams, making a distinction between objectivity of morals and that of science, argues for the objective grounding of morals, or the objectivity of moral virtues. The thick conceptions themselves appear both as objective grounding by indicating the sense of good/bad or wrong/right, and as objective moral virtues by being selected. For example, the thick concepts, generosity and stinginess, indicate what is supposed to be taken or abandoned in terms of good or bad. Furthermore, on the basis of a sense of good or bad, we know that

generosity can be an objective virtue in the sense that it can be universally accepted. Notice that the thick concepts tell us which moral virtues are universally accepted/not accepted. In one case the universally accepted virtue, generosity, becomes a positive virtue that is universally looked for. There are many thick concepts that are positive and universally accepted as a virtue that is to be pursued: friendship, love, sincerity, and so forth. One may argue that the positive thick concepts are objective moral virtues on the grounds that we hardly find a society where those are not accepted. However, a meticulous person can ask a further question: Are the positive thick concepts acceptable in every case without any exceptional cases? There seem to be exceptional cases. So one would argue that purely universally accepted or objective virtues cannot exist. This argument appears to be plausible: Are there no objective virtues or no objective grounding of morals? We can avoid this problem by clarifying the term objectivity in a moral context.

Bernard Gert, arguing for the objectivity of morals, clarifies the term objectivity by making a distinction between "being absolute" and "being universal." He understands objectivity as "being universal" allowing exceptions:

> The moral system includes not only the universal moral rules, it also includes a procedure that allows for justified exceptions to the rules. The confusion between a rule being universal, i.e., applying to all rational persons without consideration of person, time, place, or group, and its being absolute, i.e., admitting no exceptions, has been one of the main sources of ethical relativity.[342]

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342 Bernard Gert, <u>Morality: A new Justification of the Moral Rules</u> (New York: Oxford UP, 1988) 260.

Here Gert's point is to reject a strict or absolute sense of "objectivity" that does not allow room for any exceptions. Practically, it is hard to find principles and rules that have no exceptions. For example, consider a universally accepted moral principle: Humans are not supposed to kill other humans. We can easily think of exceptional cases for this principle. There are cases where killing is justified and allowed: in the case of the self-defense and in a battle. As Gert argues, the term objectivity should not be understood in a strict or absolute way. This means that, not undermining objectivism, we have to allow relativism to some degree. Perhaps, objectivity in morals or virtues should be understood as a matter of degree. To accept a principle universally, then, is to reject both arbitrariness and absoluteness. In early Buddhism and classical Confucianism, objectivity in terms of universally accepted virtues or objective grounding of morals should be understood in this way.

As addressed, the focus of our concern is to see compassion/benevolence as a positive thick concept and universally (not in the strict sense) accepted virtue. It is representative in the sense that it is a leading virtue and takes other virtues from the perspective of its realization. It is, for a self-transformative person, a universally accepted and required virtue. Its relationship with other virtues is explained in chapter three. Here we shall explore the concept itself. Since compassion/benevolence is considered as the main virtue in each ethical system, it is important to first identify its locus in relation to other virtues.

In its relationship with three other virtues for the noble way of life (***brahmacariya***), compassion (***anukampā, karuṇā***) can represent, loving-kindness (***mettā***), sympathetic joy

(*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*). We can easily notice that loving-kindness and sympathetic joy consist of compassion. But we wonder how equanimity can consist of compassion. As we examined in chapter three, compassion requires self-restraint and concentration (*samādhi*) in its development. Fully developed compassion requires a status of equanimity without being disturbed by anything. Whatever happens, one should not be disturbed. In a way, the degree or level of equanimity may reflect the degree of compassion.[343] One who practices the virtue of compassion fully will always maintain the virue of equanimity.

Compassion in equanimity shows one essential characteristic of early Buddhist ethics -- the inseparability of right understanding and concentration. In general, equanimity (*upekkhā*) has a firm epistemological foundation. The word *upekkhā* means "a close look" or "a careful observation."[344] Looking at or observing closely requires one to analyse the objects of observation--which are mainly phenomena and the self--and also requires one to conduct a through investigation. The investigation of all phenomena and the self leads one to see the impermanence (*anicca*) of all phenomena and the non-substantiality (*anatta*) of the self. Furthermore, one is led to see the existence of suffering (*dukkha*) that is based on the false understanding of the permanence of phenomena and of the substantiality of the self. It also results from the attachment to phenomena and the self that arise from this false understanding. Notice that equanimity is understood in terms of epistemological investigation resulting in right understanding (*paññā*). Right

343 To understand the four virtues hierachically, see Aronson's Love and Sympathy in *Theravāda* Buddhism chapter 5. One may also argue that equanimity is a later development of compassion.
344 *Upekha,* as Kalupahana analyzes, is derived from the root *iks* (Kalupahana 65). The prefix *upa* means "close" and the root *iks* means "to see," "to look at," or "to observe."

understanding requires an attitude of detachment from phenomena and the self. As a result of detachment from phenomena and the self, one generates a neutral feeling toward them without a feeling of happiness and suffering or of like and dislike. This neutral feeling must be considered that acquired dispositional attitude of equanimity. There we must point out that concentration is an essential ingredient in the process of obtaining right knowledge and of generating an attitude of detachment and neutrality. Therefore, equanimity has the component of right knowledge and of concentration. Similarly, in the domain of compassion, equanimity involves both right knowledge and concentration since it assumes the following two: (1) understanding of kamma theory and the principle of dependent arising, which means interconnectedness of beings in the past, present and possibly future (and an understanding of situations and others.) (2) This understanding is developed and deepened in concentration.[345] A certain level of right knowledge must be achieved to the point at which kamma theory and the principle of dependent arising are known. This level of wisdom must be deepened by practicing concentration. In a word, the virtue of compassion is bound together with right knowledge and concentration.

Interestingly, compassion in the noble way of life is discussed together with other three virtues when the Buddha dicusses the fourth level of meditation (***catutthajjhāna***).[346] The status of the fourth level of meditation in a state of equanimity has the same quality of noblity as the status of possessing loving-kindness and the other three virtues. In the same

[345] However, wisdom in compassion must be a result of insight concentration (***vipassanā***). So another issue arises: At what point contemplative concentration (***samathi***)is transferred into insight concentration in order to give wisdom arises. Or, what are the relationships of the two concentrations. This issue seems to be another research subject.
[346] A 1.182-84.

text, the status of the fourth level of meditation and that of possessing loving-kindness are also identified with the status of noble life freed from the three defilements, greed (***lobha***), hatred (***dosa***), and confusion (***moha***). Significantly, getting rid of these defilements is closely related to the complete attainment of compassion. First, the self-restraining aspect of compassion requires freedom from greed. Second, recognition of the principle of dependent arising or of interconnectedness with other people presupposes being free from confusion. Third, in compassion there is no remains of hatred. It is certain that one who possesses this noble way of life completes transformation of the self. This person is also free from influx (***āsava***) and is no longer bound by ignorance (***avijjā***). He/she must achieve *arahanthood*, and therefore the highest moral goal, freedom (***nibbāna***).

The main virtue of classical Confucianism, benevolence, has a similar framework in its ethical system. Cooperating with other virtues, it takes a central place in the classical Confucianist ethical system. The virtues, rites (*li*) and righteousness (*yi*), consist of benevolence by providing benevolence with the forms of external and concrete presentations, and justificatory and objective principles respectively. Rites, as the specific ways of presentations of benevolence, are located between two individuals or between an individual and a group. Righteousness as a justificatory and objective principle is located in one's moral consciousness. Whenever benevolence takes the external forms of rituals, righteousness carries theoretical reasons why those forms of ritual should be taken. The role of rites and righteousness in benevolence can be compared to embroidering a design. If benevolence is the final embroidered picture, righteousness represents the outline of the design and rituals the actions of sewing.

As we saw in the previous chapters, realizing benevolence through rites and righteousness is not possible without knowledge. In realizing benevolence, the correct forms of rites and the significance of righteousness need to be continuously learned (*hsüeh*) for the purpose of obtaining right knowledge. Learning in a reflective way (*ssu*) helps one to know the value of benevolence and to practice it. In addition, other Confucianist virtues such as sincerity (*ch'eng*), loyalty (*chung*), and faithfulness (*hsin*) consist of benevolence. These virtues play a similar role with rites, righteousness, and knowledge. All the cooperative virtues to benevolence may be independent virtues. However, they do not seem to be comprehensive virtues. In other words, benevolence can include these virtues, but not *vice versa*. When one embodies the comprehensive virtue of benevolence fully, one realizes the highest goal, the Way. This is the highest moral stage that a self-transformative person can achieve.

As we have seen, compassion/benevolence, as a comprehensive virtue, takes a central place in the early Buddhist and classical Confucianist ethical system. Both virtues lead a self-transformative person into the highest stage of moral achievement, freedom and the Way. Since the highest moral goal as a universally pursued objective is open for everybody, compassion/benevolence is to be universally adopted for the moral goal in both ethical systems.

As already explained, the universally adopted virtue for the universal moral goal is not an absolute virtue that is required to be applied everywhere and all the time. There must be exceptional situations for its applications. This implies that both ethical systems should have room for allowing non-compassionate/non-benevolent action in some degree. This

idea may not be accepted since both systems do not explicitly deal with this issue. There is, however, a ground for arguing for the exceptional situations. The Buddha's, Confucius,' and Mencius' actions and remarks show that there are some cases where compassionate/ benevolent actions are not the best.

There is a case that shows the Buddha's unusual feeling. In the ***Upakkilesa Sutta***, the Buddha, very disappointed with his disciples' behavior, leaves them.[347] The monks of ***Kosambi*** are disputatious, quarrelsome and contentious. In the absence of understanding each other, they fight each other. Having been asked to settle this battle out of compassion, the Buddha speaks to them: "Enough, monks; no disputes, no quarrels, no contention, no argument."[348] He speaks the same words three times. But the monks continue to abuse each other; and moreover, they say that it is none of the Buddha's business: "Revered sir, let the Lord, the Dhamma-master wait...for it is we who will be (held) accountable for this dispute, quarrel, contention and argument."[349] Having seen the monks not listening and continuing to fight, he leaves ***Kosambi*** early in the morning. On leaving, he expresses his feeling; the monks are fools in fighting and they do not care about creating a schism in the Order. So he chooses to fare alone and not to be accompanied by the foolish who make evils.

His three times of persuasion failed to stop them and he did not see anything that he could do. The monks did not care about his extreme concern about a schism in the Order at all. At this point, I wonder what the Buddha truly felt about the monks. His expressions,

347 MLS 3.198-99.
348 MLS 3.198.
349 MLS 3.198.

"companion in the foolish (***bāle sahāyatā***)" indicating the monks and "makes evils (***pāpani kayira***)" indicating the monks' behaviors, show that he considers them as fools committing evils. He seems to have had a sense of indignation. Furthermore, his indignation seems to be expressed in his action of leaving. I think that both indignation and leaving are proper in this story since the monks do not stop committing evils and his efforts are completely rejected. On the other hand, how would we describe his feeling from the perspective of compassion? His compassion towards them as sentient beings and as his pupils must be kept while they are committing evils. However, the question whether he has compassion for them as personalities that embodied foolishness and stubborn evil actions requires a different answer. Part of their personalities that raise indignation do not deserve compassion. It seems to be proper to say that not abandoning compassion toward a whole person, one may reserve compassion toward a certain part of the same person who causes a sense of indignation. Even though indignation and compassion for the same person can be compatible, compassion toward the whole person seems to be weakened by indignation toward part of the same person. On the other hand, to weaken compassion for the person due to indignation causes one to have more compassion for the whole group of people. In other words, indignation triggers one to have a much broader level of compassion and allows one to be more concerned about more people's welfare. In the Buddha's case, his indignation at the monks committing evil is based on a concern about the welfare of the whole group of monks. For the Buddha, there must be time to express certain feelings such as gratitude or indignation properly in a restrained-attitude. Also, there can be a time when compassion should be properly weakened without being abandoned completely.

Classical Confucianism takes a clearer position on the case when benevolence should be weakened or should not be exercised. One can obviously have a certain person whom one does not like. Confucius dislikes those who are specious.[350] More specifically, he dislikes the speciously virtuous man who confuses people by exercising specious virtue and contaminating the true virtues. For this person, no benevolence should be shown. For Confucius, there seems to be a certain group of persons to whom benevolence should be reserved on the basis of their virtue. Mencius makes it far clearer in which cases one should not have benevolence. As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are criminals who should not be forgiven and there are tyrants who should be conquered. It is hard to find room for benevolence for them. It is very natural and righteous to attack the tyrants. It is a required moral obligation for the benevolent king for the purpose of setting the people free from the tyrants.

For Confucius and Mencius, benevolence for certain people such as the specious person or the tyrant should be withheld. It is interesting to see that withholding benevolence from certain people is based on consideration of other people. More specifically, disliking the specious person is based on a concern for the common people who are confused by him, and to conquer the tyrant is based on the motivation to save the people opressed by him. Also, it is interesting to see that the situations in both examples require a sense of indignation. For Confucius and Mencius, the ability to tell who should be disliked or attacked, and consequently from whom benevolence should withheld seems to be a crucial capability of a moral person.

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350 7B-37.

With regard to indignation, early Buddhism and classical Confucianism seem to have different strength of voice. In early Buddhism, indignation is not explicitly expressed. Notice that identifying indignation is a matter of my speculation. In classical Confucianism, indignation is more explicitly identified and reduces to more active action.

It is very significant that in the light of the object of indignation, there is a tension between compassion/benevolence and indignation. Indignation weakens compassion and causes restraint from exercising benevolence toward its object. However, if we look at indignation in the light of the motivation causing it, we observe its cooperative relation to the virtue. The motivation of indignation is based on concern about other people's welfare. At this juncture, an important nature of indignation should be pointed out. As Strawson thinks, indignation can be felt either for oneself or for others.[351] In both ethical systems, indignation is felt for others. It is not based on one's own interest but on other parties' welfare, and therefore a sense of justice. More specifically, the intentions to fix wrong things by stopping the vicious disputation and by dethroning the tyrants, are based on a concern for more people's welfare, or on a sense of justice. This sense of justice will be a source to encourge one to establish righteousness (*dhamma/yi*).

Returning to the point of our discussion, let us make clear that there can be exceptional cases for the virtue, compassion/benevolence. A sense of indignation weakens compassion/benevolence for certain people who are its objects. Compassion/benevolence then is a universally accepted virtue with some exceptions.

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[351] P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, ed. P. F. Strawson (New York: Oxford UP, 1968) 85.

This nature of the virtue of the two systems represents their ethical position, which is essential to understanding them--that is flexibility in application of virtues and morals. Rejecting absolute applications of moral concepts, the two systems consider individual differences and contextual or environmental differences.

In early Buddhism, while lay people have five virtues (***pañcasīla***), the monks have eight virtues (***aṭṭhaṅgasīla***) or ten virtues (***dasasīla***). Laying out the five common virtues as common rules, the Buddha makes the three rules that distinguish the monks'life from lay's life. The ten virtues are adapted for "***sāmaṇeras*** and for the more pious of the laity who could remain unattached to their families."[352] Depending upon individual differences in terms of the life styles of the monks and the laity, he sets out different numbers of rules. This would be one element of flexibility. Further flexibility is that lay people can have a chance to practice the same number of the monks' virtues. If they choose a special occasion to follow the three more virtues, they can do so for a special period of time (***uposatha*** days) at the temple. Once they choose to observe the three additional virtues required to practice in special environment, the distinction between lay and monk in terms of the numbers of the virtues is not maintained.

A clearer example of the flexible application of virtues is observed in the manner of setting the rules for the Order. It is commonly observed that the Buddha made the rules of the Order whenever they were needed. New or unprecedented situations require new rules, not *vice versa*. The 227 disciplinary virtues (***pātimokkha sīla***) are made in this way. By implication, when these rules do not fit new situations, they must be modified or

[352] Saddhatissa 97.

discarded, and new rules need to be made. In this context, one of the Buddha's last words at his death is extremely significant. He tells Ananda: "When I am gone, Ananda, let the Order, if it should so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts."[353] However, the pupils did not ask what are the lesser and minor precepts or what are the criteria to decide the lesser and minor. So the 227 precepts have continued without modification or discard.

Situational or environmental factors together with individual factors are taken into consideration in making and adopting rules or virtues in early Buddhism. The flexibility in adoption and application of virtues is based on these two. So one may say that individual differences and concrete situations are firstly considered. It is not the virtues or moral rules that are firstly given.

Similarly, classical Confucianism considers the factors of individuals and circumstances in adopting, applying, and practicing the virtue. Mencius considers how the achievement of the virtues, the Way, is different depending upon individuals. He occasionally praises the life of Po Yi, Yi Yin, and Liu Hsia Hui in comparison with that of Confucius. For him, they achieved the Way by applying the virtue in their own ways. Po Yi did not want to look at and to listen to what was not right. Yi Yin served any king without considering the king's qualification and appropriateness of time, and he participated in politics in any situations. Liu Hsia Hui also regardless of the king's virtue took governmental positions and harmonized with everybody.[354] It is clear that, according to Mencius, the same virtue can be realized in different ways depending upon the way that individuals understand and

[353] DA 2.172.

[354] 5B-1. To conclude, Mencius says, "Po Yi was the sage who was unsullied; Yi Yin was the sage accepted responsibility; Liu Hsia Hui was the sage who was easy-going; Confucius was the sage whose actions were timely" (5B-1).

adopt it. On the other hand, situational or environmental consideration in applications of the virtue is clearly addressed in classical Confucianism. For example, even though taking office is for realizing the Way, one may take office because of one's poverty.[355]

A flexible attitude toward applications of the virtue, as in early Buddhism, is very important in classical Confucianism. In a way, having flexibility itself is a virtue. Confucius, clearly rejects inflexibility together with conjecture, certainty, and selfishness.[356] Furthermore, he clearly states: "I have no preconceptions about the permissible and the impermissible (*wu ko wu pu ko*)."[357] In other words, both "absolute *yes*" and "absolute *no*"[358] are rejected. This position tells us that virtues or morals are not for virtues or morals themselves. Rather, they are supposed to fit human good.

The flexible nature of virtues or morals in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism can be explained with the concept of the middle way. In early Buddhism, the middle way position allows neither strict application nor absence of guideline. If one believes in strictness or absoluteness of the virtue without considering a person's unique character and situations, it could cause harm for either the person or other people. In other words, morals are for human beings. Moral life should not deviate from the good life. When the virtue becomes fossilized and absolutized, moral life deviates from the good life. Furthermore, if one becomes a tool or instrument for the virtue itself, the virtue becomes a tyrant. Avoiding fossilizing or absolutizing, one should also avoid the other extreme, total

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355 Mencius says, "Poverty does not constitute grounds for taking office, but there are times when a man takes office because of poverty. To have someone to look after his parents does not constitute grounds for marriage, but there are times when a man takes a wife for the sake of his parents" (5B-5).

356 9-4.

357 8-8.

358 Chung-ying Cheng 237.

rejection of the value of the virtue. This is possible in the middle way. Classical Confucianism shares this same middle way position, *chung tao*, in applying virtues. The two extremes should be abandoned in practicing the virtue: "There is little to choose between overshooting the mark and falling short."[359] Mencius, especially, is very concerned about crippling the Way by holding on to one extreme. Also, he is concerned about the middle way being mistaken. A moderate standard, discretion or *quan tao*, is a subtle rule for grasping the middle way properly. He criticizes Tso-mo who holds on to the middle between the two extremes without the proper measure, discretion.[360] Not properly measuring the middle way or not having discretion is considered as much of a failure as the two extremes.

It is important to notice that the middle way itself is not an absolute moral concept in early Buddhism and classical Confucianism. It involves the idea of decreasing harmful results that may be caused by strict application of virtues. One extreme application of virtues can be virtues for the sake of the virtue rather than for the good of human life. Therefore, the middle way is a tool for proper application of the virtue.

In this section, we have seen the objectivity of the virtue of both ethical systems in terms of how the virtue, compassion or benevolence, is universally acceptable with exceptional cases. This very nature of the objectivity of the two ethical systems is theoretically based on their flexibility and the middle way for the sake of the good of human life. To be sure, non-absolute objectivity in flexibility and the middle way do not imply that the virtue is arbitrary.

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359 11-16.
360 7A-26.

D. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE VIRTUE IN PRACTICE

The issue of the objectivity of the virtue in practice raises the question of how one can be impartial in one's actions. Generally speaking, there is a tension between self-interest and other-interest in moral thinking and moral actions. This tension has been perceived in various terms: self-regarding and other-regarding, selfish and unselfish, partial and impartial, personal and impersonal, individual and social, liberal and communitarian, particular and universal, subjective and objective, emotional and rational, and so forth. The task of a moral person is to dissolve the tension. In dissolving the tension, either can be subordinate to the other, or both can be given equal weight.

In early Buddhist and classical Confucianist ethics, the same issue of the tension between self-interest and other-interest in human actions is addressed, and also a way of dissolving the tension is provided. However, the way of resolving it is different from Kant's. Consequently, the way to reach objectivity of the virtue is also different. Furthermore, the very notion of moral objectivity itself is different.

Let us recall some of the discussions of chapter three for our present concern. If we look at self- and other-regarded action from the perspective of the development of compassion/benevolence, self-regarded motivation or action is developed before other-regarded action. Compassion/benevolence is extended from consideration of oneself and those close to one to consideration of other people. Even though the virtue is developed from the self or relation, and concern for one's own welfare, in both systems equal weight is given to all. The interest or welfare of both sides should be considered equally in order to be objective in practicing the virtue. In principle, the welfare of self and of others

should be equally realized. So, unlike Kant's thought, to achieve moral objectivity does not mean to abandon subjectivity, or to subjugate subjectivity to objectivity.

To obtain objectivity of morality in equally-regarded actions reflects the position of the middle way of the two systems. The Buddha rejects both the extreme egoism of not being concerned for others, and the extreme altruism of not being concerned for oneself. Similarly, the classical Confucianist position of both regarded action is clear in rejecting both the egoist Yang Tzu and the universalist Mo Tzu.

Equally-regarded actions require an impartial attitude. Both systems say that one should be compassionate/benevolent towards others just as one takes care of oneself. Equal quality of concern towards others is suggested. The impartial attitude and actions are obtained through the eyes of the third person observer. When one treats others, one should identify oneself with others by putting oneself in their position, and by treating them in the way that one would want to be treated if one were in the same situation. One should have the eyes of an ideal observer.

In the ideal observer theory, imagination takes place in interpreting the other's situation. Imagination from the point of view of an ideal observer helps one to infer how other people feel and think in the situation, and to keep an objective or impartial attitude. Imagination is exercised on the basis of a sense of sympathy and reflection. When this imagination is exercised in the scope of the objectivity of morals, it requires us to exercise our sympathetic and rational faculties. Without using imagination, one would not be able to understand feeling and thinking of others. Through imagination, others' subjectivity is

identified with one's own subjectivity. Depending upon this perceived subjectivity of others, one can treat others just as one wants to be treated oneself.

As long as one can consider both self-interest and other-interest equally, the equal-regarded position does not cause any conflict between them. However, where one cannot take both interests equally, and one has to choose only one of them, a conflict arises. As already discussed in chapter three, the Buddha seems to suggest that one considers one's own interest first. Confucius and Mencius would also make this suggestion since they always give priority to the more closely related person in extending benevolence. At this point, the notion of the objectivity of the virtue in practice does not seem to be maintained.

Impartiality in the common moral context would mean to treat people equally without giving any special concern or interest to oneself, a specific person, or a specific group. This means that personal preference or attachment to any individuals including oneself is to be abandoned. So to choose the self-regarding action would be apparently regarded as a partial action. Equally, to choose other-regarding action is also to be partial. In other words, impartiality does not mean putting one's interest before that of the other and it also does not mean putting the other's interest before one's own. If there is a conflict between self-regarding and other-regarding action, then to be partial is unavoidable because either choice would be partial. There is no way to be impartial in a conflict situation.

Since the conflict situation lacks the possibility of being impartial, it is not proper to say that to choose self-regarded action is partial. This leads us to conclude that the conflict situation itself is not appropriate for the application of the notion of impartiality. John

Cottingham, who claims that impartiality should not be "a necessary feature of all ethical reasoning," suggests that we should limit adoption of an impartial outlook to a special type of ethical situation.[361] His suggestion seems to be proper for the conflict situation.

In early Buddhism and classical Confucianism, impartiality or objectivity in actions involves realizing both self- and other-regarded action. The point is that one has to treat others as one wants to be treated. Treating others in this way requires application of one's own subjectivity. In the third person's eyes, one finds objectivity without abandoning subjectivity. So objectivity holds subjectivity. In other words, being impartial or objective is based on the subjective interpretation of the other's situation.

Here we have to admit that there is a limit to being objective by performing both-regarded actions. The other's inner state is inferred from observation of their external deeds since we are not able to observe the other's inner state. There could be a case where the other's inferred subjectivity, does not match their real subjectivity from their perspective.

This seems to be an unavoidable moral limit. In moral actions, as we do not know what is right but we do what we think is right, so we consider not what others think, but what we think of them. This is an unavoidable moral limit as long as human diversities are maintained in different moral situations. Theoretically, the limit of morals in being objective could be overcome, if we were able to see and perceive the other's inner state, as we observe our own internal state, and act on the basis of this perception. However, practically, this is not possible as a non-perspectival view is not possible. Early Buddhism

361 John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83.

and classical Confucianism seem to accept the unavoidable moral limit and do not look for a pure non-subjective objectivism in moral actions, just as they do not look for a non-perspectival perspective in epistemology.

To understand both systems' position of recommending self-regarded action in the conflict situation, we should consider the naturalistic position of both ethical systems. They are not completely against human nature. They do not attempt to ignore a certain part of human nature. To follow self-regarded action is human nature, and would be more natural than to follow other-regarded action when we cannot carry out both. Moreover, to follow self-regarded action is not "selfish" since it does not cause harm to others.[362] It, as self-interested action, should not be abandoned for the sake of the welfare of others.

However, one may think that taking self-regarded action in a situation of conflict situation goes against the middle way between egoism and altruism by falling into egoism. Furthermore, one may look for a compromising way between both. James Sterba suggests one way to compromise. According to his "Standard for Reasonable Conduct," one can sometimes give priority to self-regarded action, and sometimes give priority to other-regarded action. For example, a high-ranking self-regarded action would have to be preferred to a low-ranking other-regarded action, and a high-ranking other-regarded action would have to be preferred to a low-ranking self-regarded action.[363] This way

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362 Here one point needs to be clarified: Either self-regarded or self-interested action should not be considered as immoral. Cottingham is right when he said that we must, as Aristotle did, make a distinction between "self-interest" and "selfish"; "by selfish conduct we mean actions done at the expense of others, which ride rough-shod over the interests of others; and to say that such conduct cannot be justified ethically does not at all entail that no self-interested act is ethically justifiable" (Cottingham 85).
363 James Sterba, How to Make People Just: A Practical Reconstruction of Alternative Conceptions of Justice (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988) 168-69.

provides the third criterion for moral actions without rejecting the basic moral thesis of both-regarded action. It may be easy to say that we can choose either of the actions by compromising the choices under the third moral criterion. This seems to be an appealing and better way of maintaining the two systems' ethical position. However, even in this way, we are not free from making a choice. The only difference is that this way performs either acts of egoism or of altruism by the third moral criterion, while choosing either egoism or altruism performs either those of egoism or of altruism for egoistic or altruistic reasons. On the other hand, this criterion raises another problem: How we can decide which action is to be highly or lowly ranked. In order to decide this, we may need other criteria.

CONCLUSION

1. In this study,[364] I examined early Buddhist ethics in a comparison with classical Confucianist ethics from the perspective of self-transformation. This study shows more similarities than differences. In spite of the differences in historical background, in their analyses of human nature, and in their metaphysical background of morals, the early Buddhist ethical framework of self-transformation is similar to that of classical Confucianism. There are similar patterns of thought regarding how to practice morals for the purpose of self-transformation, or ultimately for the final moral goal of ***nibbāna*** or *tao*.

In conclusion, I shall recapitulate the result of this study briefly and interpret the final moral goal in the framework of the two ethical systems. Furthermore, I shall consider the pattern of the life of the self-transformed one.

2. The self-transformative perspective is justified in both ethical systems. The empirical self as an agent of self-transformation is accepted. The self is neither illusory nor a substantial entity. It is identical diachronically since the self continues in its identity and unity. In changing the self, the self maintains its sameness. Change and sameness coexist.

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364 One may wonder whether this study reveals the whole ethics of early Buddhism in comparison with that of classical Confucianism. In fact, this study did not intend to explore all ethical problems and issues in the two traditions. Rather, it intended to explore early Buddhist ethics and bring a deeper understanding of it from the pragmatic position. In the process of exploration, it intended to question popular belief, such as that early Buddhism is only self-liberation-seeking soteriology and classical Confucianism is only social welfare concerned (ignoring individual welfare). On the other hand, one may wonder and notice an underlying intention of this study, which is to present some useful sources to improve the present ethical situation. This intention is based on my belief that one of the main tasks of studying traditional ethics is to rediscover, re-interpret, and highlight it properly here and now. I think this study achieves this intention to some degree and presents some utilizable sources for the present situation where a moral paradigmatic person is lacking and only rules or laws are dependable.

Even though early Buddhism and classical Confucianism do not share common ideas regarding human nature, they agree that a person's dispositions and personality can be gradually changed, is malleable, transformable, and improvable. Every human has the potential to formulate a better personality through exerting effort. In making such efforts, basic necessities and a desirable environment must be provided.

Kamma and rebirth theory and the notion of *t'ien* (heaven) as the metaphysical ground of morals are presented in order to explain why and for what reason one should be moral. In early Buddhism, everyone is in continuous wandering (***saṁsāra***) unless one completes transforming dispositions and achieves the moral goal. Depending upon what one has done, one may travel in continuous wandering and suffer throughout many lives. The reason for being a moral person by transforming the self is to be free from the wandering world.

The framework of the metaphysics of morals of classical Confucianism shown in the notion of *t'ien* is very different from that of early Buddhism. Every human has a virtue that is given by *t'ien*. However, the given virtue or endowed morality does not grow naturally. One should let it grow by making efforts. It is significant that even though both ethical systems present the grounds of morals in different modes of thought, they put humans in the center of the ethical systems in establishing moral ideas and reasons. Morals are not for morals themselves but for human good. In this aspect, their moral systems are closer to a utilitarian position than a deontological one.

In transforming the self, self-restraint/self-overcoming and compassion/benevolence are essential virtues. Both virtues are interconnected. However, a certain level of development

of the former is required in order to achieve the latter. The way of self-restraint/self-overcoming is perceived in the middle way that requires one to exercise autonomy. A sense of self-restraint/self-overcoming generates autonomy, self-respect, and self-confidence, which are fundamental for the realization of compassion/benevolence. Also, it is perceived as a type of self-assertion which provides a springboard for self-modification, self-improvement and self-transformation. In the process of self-restraint/self-overcoming, the reflective methods, concentration (*samādhi*) and reflection (*ssu*), are crucial tools. However, they are not the same in their applications. On the other hand, the emphasis of self-restraint/self-overcoming is significant in the sense that it reveals the important features of their ethical thinking: (1) Virtues and morals are emphasized in the domain of the self alone without undermining them in the domain of social interactions as well. (2) The self plays a crucial and ultimate role in making moral judgments and actions. (3) The ethics of the two systems can be characterized as ethics of building a character which rejects the notion of "moral luck" and hard determinism.

The underlying theory of the development of compassion/benevolence is the principle of extending from those who are more closely related to those less closely related. Psychologically, the virtue is based on self-oriented motivation: I want to be cared for, so I care for others. This does not undermine the value of the virtue because it always looks for both-regarding action; neither only self-regarding nor only other-regarding action is pursued. From the perspective of justice, the position of both-regarding action is significant. It rejects the utilitarian principle of maximum happiness and also self-sacrifice. Their notion of justice tells us, as does Rawls, that even one single person's interest or

welfare should not be sacrificed for the good of many. On the other hand, sympathetic feeling and reason are interconnected and cooperate with each other dynamically in generating, extending, and developing the virtue. This leads us to see another characteristic of the virtue: The framework of the virtue reflects a Humean and a Kantian perspective, because the virtue is grounded on concrete and experiential relationships, and yet moves on up to an abstract and non-experiential level. However, its main framework remains in the relational, experiential, and contextual domain. In this aspect, its framework agrees with the feminist analysis of care. The virtue is also perceived as an ordinary virtue: As Rawls thinks, it is not extraordinary and supererogatory.

In responding to society, the self-transformed person has a responsibility to realize the virtue through educational and political participation. Although the two systems adopt education as a tool for realizing the virtue, their motivations and reasons for education are not the same. In one system, the motivation is based on the attitude of sharing the doctrine, and the intention to free people from suffering. In the other system, the motivation is based on the intention to help and serve people. For the former, teaching activity is required for the happiness of both oneself and others, since the principle of dependent arising implies that one's happiness is inseparably related to that of others. Similarly, for the latter, the final goal of education is to benefit all people, since learning eventually aims to benefit them and to pacify the whole world.

Holding the common view that the aim of politics is to benefit people, the two systems share similar political ideas. Politics is based on morals. Being based on a ruler's moral quality, emphasized in the concept of "the two wheels of *dhamma*"/"inner sageliness and

outer kingship," politics should conduce to the people's morality. In a similar context, elected by people for his moral quality, the ruler is taken to be a problem solver, protector, carer, and mental labourer rather than a monarch wielding absolute power. The political principle expressed in a repetitive phrase, "maintaining righteousness"/"rectifying names," reveals the recognition of the diversities of human affairs and of goods, and the hesitation in formulating absolutely applied political rules and methods. Thinking that the best politics should reflect the differences of individuals and situations, they allow flexibility in politics (and morals). This line of thought reflects a modern legal realist position.

In spite of the absence of the presentation of specific political rules and methods, we perceive the moral principles in politics. Politics should be based on compassion/ benevolence. So politics based on punishment and formal law is not encouraged. Furthermore, politics aims at correcting people on the basis of each individual's autonomy. To put this another way, politics appeals to each individual's autonomous morality.

There is a positive correlation between wealth and morality in both systems. Moral actions bring more wealth. As long as one lives in a right and diligent way, accumulating wealth is desirable and encouraged. The early Buddhist unique notion of giving (***dāna***), sharing wealth or sharing what one owns without any expectation in return, is an active and efficient way of practicing compassion. The virtue of giving is understood as an alternative way to solve the problem of redistribution. This way of redistribution is solely based on each individual's moral consciousness rather than external force or a legal system.

With regard to objectivity of the virtue, both systems share a common view. First, they do not separate factual knowledge from moral practice. Epistemologically, this position is based on their pragmatic position; they do not get deeply involved in any metaphysical issues that are not related to moral life. This necessarily reflects their middle way position between substantialism and nihilism, and the attitude of giving equal weight to both the subject and the object. Second, compassion/benevolence is a universally acceptable objective virtue. However, its universal acceptability does not mean absolute acceptability without any exceptions. The term objectivity is understood not in an absolute way but in a flexible way. This shows the flexible nature of the virtue and also morals in their applications considering the diversities of individuals and situations. The flexible nature of the virtue and morals rejects both absolute yes and no. The two ethical systems are open-ended with regard to possible changes and modifications regarding perceptions of phenomena and values based on them. Yet, they do not allow arbitrariness or a strong sense of relativism. On the other hand, the flexibility is grounded on their ethical position regarding morals: Morals are not for morals themselves but for human good. Third, with regard to the objectivity of the virtue in practice, the two traditions suggest that one can be impartial by taking both-regarding actions.

3. Perhaps, since the purpose of transforming the self is to achieve the highest moral goal, ***nibbāna/tao***, we should consider how it should be understood in the light of the self-transformed person. First, let us consider the structural components of ***nibbāna/tao*** in the framework of the two systems and then consider the pattern of the life of the self-transformed person.

It is argued that the self-transformed person is required to practice compassion/ benevolence in the framework of both-regarding action in order to achieve the moral goal. This implies one should not be isolated from others for that purpose. That is why the Buddha had to rise away from the joy of the enlightenment under the tree and come back to the society that he left. Similarly, Confucius and Mencius wanted to get involved in politics in thinking that it is an efficient way to benefit people. In a word, for the transformed person, "sociability" is a requirement in order to be a perfected person. Rawls expresses this idea: "It is a feature of human sociability that we are by ourselves but parts of what we might be."[365] This leads us to understand the goal in the context of society without undermining the dimension of the individually--achieved virtue, self-restraint/self-overcoming, to some degree.

Nibbāna cannot be incarcerated in a personal state of experience. This is because, although it requires a personal experience, it always involves relationships to others. The knowledge of one's interdependence with others, calls one to complete one's perfection in relationship with others. Interdependence seems to be constituted of two components: deterministic and indeterministic. First, the interdependence is decided by the context determinately given to each person. For example, we are determined to be a biological son/daughter of certain parents in this very modern society; we are determined not to be connected with any people of the past or future society. The range of our cultural values are limited and determined in the sense that we are not able to encounter the cultural values of any other society at any other times. Second, interdependence is determined by

365 Rawls 529.

our will and choice. Depending upon our personal preference, we can make various interdependent connections by choosing different groups within the boundary of the determined context. We can have our own unique values in the boundary of shared or determined values.

Similarly, *tao* has two structural components in the determined scope of social context and in the undetermined scope of social role. Understanding *tao* in the human relational world leads one to see one's own place determined in the social context. The place is determined in the connection with others in that one cannot choose and change certain conditions. Yet *tao* allows one to exercise autonomy in a certain scope of life. On the one hand, one may be determined as a particular human being in a certain social and historical context, and on the other hand, one is undetermined in the performance of one's own particular role. In order to identify one's deterministic component in the whole context of the other-related world, one needs to know the mandate of Heaven. Individually created indeterministic *tao* that is individually performed virtue (*te*) is not to be separated from the contexually perceived deterministic *tao*.

In this way, both ***nibbāna*** and *tao* can be explained within a similar framework. Their deterministic and indeterministic components imply other characteristics. Their deterministic component in the social context will provide commonality among different individuals. For example, regarding my values I may have more commonality with contemporary people in this social context than with other people in any other social context any other time. This commonality in the ground of universality provides shared values and a shared life. The indeterministic component of ***nibbāna/tao*** allows one to have

diversity and particularity by exercising autonomy and creativity. ***Nibbāna/tao*** needs to be interpreted under the consideration of the two components: a indeterministic component within a deterministic component, or particularity within commonality. So each person's experience of ***nibbāna*** and realization of *tao* consist of the two components.

The deterministic and indeterminstic component of the ***nibbāna/tao*** can be also explained in terms of communitarianism and liberalism. While communitarianism emphasizes community, relationships, commonality, universality, context, and the unity of each individual, liberalism emphasizes individuality, particularity, autonomy, creativity, diversity, and plurality. The deterministic and indeterministic components are connected with the communitarian and liberal components respectively. In our belief and moral life, both components cannot be opposites or contradictions because they coexist.[366] They are co-constituents of the realization of ***nibbāna/tao***. So in the framework of the realization of ***nibbāna/tao***, we should reject the bifurcation between the two components, and we should not emphasize one over the other. This is based on the ethical position of the two systems: they equally emphasize both the commonly shared social context and the individual's autonomy. Their moral framework takes both the communitarian and liberal components in seeking both other- and self-regarding action. Therefore, the completion of self-transformation is the realization of the self through interaction with others in a social context. So completion of self-restraint/overcoming as the virtue of cultivating autonomy

[366] Furthermore, one needs the other. For example, an individual's autonomy and its exercise require community. As Margaret Moore rightly argues, the development of the individual's autonomy is not defined in opposition to community. "Rather, community is a necessary condition for the possibility of autonomy: the community is necessary to the development of the person's own powers of self-control and self-mastery and competence." Margaret Moore, Foundations of Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 184.

of the self necessarily involves a completion of compassion/benevolence as the virtue of presupposing commonality in society.

Within the framework of ***nibbāna/tao***, consider the mode of life of the ***nibbānic***/*taoic* person. His/her mode of life is to be structured on the communitarian components and then flavored by the liberal components. His/her life has a distinct flavor based on the liberal components, yet sharing the common communitarian ingredients. His/her actual pattern of life can be described as follows: Holding perfectly wholesome dispositions in thinking, talking, and acting, he/she follows his/her desire, which naturally fits his/her own and other's good. His/her desire naturally fits the good of both self and others because his/her wholesome dispositions are obtained in moral practices based on the two components.

In the two ethical systems, the significance of cultivating the perfectly wholesome dispositions pertains to the maintenance of right habits. Holding to the perfectly wholesome dispositions and so maintaining the right habits without losing them even for one single moment seems to be a crucial condition that distinguishes the self-transformed one from the ordinary person. The ordinary person may hold wholesome dispositions and perform right actions, but his/her dispositions are not always perfectly wholesome and his actions are not always right. In other words, he/she will not be successful in making a habit of acting rightly with wholesome dispositions. For the self-transformed one, performing right actions in the perfectly wholesome dispositions is habitual. Therefore, he/she would not need to make special efforts to keep his/her moral ideals because they are firmly embedded in his/her pattern of life in thinking, talking, and acting. This is why,

once he/she achieves ***nibbāna/tao***, he/she hardly commits even a single mistake. For this person, unlike Kant's moral person, there does not seem to be a possibility to relapse into old dispositions.[367] He/she must be a person who "accomplishes the noble way of life" (***vusitam brahmacariya***)[368] or "follows his/her heart's desire without overstepping morality."[369] He/she as a fully transformed person is a worthy one (***arahat***) or a virtuous one (*chün tzu*). However, in spite of the common characteristics of the self-transformed person in the two traditons, there is a crucial difference regarding his/her future life. From their moral metaphysics we observe this: While no further rebirth in the continuously wandering world is promised for the ***nibbānic*** one, nothing is known about *taoic* person's future life.

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367 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960) 71. For Kant, the achieved one is always vulnerable to relapse to old dispositions.
368 M 2. 39.
369 2-4.

APPENDIX

Chinese Glossary

ai 愛
cheng 政
ch'eng 誠
cheng ming 正名
ch'i chia 齊家
chiao 教
chih 知
ch'ih 恥
chih kuo 治國
chih sheng 知生
ching 敬
chung tao 中道
chün chün, chen chen, fu fu, tzu tzu 君君臣臣父父子子
chün tzu 君子
chung 忠
fa 法
fang hsin 放心
fu 富
gong 恭
heng hsin 恆心
ho 和
hsiao 孝
hsiao jen 小人
hsin 心
hsin 信
hsing 性
hsing 刑
hsing 行
hsiu wu 羞惡
hsüeh 學
hsiu shen 修身
jen 仁
jen hsin 仁心
jen hsing 人性
jen yi cheng chih 仁義政治

ji 祭
jie xiong t'i 皆兄弟
ke chi 克己
ke chi pu li 克己復禮
ko 格
lae 來
li 禮
li 利
li 力
nei sheng wai wang 內聖外王
pien 辨
p'ing t'ien hsia 平天下
pu jen chih hsin 不忍之心
qin 勤
quan tao 權道
qui shen 鬼神
sheng 聖
sheng jen 聖人
shih 士
sheh fei 是非
shih jen 事人
shu 恕
ssu 思
ta jen 大人
tao 道
te 德
te chih 德治
t'i 弟
t'ien ming 天命
ts'ai 材
ts'e yin 惻隱
tuan 端
t'ui 推
tz'u jang 辭讓
yang 養
yang hsin 養心
yi 義
yu 友

yue 悦
wei cheng 為政
wu ko wu pu ko 無可無不可
wu wei 無為
zheng 征
zhi 直
zhu 誅

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